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I think men and women deserve social equality, and this is reflected in the language of my thesis: 
In order to highlight that I am referring to both men and women I will use male and female 
pronouns alternately. 
 1 Introduction
This thesis deals with the fascinating concept that what people say does not only depend on the 
individual and his or her thoughts but also on the conventions that are established in the social, 
cultural  or ethnic  group that  he or  she is  part  of.  These conventions  vary from language to 
language and from culture to culture – thus, sometimes making it hard for us to communicate 
successfully. The success of our communication depends on the knowledge that we have of the 
conventions of the culture of our conversation-partner. Being aware that these differences are a 
challenge in  inter-cultural communication, certain scholars have devoted time and effort to find 
out  what  these  conventional  differences  are,  how  they  affect  language  learners  and  people 
communicating in a foreign surrounding.
 This thesis operates in the realm of pragmatics, the part of linguistic studies that deals 
with language and its users in a social context. The term “pragmatics” as it is used nowadays was 
first brought up by Charles Morris in 1938. He defined it as the branch of semiotics1 that deals 
with the relation of signs to interpreters (Levinson 1991: 1) and thus with the psychological, 
biological and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs (Morris 1938: 
30). This rather broad definition was narrowed down according to its various usages in different 
fields of study, of which one is Anglo-American linguistics and philosophy (Levinson 1991: 5). 
But even here, research is done in different fields of interest, making it impossible to narrow 
down the term pragmatics to one definition and still giving full credit to the work being done. 
Levinson takes the interested reader on a tour through the world of pragmatics, pointing out the 
various definitions with their advantages and drawbacks (Levinson 1991: 1-35). Mey (2001), on 
the other hand, brings himself to propound the following definition: “Pragmatic studies the use 
of language in human communication as determined by the conditions of society” (2001: 6). He 
also utters his doubt concerning “clear, sharply demarcated boundaries”. Pragmatics, he states, is 
in constant development, thus boundary markers once placed will have to be moved. (2001: 7). 
One of the basic facts about pragmatics is that it is interested in the language user. (Mey 
2001: 5) It does not care about thought up conversations and the meaning of sentences and words 
but rather about the meaning of a speaker's utterance and how it is understood by the hearer. In 
short, pragmaticists2 care about language as it is used in real life situations. The branch that is of 
1 The study of signs
2 Levinson (1991:9) uses this term to refer to people working in the field of pragmatics. Robinson (2006:87) refers 
to them as pragmaticians. 
1
most importance for this paper is inter-cultural pragmatics, which focusses especially on how 
cultural  values  and  cultural  norms  shape  the  interaction  of  the  speaker  and  the  hearer 
(Wierzbicka 1991: 2). Analysing this link between language and culture comes with difficulties 
and uncertainties which Wierzbicka is keen to explore. She claims that cross-cultural pragmatics 
is vital to human concerns and that it is worth taking “the risk of errors and blunders” in this field 
of  study  as  the  questions  to  be  discussed  within  and  the  insights  to  be  gained  are  truly 
worthwhile (1991: 283). 
This is also the opinion of the pragmaticists working on the Cross Cultural Speech Act 
Realization Patterns (CCSARP) project (Blum-Kulka et.al. 1989: 2) who did research on speech 
acts  and  the  varieties  they take  across  a  range  of  languages.  This  project  attracted  a  lot  of 
attention and support in its time and even now, more than twenty years after its foundation, 
researchers are using the coding scheme developed by the CCSARP (cf. Afghari  2007: 178, 
Kasanga  2007:  65).  The  CCSARP project  shows  that  problems  that  occur  in  inter-cultural 
communication are “often the direct results of differences in systems of conversational inference 
and cues for signalling speech acts which combine to form the culture's distinctive interactional 
style.” (1989: 6). 
The purpose of this thesis is to find out whether a culture's distinctive interactional style 
can be tracked down in the public speech act of apology.  While study groups like the CCSARP 
research  into  speech  acts  in  a  very  personal  area,  like  apologies  and  requests  between 
individuals, the focus in this diploma thesis is put on the public area and how apologies,  or – to 
use Benoit's (2000) term for this broad concept –  image repair work,  is carried out.  
I  assume  that  the  above  mentioned  connection  between  language  and  society  also 
influences how image repair work is conducted and will analyse examples of public image repair 
work from two different cultures. According to Coulmas, apologies are a good choice for such an 
endeavour, because they “exist as generic speech acts in every speech community” (1981: 81). 
And even though apologies tend to be highly routinised, each speech community has its own 
way of expressing them, thus maybe revealing some of its norms and values (ibid.). 
When it came to choosing the cultures that I would be analysing, my experience played 
an important  role.  Various holidays  in  the UK gave me the feeling that  customers there are 
treated with more care than in my home country, Austria.3 I gained this impression first of all in 
British supermarkets, where I felt that I did not have to queue up that long at the checkouts and 
3 The following examples are not meant to be  proof of anything, they should simply show the reader how I came to 
choose my topic. 
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was treated friendlier  by the cashiers.  Further,  experiences  with British and Austrian waiters 
added to my suspicion that customers are deemed higher in the UK than they are in Austria. 
Discussing these thoughts with (British) friends, I was supported in my ideas and got interested 
in finding out more about this. 
I will take these two examples as starting points for this thesis' first research question: Is 
there a difference in value of public and customer relations between the UK and Austria? Of 
course, tackling this problem involves research into the relevant areas of study and relying on 
theories and approaches that have been established and worked with before. This will be done in 
the next chapters. 
I.  Theoretical Background
 2 Speech act theory
Why speech acts are of such importance for anyone dealing with language and how it is meant 
and understood is pertinently summed up by Wierzbicka in the introduction to her dictionary of 
speech act verbs:
“Public life can be conceived as a gigantic network of speech acts. […] Virtually 
every time someone opens his or her mouth in our presence we seek to categorize 
their  utterance as this  or that  kind of speech act.  […] Speech act  verbs […] are 
crucially important to the way we perceive the world we live in – the world of human 
relationships and human interaction.” (1987: 3)
Let us start off with a look at how speech act theory came into existence. 
 2.1 A brief history 
Speech act theory was introduced by John L. Austin who is remembered for having shook the 
world of philosophy by claiming that we use language not only for describing the world around 
us. He pointed out that sentences can be more than mere true or false statements and separated 
the things that we say into constatives and performatives. Constatives being the aforementioned 
statements that are either true or false, and performatives being the new concept of performing a 
certain  kind  of  action  through  words.  Thus,  by  saying  something  we  can  also  be  doing 
something.
Austin  gives  the  following  example  of  a  performative  speech  act.  In  the  marriage 
ceremony, by saying “I do” you are marrying your partner. You are not doing anything else 
which you  are  reporting  on  by  saying  these  words,  it  is  these  words  themselves  that  are 
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performing  the  action  of  marrying.  Other  examples  of  performative  speech  acts  include 
christening a ship or sentencing someone to prison, but we do not have to leave the realm of 
everyday  speech  for  finding  them:  Promising,  inviting,  threatening,  betting,  congratulating, 
apologizing, etc. are also examples of performative speech acts. When talking of performatives 
one cannot say that they are true or false as one can do with constatives. However, performatives 
can most  certainly go wrong.4 Austin put a lot  of thought  into how acts  that  are performed 
through speech (marrying, betting, promising, etc.)  can end up as failures and summed up his 
conclusions under the name of infelicities. Furthermore, he sees it as his task to establish clear 
criteria to classify all the performative verbs (i.e. verbs with which we do something rather than 
state something). In the course of doing this, however, he finds that he is dealing with rather 
fuzzy  boundaries.  Marrying,  naming and  sentencing are  clear  examples  of  performatives 
whereas  stating or  maintaining are  not  this  clear  and  can  be  used  in  both  constative  and 
performative utterances.5  Also, truth (which Austin first thought to be unique to constatives) and 
felicity conditions6 (which he first thought to be unique to performatives) he now considers to be 
vital to both types of utterances, not a means of distinguishing them. Eventually, Austin discards 
the constative/performative distinction and moves on to what he calls a fresh start on the problem 
(Austin 1975: 90f).
 2.2 Locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts
This fresh start first involves pinning down what 'saying something' actually is. First,  Austin 
claims, one has to utter the sounds which form words. He calls this the 'phonetic act'. One also 
has to combine these words according to certain  rules of the lexicon, grammar, intonation, etc. - 
this is the 'phatic act'. Furthermore, one uses these words with a certain meaning (i.e. sense and 
reference), which is what he calls the 'rhetic act'. These three acts together are 'saying something' 
or, as he calls it from now on, the locutionary act.
Once we have produced speech (the locutionary act) Austin asks in which way and sense 
we are using it. We could be giving information, answering a question, threatening, reassuring, 
criticizing  someone,  etc..  All  these  are  various  forces  or  purposes,  which  Austin  calls 
illocutionary acts.  To explain this, let us take the locutionary act
4 Think of a couple that is getting married in church but finds out that the person that married them was not a 
priest after all.
5 Or, to put it Searle's way (1976: 14): saying certain things constitutes getting married (performative), saying 
certain things constitutes making a promise (also performative), but saying certain things also constitutes making 
a statement (constative?). Making a statement is an illocutionary act just as promising or marrying is. 
6 Conditions that need to be fulfilled to perform a speech act successfully
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1.   I will be here tomorrow at 10.
This sentence can be uttered by the speaker with different forces/illocutionary acts behind it: it 
can be meant as a promise, reassurance, an order, a threat, a warning, etc.
Further  on,  the  effect  that  this  illocutionary  act  has  on  the  hearer  is  called  the 
perlocutionary act. It is what we bring about or achieve by saying something, the consequential 
effect that we have on the hearer by uttering an illocutionary act. If we take the example from 
above, the perlocutionary effect of  I will be here tomorrow at 10  could be that the hearer is 
scared and does not show up, it could be that she feels persuaded to be there at 10, it could be 
that  she  feels  threatened  and  shows  up  with  strong  friends  (Austin  1975:  109).  “The 
perlocutionary  act  always  includes  some  consequences,  as  when  we  say  'By  doing  x [the 
illocutionary  act]  I  was  doing  y [the  perlocutionary  act]'  ”(Austin  1975:  107).  These 
consequences may be of big or small impact or even totally unintentional.
 I will use our example one more time to distinguish the three acts clearly: He said that  
he would be there tomorrow at 10  refers to the locutionary act,  he promised that he would be 
there tomorrow at 10  refers to the illocutionary act and  he made me believe that he would be  
there tomorrow at 10 refers to the perlocutionary act. (Austin 1975).
Austin states that illocutionary acts are connected with the production of certain effects 
other than the perlocutionary effect. First, one has to make sure one is understood. As he puts it 
“I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a 
certain sense.” (1975: 116) He concludes that to perform an illocutionary act successfully, one 
has to secure its uptake, i.e. make sure that one is being heard. Further, a successfully performed 
illocutionary act takes an effect, “changes the natural course of events” (Austin 1975: 117). For 
instance, a ship that is given a certain name will be referred to by this name in the future or a 
person who is  sentenced to  two years  in  prison will  be spending two years  in  prison.  Last, 
illocutionary acts  are inviting a response.  An examples could be an order,  which invites the 
response of obedience or a promise which invites the response of fulfilment (1975: 117). 
Having  established  his  theory  of  illocutionary  acts  Austin  draws  up  a  list  of  the 
illocutionary forces an utterance can take.7 Going through a dictionary he filters out the verbs 
that carry illocutionary force and ends up with a list of thousands of verbs. These he puts into 
five  categories  (1975:  150f):  (1)  Verdictives,  i.e.  speech  acts  used  for  giving  a  verdict;  (2) 
Exercitives, i.e. speech acts used for the exercising of powers; (3) Commissives, i.e. speech acts 
7 This is very similar to the list of explicit performatives which he saw a need for before his rejection of 
constatives vs. performatives. 
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that commit you to doing something; (4) Behabatives, i.e. speech acts having to do with social 
behaviour (apologizing is part of this group);  and (5) Expositives, i.e. speech acts that make 
utterances fit into the course of an argument. This, the first of innumerable attempts to classify 
illocutionary acts,8 leads me on to John R. Searle, the second important contributor to speech act 
theory who, amongst other things, revised this taxonomy.
Searle further developed and systematised Austin's theory of speech acts. He is said to 
have improved the understanding of the relation between the three speech act types with his 
schema of an illocutionary act 'F(p)'. F being the illocutionary force that is applied upon the 
proposition p, which for Austin was the locutionary act (Martinich 2002: 95, Searle 1969: 31). 
Searle emphasises that propositions are not statements or assertions in themselves – they are 
what  is  asserted  through  the  act  of  asserting  but  in  themselves  do  not  carry  any  kind  of 
illocutionary force and therefore also cannot occur  alone.  Searle  makes clear that  “[w]hen a 
proposition  is  expressed  it  is  always  expressed  in  the  performance  of  an  illocutionary act.” 
(1969: 29). 
Searle coined the term of the illocutionary force indicating device.(1969: 30) This IFID 
indicates “[...]what illocutionary force the utterance is to have; that is, what illocutionary act the 
speaker is performing in the utterance of the sentence”(1969: 30). Illocutionary Force in English 
can  be  expressed  in  various  ways,  like  e.g.  through “word  order,  stress,  intonation  contour, 
punctuation, the mood of the verb, and the so called performative verbs” (1969: 30) and does not 
necessarily have to contain explicit IFIDS like “I apologize” or “I question”. 
Another area in which Searle sees space for improvement is Austin's taxonomy of speech 
acts. Declaring that is is defective “in its lack of clear criteria for distinguishing one kind of 
illocutionary force from another” (1976: 1) he writes his own “Classification of illocutionary 
acts” which primarily aims at providing a reasoned classification of illocutionary acts into certain 
basic categories or types. In his taxonomy Searle does not want to put the focus on  illocutionary 
verbs as those are specific to their language. Austin, he claims, only achieved a classification of 
English speech act verbs, he himself wants to go further and aims at classifying the illocutionary 
acts which are part of any language (1976: 8). 
8 Cf. chapter 3.1 
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 2.3 Searle's taxonomy of speech acts
 2.3.1 Conditions 
As basis for his taxonomy Searle names  “illocutionary point, and its corollaries, direction of fit 
and expressed sincerity conditions“ (1976: 10). First, the illocutionary point is the purpose of an 
illocution. It is different to the illocutionary force as it does not take into account the various 
degrees  an  illocutionary  force  can  have.  Thus,   requests  and  commands  which  are  clearly 
different in force have the same illocutionary point, namely  getting the hearer to do something 
(1976: 3). 
Second, direction of fit,  is a consequence of the illocutionary point.  It shows whether 
through the speech act the speaker attempts to change the world according to his words (as is 
done in e.g. requests, where the hearer is asked to act according to the words of the speaker) or 
whether  the  speaker  attempts  to  match  his  words  to  the  world  (as  is  done  in  explanations, 
statements or descriptions) (1976: 3f). 
Third, the sincerity condition is the psychological state expressed in the performance of 
the illocutionary act.  This  refers to what  has to be the case for the speaker so that  she can 
perform  the speech act in question – a sincerity condition is intrinsic to the notion of the act. For 
example, the sincerity condition for promising is that the speaker intends to do what it is that she 
is promising; the sincerity condition for asserting is that the speaker believes that it is true what 
she is asserting.  When a sincerity condition is  not satisfied and the speech act  is performed 
nevertheless, this is called a defective9 illocutionary act. With this background knowledge we can 
now have a look at Searle's five categories of speech acts. 
 2.3.2 Categories
(1)  Representatives.  They have  the  purpose to  “commit  the  speaker  (in  varying  degrees)  to 
something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition.”(1976: 10). Direction of fit 
here is words to world,10 and the sincerity condition is that the speaker believes in what he says. 
This class contains many of Austin's expositives and verdictives. 
(2)  Directives.  Their  illocutionary  point  is  to  get  the  hearer  to  do  something.  Their 
direction of fit is world to word,11 and the sincerity condition is that the speaker really has the 
wish or desire which he communicates through this speech act. Many of Austin's behabatives 
9 The term defective is closely related to Austin's infelicitous (Searle 1969: 54)
10 I.e., the speaker tries to match his words to fit to the world.
11 I.e., by uttering a directive, the speaker tries to change the world according to his words.
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(like daring or challenging) as well as some of his exercitives fit into this category. 
(3) Commissives. These illocutionary acts commit the speaker to some future course of 
action. They aim to make the world fit to the words12 and their sincerity condition is intention. 
Searle takes over this class from Austin but excludes some of the verbs that Austin saw fitting 
here, like e.g. intending.
(4) Expressives.13 They are used to express the speaker's attitudes about the state of affairs 
represented by the propositional content. There is no direction of fit but the hearer is expected to 
believe that the proposition expressed by the speaker is true. Sincerity condition thus is, that the 
speaker has the feelings that he expresses in this speech act. As examples Searle names amongst 
others apologizing, thanking and congratulating. 
(5) Declarations.  They are what Searle calls a “very special  category of speech acts” 
(1976: 15). With speech act verbs of this class, through applying the IFID and through saying 
that something is the case, this something becomes the case.14 If a declaration is successfully 
performed it changes the status or the condition of the referred-to object. Examples are “You are 
fired” or “ I appoint you chairman”. Declarations do not have sincerity conditions. 
This classification of speech acts is the one most widely used and often seen as the final 
word  on  the  matter  (Robinson  2006:  82).  It  is,  however,  greeted  with  different  levels  of 
enthusiasm. Martinich (2002:  95) highly praises Searle's  taxonomy when he writes that  it  is 
intuitively  satisfying,  semantically-based  and  has  several  especially  neat  aspects.  Others, 
however, are not that  overwhelmed and move on to create their own taxonomies. Ballmer and 
Brennenstuhl (1981), for example,  set out to test Austin and Searle's taxonomies on German 
verbs and, being unhappy with the result, end up proposing a more holistic taxonomy of speech 
acts  themselves.  Vendler  (1972) adapts Austin's  classification and adds two more categories. 
(Robinson  2006:   82).  Bach  and  Harnish's  taxonomy15 (http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach 
/spchacts.html., 17 September 2010) focuses on the type of attitude that is expressed through the 
illocution.  Wierzbicka  (1987:  3)  on  the  other  hand  does  not  share  the  enthusiasm  for 
12 Even though commissives and directives are very much alike (they have the same direction of fit), Searle prefers 
not to sum them up under one category, because that would imply that promises are some kind of request to 
oneself. For more details see Searle (1976: 12).
13 Searle's explanation of expressives in “Foundations of Illocutionary Logic” (1985: 211) is much clearer in my 
opinion. Therefore I use this one rather than the definition given in “Classification of illocutionary acts”: “The 
illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a 
state of affairs specified in the propositional content.” (1976: 12)
14 Declaratives neither have world to word nor word to world fits but bring about a fit if they are performed 
successfully (1976: 14)
15 Based on both Austin and Searle's taxonomies
8
categorisation and criticises Searle and his taxonomy companions for their inclination to classify 
before analysing. She cannot see why they would develop neat categories for speech act verbs to 
fit into before having analysed how they work in detail. To her, the analysis of the single speech 
act words is of greater importance.
 Overall,  one has to bear in mind that any attempt to put all the speech act verbs into 
categories can only be partial and focuses on the aspect most important to the author. This could 
be seen as a drawback if one cared deeply for putting things into categories – or, one could look 
at  it  through Robinson's  (2006:  87)  eyes  and appreciate  “the rich creative variety of  human 
verbal actions”.
 2.4 Universality of Speech Acts 
The  idea  of  universality  in  general  refers  to  the  highly  discussed  concept  that  there  are 
“transcendent features that any natural language must possess in order to be able to fulfil its two 
basic  functions  of  expression  and  communication”  (Vanderveken  2002:  25).  In  this  paper 
however, the notion of universality shall be discussed in the light of speech act theory. Searle 
claims that his work is “an attempt to give philosophically illuminating descriptions of certain 
general  features  of  language,  […]  and  […]  is  concerned  only  incidentally  with  particular 
elements in a particular language.” (1969: 4) and states that throughout his work he has to pay 
attention to “actual natural languages”. Thus, when working on his taxonomy he has to consider 
illocutionary verbs, which are part of a specific language, but only to use them to get a grip on 
illocutionary acts,  which are  a part  of every language,  i.e.  universal  (1976:  8).  The specific 
language that Searle chooses to extract his universal pragmatic principles from is English. And 
he is not the only linguist drawing the ethnocentric conclusion that what is working for English 
must be working for any language. Wierzbicka (1985a) criticises Clark and Schunk (1980) for 
the same assumption that  Shoshana Blum-Kulka (1987) criticises Leech (1983),  namely that 
indirectness is a politeness indicator, not only in English but in all languages. Both Wierzbicka 
(1985a) and Blum-Kulka (1987) report on cultures where this assumption does not hold true and 
thus show that how one implies politeness into speech acts is not the same in various cultures. 
Therefore, they conclude that the realization of speech acts is not universal. Rather, speech acts 
are verbalised and conceptualised differently across languages. 
Still,  it  needs  to  be  pointed  out  that  the  notion  of  universality  is  only  deemed 
inappropriate  for  the  realization of  speech acts.  The claim that  there  are  universal  laws for 
successful performances in speech act theory (2002: 60) or the claim that some universal laws 
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are valid for illocutionary forces (2002: 47), as made by Vanderveken, shall not be contested here 
as  they are  not  of  relevance  for  this  thesis.  What  is  of  interest  though,  is  the  concept  that 
“illocutionary forces are […] natural kinds of language use” to which the performative words 
and force markers of natural languages do not correspond exactly (Vanderveken 2002: 29). This 
means that what can be done with words is the same in all languages, but that what practically is 
done, (i.e. whether and how a speech act concept is realized) can be different in each language. 
Thus, some languages and cultures realize certain illocutionary forces, which others do not. For 
example, in English one cannot break off one's marriage through the performance of a speech act 
like “I hereby divorce you” - even though in Islamic culture, i.e. under Sharia law, this can be 
done  (http://www.islamic-sharia.org/divorce-talaq/what-is-the-proper-way-of-giving-divorce-in-
islam-13.html, 16 Nov. 2010). Or, in a different culture the appliance of an illocutionary force 
might  bring  about  an  unexpected  perlocutionary  effect.  For  example,  Samoans  when 
complimented, feel obliged to offer what they have been complimented on to the complimenter 
(Holmes 1988) – a rather different reaction to what Europeans would do. To my mind, these 
fairly obvious examples of differences show very well how speech acts depend on the cultures 
they are part of. And, if one is interested in this aspect of language, one should try to find out 
also  about  subtle  cultural  differences  in  speech  act  realizations,  which  is  exactly  what  the 
researchers of the CCSARP set out to do. 
 2.5 The Cross Cultural Speech Act Realization Patterns project 
(CCSARP)
The CCSARP project16 was initiated in 1982 to investigate the cultural differences in speech act 
realization. The study group was concerned with the “repertoire of linguistic behavior [that a 
speech act,  in  their  case  requests  and  apologies,]  exhibits  in  its  performance  in  languages.” 
(Blum-Kulka et.al 1989: 2). One of the challenges in this context was the data gathering process. 
Requests  and  apologies  are  widely used  in  our  daily lives,  but  how can  a  large  number  of 
samples be obtained for  analysis?  How can one find out  about  the pragmatic  knowledge of 
people?  It  has  been  argued that  the  only reliable  method  for  collecting  data  for  speech act 
analysis is ethnographic observation (Manes & Wolfson 1981: 115). However, as this is a rather 
laborious process which comes with its own disadvantages (it is unsystematic and the social 
characteristics  of  the  informants,  like  age  or  ethnicity,  often  remain  unknown)  (Beebe  & 
Cummings 1996: 67),  the CCSARP researchers have been thinking of new methods to obtain 
16 Which was mentioned before in chapter 1
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the data needed.  The result of this endeavour is the Discourse Completion Test. 
 2.6 The Discourse Completion Test – Advantages and Drawbacks
The CCSARP researchers suggest the Discourse Completion Test (DCT) as a method fit for their 
purposes. Participants are given a handout which describes various situations and are asked to 
write down what they would say in each situation. The situations were designed to elicit a certain 
speech act, e.g. an apology. “[T]he same coding scheme [was used] for the analysis of patterns in 
different languages […] to ensure cross-linguistic comparability” (Blum-Kulka 1987: 132). 
It has been argued by Wolfson, who also worked on the CCSARP project (1989: 181), 
that the DCT cannot reveal the whole spectrum of a speech act as “one can not assume that in 
different cultures, what appears to be the same situation will result in the same speech act.” This 
means that a Canadian researcher writing a DCT with the aim of eliciting apologies, can only put 
down situations  of  which  she  knows that  one  would  answer  apologetically  in  the  Canadian 
culture. If, however, in the target culture apologies are given in situations in which one would not 
apologize in Canada, the researcher would not find out about them with the DCT. 
Nevertheless, the DCT is a rather efficient method for collecting a large corpus of data 
and finding semantic  formulas that  occur  in natural  speech (Beebe & Cummings 1996:  80), 
which makes it a much used data collecting tool. After a variety of studies17 have been published 
using this method the question arises as to how much the data gained represents natural language 
behaviour. Beebe and Cummings published a report on the DCT in 1985 (1996: 65), in which 
they encourage the use of DCT despite its many weaknesses. They compared data gained in 
telephone conversations to data gained with the DCT and state that even though the DCT data is 
less elaborate, less complex and less repetitive (Beebe & Cummings 1996: 75) it contains the 
same formulas and categories as the telephone responses. Thus, they maintain that DCT is a 
legitimate data collection method. 
Mansoor and Parvaresh (2009) do not share this  opinion.  They compared the various 
forms of DCTs18 and, analysing the results of the tests separately , they had to draw deviating 
conclusions about the Iranian culture (2009: 371). These results together with research done by 
others19 lead them to argue against the DCT. However, they do not suggest a  more suitable data 
17 For some examples see (Varghese & Billmyr 1996: 39)
18 Open Written DCT, Dramatic Written DCT, Multiple-Choice DCT, Oral DCT, Discourse Role-Play Task and 
Discourse Self-Assessment Task ( Mansoor & Parvaresh 2009: 366)
19 E.g. Yuan (2001) argues that in a DCT people fill in what they think they would say in a situation, not what they 
actually would say. 
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collecting method. Also, some of the reasons that they claim speak against the use of the DCT20 
were also identified by Beebe and Cummings (1996), but not thought to be significant. This 
paragraph should show that even a method used by such a large number of researchers over such 
a long period of  time like the DCT is not uncontroversial and that the data gained should be 
treated with care regarding possible limitations. 
 3  Private Apology – A speech act 
Apologies between individuals, or in other words, private apologies, are a well covered area in 
speech  act  research.  They  can  be  described  as  “an  interpersonal  exchange  between  two 
individuals, one who has been wronged another who is in need of absolution.” (Hearit 2006: 81). 
 3.1 Taxonomies and Classifications 
A lot of thought has been put into the form of apology, i.e. what has to be said exactly to perform 
the speech act of apologizing.  Various authors have come up with various categories for the 
different realizations of apologies. As Meier points out,21 these categories are not congruent, they 
lack a mutual system that allows comparison. She maintains that in the attempt to define Repair 
Work we are “confronted with  […] a terminological smorgasbord” and that analysing twenty-
five  treatments  of  the  speech  act  of  apology  she  found  nineteen  different  “combinatory 
renditions” (1992: 23). Nevertheless, a definition of apology is vital for our understanding of it, 
which is why some  important classifications are put forward in this chapter. 
Before, let us consider Ellwanger's view on this topic. He questions taxonomies which 
are created for their own sake (2009: 27) and maintains that a new taxonomy is not meaningful 
unless it can be used for a specific purpose, and that with so many taxonomies being around, 
authors have to show how theirs is useful in particular if they want to see it survive in academic 
discourse (2009: 20). He gives Tavuchis' work as an example of a simple and useful taxonomy. It 
consists of only four categories (“the apology given by one individual to another, that given by 
one to a collective, that offered by a collective to an individual, and that extended by a collective 
to a collective” 2009: 20) and can be used for a fast classification. Of course, different purposes 
require different categories. The following sub-chapters provide an introduction to taxonomies 
which serve different purposes and are of relevance to this thesis. 
20 Namely, that data is not as rich and complex as natural data (Mansoor and Parvaresh 2009: 371)
21 Strictly speaking, Meier is looking into definitions of Repair Work, of which apology is only a subcategory. 
However, many of the authors and their taxonomies which she mentions are those I am referring here too. (e.g. 
Fraser, Goffman, Coulmas, Wierzbicka)
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 3.1.1 The CCSARP's definition of apology 
One influential categorisation is the one developed by Olshtain and used in the CCSARP- and its 
successor-projects.22 Wolfson (1989: 180) and Meier (1992: 26) show how this terminology is 
built on six others, the first in the line being Fraser's terminology from 1981. Olshtain, who also 
worked on a taxonomy together with Cohen in 1981 and 1983 and Blum-Kulka in 1984, offered 
the final taxonomy to be used in the CCSARP in 1989. First, she gives the following definition 
of apology:
[An apology is] a speech act which is intended to provide support for the H (hearer) 
who was actually or potentially malaffected by a violation X. In the decision to carry 
out the verbal apology the S (speaker) is willing to humiliate himself or herself to 
some  extent  and  to  admit  to  fault  and  responsibility  for  X.  Hence  the  act  of 
apologizing is face-saving for H and face-threatening for S, in Brown and Levinson's 
(1978)  terms.  According  to  Leech  (1983)  […]  the  social  goal  [is]  maintaining 
harmony between S and H. (Olshtain 1989: 157)
Second, she analyses how the speech act of apologizing can be realized. She claims that the 
speaker has the following options:  (1) she can apologize through an explicit  IFID,23 like for 
example I am sorry or I apologize. This is the formulaic routinised way to perform an apology; 
or (2) give an explanation or account of the cause which brought about the violations; (3) She 
can express her responsibility of the offence; (4) offer repair; or (5) promise forbearance. Two of 
these strategies are called general – they can be used to apologize in any situation. These are (1) 
the uttering of an IFID and (3) claiming responsibility for the offence, which shows the speaker's 
willingness to admit her own fault. The other three strategies may work as an apology depending 
on the situation in which they are used.24 
Olshtain uses this  taxonomy in the comparison of three different  languages  (Hebrew, 
Canadian  French  and  Australian  English25)  and  finds  no  significant  differences  in  strategy 
selection between these languages (1989). Rather, the two general apology strategies account in 
all three languages for 60 % to 75 % of all cases, while explanations only make up 10 % of the 
data. In 2009 (Mok & Tokunaga 2009: 75) Olshtain's strategies were called “the classic five 
semantic formulas” which shows how influential this categorisation has remained even outside 
of the CCSARP.
22 The categorisation developed for the CCSARP is still used in our decade , like for example by Kim (2008) and 
Grieve (2010).
23 Which is explained in chapter 2.2
24 Especially (2), explaining why one did something that caused the offence, may add to the hearer's grief rather 
than relieve it.(Olshtain 1989: 157). 
25 Speech samples were elicited by means of the DCT
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 3.1.2 Wierzbicka's definition of apology
A different  way  to  define  apology  is  brought  forward  by  Wierzbicka.  She  aims  at 
describing  speech  acts  “inherently  intelligible”  and  “intuitively  verifiable”,  thus  avoiding 
ethnocentrism. For doing so, she uses her technical “metalanguage” which lists the semantic 
components and constituents of each speech act verb (1987: 10). She puts apologizing in the 
“Thank group” and describes what the speaker means by it the following way:
• I know that I caused something to happen that was bad for you
• I think that you may think something bad about me because of that and feel 
something bad towards me because of that 
•  I say: I feel something bad because of that
• I don't want you to think something bad about me because of that and to feel 
something bad towards me because of that
• I say this because I think I should say it to you (Wierzbicka 1987: 215)
Meier (1992: 11) believes this to be the “best formulation of preconditions or presuppositions for 
apologize or even for RW [Repair Work] in general”. 
 3.1.3 Deutschmann's definition of apology
In “Apologising in British English” Deutschmann shows that the form of an apology, the IFID, 
can be used to fulfil various functions. He classifies apologies according to these functions and 
ends up with the following three categories (2003: 44). 
First, the prototypical or 'real' apology is basically apology as we got to know it so far. It 
is  the  remedy  for  a  transgression  and  consists  of  4  components:  the  offender,  who  takes 
responsibility for the offence (even though he does not have to have caused it); the offended, 
who either perceives her/himself as such or is perceived as such by the offender; the offence, 
which is real, potential or perceived as such by the offender or offended; and finally the remedy, 
which consists  of the recognition of the offence,  acceptance of responsibility and display of 
regret (cf. Figure 2.2. in 2003: 46). Second, 'formulaic' apologies are used in situations where the 
offence is minimal and apologizing is a matter of routine, like for example when apologizing for 
social gaffes like coughing or slips of the tongue (2003: 46). Third, 'face attack' apologies are 
those which do not serve a remedial purpose. They are used as disarmers before a reprimand or 
challenge (2003: 46, 204). 
In his study of the dialogue corpus of the spoken part of the British National Corpus of 
the years 1992-3, Deutschmann found that formulaic apology is the most widely used of the 
three groups - it makes up for half of the data. It hardly ever expresses regret and takes the short 
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form of a “simple, syntactically detached IFID” (2003: 204).  'Face attack' apologies account for 
roughly ten per cent and are a bit more complex in form. The most syntactically complex form is 
used in 'real' apology, which comprises 36 per cent of the data. 
 3.1.4 Goffman's definition of apology
Goffman  (1971)  analyses  apologies  with  regard  to  social  dynamics.  He  claims  that  having 
committed an offence, an offender can be sanctioned or expelled from society if she does not 
show that she subscribes to its rules. To avoid this, she will have to do remedial work, which 
according to Goffman (1971: 109)  can take the form of a request, an account or an apology.26
The request is the only form  of remedial work that occurs before the offence. It “consists 
of  asking license of  a potentially offended person to  engage in  what  could be considered a 
violation of his rights.” (1971: 114). This is done for example, when someone says: “Can I ask 
you something personal” before asking whatever it is that might offend, thus giving the other 
person a chance to “invite the violation” which this way ceases to be one (1971: 114).
The category of accounts contains five sub-categories, which in short are all working on 
the principle that the offender, if he is able to mitigate the circumstances of the offence, shows 
that  the  offence  “is  not  to  be  taken  as  an  expression  of  his  moral  character.”  (1971:  112). 
Accounts consist of (1) denials that either the offence has happened or that oneself had anything 
to do with it (1971: 109), (2) “attempt[s] to redefine what [one] is accused of by shifting some or 
all the responsibility for the offense to [one's] accusers” (1971: 110), (3) claims, that what has 
been  done  was  not  meant  seriously but  rather  as  a  joke  and  that  if  one  had  known of  the 
consequences of one's deeds one would not have done them, (4) “claims of mitigation based on 
sleepiness,  drunkenness,  youthfulness  [etc.]”  (1971:  111);  and  (5)  the  claim  that  one  was 
“ignorant of what was to happen” (1971: 112). Altogether, these five remedial strategies can be 
called explanations, excuses and pretexts (1971: 112). 
Goffman's third category are apologies, which are “part of the system of social sanctions 
and rewards that encourage appropriate behavior”. (Wolfson & Marmor 1989: 175). They are 
“gesture[s] through which an individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an 
offense and the part that dissociates itself from the delict and affirms belief in the offended rule” 
(1971: 113). This means that the offender has to admit that he has broken a social norm, accept 
responsibility for it and express regret for having done so, thus showing that he is still a valid 
member of society who normally abides by the rules and who “now […] sees his offenses from 
26 Kathleen Gill prefers the distinction of remedial acts into denials, excuses, justifications and apologies (2000).
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the perspective of a moral-minded man.” (1971: 116). Several authors follow Goffman's line of 
thought and consider apologies as highly moral acts. 
 3.2 Apology as a moral act
Apology is considered a moral act because the apologiser “acknowledges the existence of right 
and wrong and confirms that a norm of right behavior has been broken” (Taft 2000: 1141). Gill 
claims  that  people  who  apologize  are  indicating  that  they  have  some  of  the  “basic  moral 
capacities necessary for social life” (2000: 16) and Paul Davis (2002: 171) even calls apologies 
lynch pins of moral growth. That is, he argues, because apologizing is a dialogue, in which “the 
culprit  and victim can develop (a) sharpened awareness of the transgression,  (b) appropriate 
affective response, and  (c) resolve to make the relevant moral improvements.”(2002: 17). 
This makes apology, in the eyes of certain researchers,27 the superior form of remedial 
work,  the  one  that  should  be  strived  for  and  performed  correctly,  as  only when it  is  done 
correctly and honestly the speaker and hearer can benefit of its effects. Let us now have a closer 
look at what have been claimed to be the effects that make apologies such special speech acts. 
 3.3 The mysterious power of apology
Apologies have been called “one of the most profound human interactions” which work for the 
offended parties, because they “have the power to heal humiliations and grudges, remove the 
desire for vengeance, and generate forgiveness”, as well as for the offender by “diminishing the 
fear of retaliation and relieving the guilt and shame that can grip the mind with a persistence and 
tenacity  that  are  hard  to  ignore”.  The  ideal  result  of  an  apology is  the  “reconciliation  and 
restoration of broken relationships” (Lazare 2004: 1). Lazare is not alone with his belief in the 
healing powers of apologies. Taft calls the process of apologizing a sacred act (2000: 1157) and 
Nicholas Tavuchis (1993: 5) claims that “in a mysterious way and according to its own logic” 
apology  manages  to  “resolve  conflicts  and  somehow  restore  an  antecedent  moral  order  by 
expunging or eradicating the harmful effects of past actions”. It can “rehabilitate the victim and 
restore social order” (1993: 9). A satisfying apology, he claims, has miraculous qualities: those of 
forgiveness and reconciliation, “which effectively transmute trespasses and prevent them from 
becoming permanent obstructions to social  relations despite  the inexorable  fact  of betrayal.” 
(1993: 6). Apologies are said to be healing in various ways: they restore the victims' self respect 
and dignity and assure them that the offence was not their fault, they assure both parties that they 
27 E.g.: Lazare 2004
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have shared values and can feel safe now in their relationship; furthermore, seeing the offenders 
suffering (in the process of apologizing), having meaningful dialogues with them and receiving 
reparation  is  said  to  be  of  additional  positive  influence  on  the  victim  (Lazare  2004:  71). 
Apologies are seen as a gesture of respect, which shows the victim that also the offender realizes 
that he or she has no right to treat the victim as he or she has done. By verifying this right, the 
apology is seen to have a psychological impact on the victim, which helps to restore a sense of 
self-worth and confidence (Gill 2000: 16).
 3.4 The felicity conditions of apologies
Above one can see how apologies can be a powerful tool for starting a healing process after an 
offence. However, apologizing does not always work out well. Apologies can be unsuccessful, or 
as Austin would have phrased it unhappy, and various authors have put thoughts into what needs 
to be the case, or what needs to be done for an apology to work well.
Searle states the truth conditions for apologies,which are part of his expressive category 
of speech acts, when he claims that “The truth of the proposition expressed in an expressive is 
presupposed”(1976: 12). This means that simply because he utters an apology the speaker is 
believed to feel the right kind of feelings necessary for doing so. As Meier (1992: 12) points out, 
this means that it is not actually necessary for the speaker to feel sorry – as one can apologize 
without these feelings – and still count as feeling sorry, because of the apology uttered. 
In “Foundations of illocutionary logic” Searle and Vanderveken claim that the point of 
apologizing is the expression of “sorrow or regret for some state of affairs that the speaker is 
responsible for.”(1985: 211). Therefore, they name the following two preparatory conditions for 
apologies: First, the speaker must be responsible for what it is that he feels sorry for and second, 
the proposition must be true and what is expressed in the proposition must have been bad for the 
hearer. 
Fraser mentions four assumptions that need to be true for the person who apologizes: The 
first one is, that she believes that an act has been performed before the time of the apology, 
implying that one cannot apologize for something that has not yet happened. Second, she has to 
believe that the act “personally offended” the hearer. Thirdly, the speaker believes that she is, at 
least  to  some  degree,  responsible  for  the  offence.  And  finally,  she  feels  genuine  regret  for 
committing the offensive act. (1981: 261). 
Many  authors  (e.g.  Olshtain  1989,  Taft  2000,  Gill  2000)  share  the  opinion  that  the 
offender's acceptance of responsibility and the expression of regret are the vital components of 
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an apology. This is also reflected in its form: it is the uttering of responsibility and regret that are 
said to make an apology sincere. Thus, to simply say “I apologize” without saying what for and 
adding an expression of regret does not constitute a sincere apology (Lazare 2004: 25). Lazare 
warns, that a lot of “insincere” and “cheap” apologies are uttered in the attempt to “reap the 
benefits” of sincere apologies.  These pseudo-apologies,  as he calls  them, are ineffective and 
exacerbate conditions rather than heal them. Lazare believes that many people do not know how 
to apologize correctly (2004: 138) and claims that apologies fail under the following conditions: 
(1)  if  there  is  no or  only conditional  acknowledgement  of  the offence  (which  could  be,  for 
example,  saying “I'm sorry for whatever I've done);  (2) if  there is  no expression of genuine 
remorse;  (3)  if  there  is  no  offer  of  appropriate  reparations;  and  (4)  if  the  speaker  lacks 
commitment to make changes in the future (2004: 8). 
Another insight into apologies is given by Davis who claims that there is an ideal apology 
(or as he calls it, a consummate apology), and that the closer an apology is to this ideal, the more 
likely it is to be accepted. To utter a consummate apology, the apologizer has to have the right 
kind of feelings,28 i.e. he has to “realise[...] exactly how he has transgressed, feel appropriate 
self-reproach at the transgression, and is therefore disposed to avoid this transgression in future.” 
If the offended can be convinced that all these conditions are fulfilled, it would be logical, but 
never compulsive, for him to accept the apology. If not, this could be the starting point for a 
process, in which the offender and the offended negotiate the apology. (Lazare 2004: 209, Taft 
2000: 171).  
The  notion  of  apology  as  a  process  is  widely  agreed  on.  (Lazare  2004,  Taft  2000, 
Liebersohn 2004). As Davis writes 
Relations are rarely hereby normalised, as though akin to the Queen’s naming a ship. 
Wounded  feelings,  as  is  well  known,  take  time  to  heal.  It  is  the  attempt  at 
normalisation to which the recipient agrees. So, whilst the apologiser is not entitled 
to swift normalisation, he should be able to rely on certain responses on the part of 
the recipient. (2002: 172)
This leads us to seeing apology as a speech act which  can start a process that  might lead to 
reconciliation  but  not  as  a  speech  act,  which  simply  by  being  pronounced  (and  having  its 
preconditions  fulfilled)  automatically  reconciles.  Again,  the  perlocutionary  effect  that  the 
illocutionary act of apologizing brings about need not be the effect  which the speaker hoped for. 
28 This reminds of Austin's felicity conditions
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 3.5 Genuine versus ritual (or pragmatic) apologies
Genuine apologies are those uttered for the reasons mentioned above and basically imply that the 
speaker accepts responsibility for his actions and regrets them. These circumstances are accepted 
as a first set of motives to apologize (Fraser 1981: 266, Lazare 2004: 134). However, there are 
also other motives for people to apologize. Fraser (1981: 266) points out, that sometimes people 
apologize merely to fulfil what is expected of them. Apologies for these reasons are called ritual 
apologies and an example would be a person pushing through a crowd, saying sorry at short 
intervals, without paying too much attention to the people around (1981: 266). Vollmer (1989: 
198) calls these kind of apologies mere expressions of sympathy which aim to meet  social needs 
for etiquette, but do not contain an expression of responsibility and regret. Lazare's  group of 
strategic or pragmatic apologies, basically describes the same thing. His pragmatic apologies are 
uttered  in  response  to  strong  external  pressure  rather  than  in  response  to  (strong  internal) 
feelings.  Through them, the speaker  seeks to  influence how others  perceive her and behave 
towards her. 
After Lazare's rejection of insincere apologies (2004: 8) one might expect a similarly 
harsh reaction to pragmatic apologies, but this is not the case. Lazare claims that both, apologies 
for genuine and pragmatic  reasons pursue the same goal,  namely to restore peace or family 
happiness, etc.. This aim, he maintains, is what is of value in an apology, and if a pragmatic 
apology “meets important psychological needs of the offended or […] reestablishes harmony and 
reaffirms important social values” then, to him,  it is just as good as a genuine one (2004: 158). 
Kramer-Moore  and  Moore  offer  an  insight  which  works  in  favour  of  Lazare's  indifference 
towards motives for apologizing. They rightly maintain that a hearer has no means of finding out 
what pushed the offender to apologize (2003: 162). If in doubt about the sincerity of the apology, 
the hearer might take some comfort in the fact that the apologizer is indicating that he “has the 
basic moral capacities for social  life” (Gill  2000: 16), admits  to playing by social  rules and 
acknowledges that he owes the hearer an apology. Thus, also this kind of apology is supportive 
of the hearer even though one can not know for which reasons the speaker apologized. It should 
not be forgotten that people lie, and that the two vital parts of an apology can be uttered without 
being heartfelt (Ellwanger 2009: 57), so the distinction between these two types of apologies to 
which so many people hold on, is probably not important, simply because it is impossible to 
know with which of the two types one is confronted with at the moment. Ellwanger also points 
out that all these attempts to look “behind” an apology show that researchers perceive it as a 
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descriptive speech act rather than a performative one (2009: 5). Apology being a performative 
act means that the speaker communicates that she has certain feelings, regardless of whether she 
really has them. Admitting to having these feelings can render the speaker vulnerable in certain 
aspects, which will be explained in the following chapter. 
 3.6 Disadvantages of apologizing 
“Never regret , never explain, never apologize.” Benjamin Jowett, 1817 – 1893, Oxford 
University
“No sensible person ever made an apology.” Ralph W. Emerson, 1803 – 1882, poet,  cf. Lazare 
(2004) 
These statements date back to a time when it was extremely unpopular for anyone in a position 
of  power to  apologize.  Apologizing was seen as a  sign of  weakness.  Nowadays,  we have a 
different view on apologies, which is visible in the literature, as we have seen above, but also on 
the political stage. Even for the president of the U.S.A. an official apology is not out of order any 
more.29 To acknowledge that one did wrong is sometimes even seen as a sign of strength. So why 
choose not to apologize?
Fear of rejection, Lazare claims, is one reason that keeps people from apologizing. Also, 
feelings of embarrassment and shame might stand in an apologizer's way. Interestingly enough, 
this second reason can also be one that pushes people towards apologizing, as apologizing is also 
seen as a possibility to rid yourself of these bad feelings. Further, as an apology counts as an 
admission of guilt, people may choose not to apologize for fear of being held responsible or even 
being prosecuted for what they have done.
Lazare states that for offering an apology one has to be courageous, as there are several 
risks to take. First, apologizing can make you look like you are “the original instigator of the 
unpleasantness”, because apologies are expected from the person who started the fight. Second, 
by apologizing one admits that one has done something wrong, which may provoke teasing or 
ridiculing from the person one apologizes to, or others who happen to hear the apology. Third, by 
being the one who gives way, one takes the risk of being perceived as weak; and fourth, in case 
the other  person chooses not  to accept the apology,  one may feel  rejection and humiliation. 
(2004: 142). 
Lastly, it shall be pointed out that the belief that any grudge can be healed by the mere 
utterance of an apology carries  its  own drawbacks.  If  it  is  assumed that  an apology undoes 
29  In the 1970's Nixon famously non-apologized, whereas Clinton apologized for his affair at the end of the 90s.
20
whatever has been done, the offender may choose not to change her behaviour but apologize for 
it repeatedly. This, of course, is not the point of an apology – it should rather be an “ongoing 
commitment by the offending party to change his or her behaviour” (Lazare 2004: 142). 
Also, in some cases, a mere apology may not be enough. On a small scale, this can mean 
that if I break a friend's vase and apologize without offering to replace it, my apology might not 
be taken seriously as I do not show to be concerned enough to compensate for the damage I 
caused. On a bigger scale, like for example after the U.S. government imprisoned its Japanese 
citizens in WWII because of fear of espionage, an apology surely is a starting point, but not 
enough to heal the grudge. Reparative justice, as described by Thompson (2008: 32) “asks that 
victims  are  put  in  the  situation  they  have  been  in  before  they  suffered  the  injustice  or 
compensation equal to the value they have lost.” But in most cases it is not possible to undo what 
has been done so what can be done?  The U.S. government decided to pay $20.000 to each 
Japanese  prisoner.  This gesture provoked a variety of feelings, and not only positive ones:  A 
man commented disparagingly that not only did the U.S. take four years of his life, they also put 
the price of $ 5.000 on each of his lost years and called it equal (Lazare 1995: 78). This only 
shows how delicate the question of apology and reparation is. 
 3.7 The reality of apology
Chapter 3.2 'Apology as a moral act' describes the high hopes that are projected on apologies in 
their function of reconciliation. As researchers tend to focus on the supposedly even sacred (Taft 
2000: 1157)  healing power of apology , it is often forgotten where the term actually comes from 
and what its original meaning is. 
The English term 'apology' derives from the Greek 'apologia', which means 'speech in 
defence'. As Yosef Liebersohn explains,
[Apologia] was used as a formal forensic term to describe the response speech of a 
defendant at a trial.  As a response to the ‘logos’ of the prosecutor, the defendant 
presents his counter-speech: the ‘apo-logos'. (2004: 923)
These apologias “were highly stylized statements of defence with tight and calculated logical 
arguments” (Ellwanger 2009: 37). Probably the most famous apologia is the speech given by 
Socrates to defend himself against charges of corrupting the youth of Athens, in which he attacks 
his opponents and justifies his deeds but “emphatically does not apologize” (Warner 2002) in the 
sense of apologizing today. The aim of such a speech was not merely to defend one's actions but 
to  seek  acquittal,  as  the  consequences  of  a  guilty  verdict  included  exile  and  death  while  a 
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successful speech could lead to exoneration (Downey 1993: 47). Ellwanger (2009: 42) maintains 
that apology was seen as an “exclusively defensive statement” until the end of the Middle Ages. 
Apology gained its remorseful dimension through the Catholic church’s way of 
dealing with conflict  and its close relationship and interdependence with the Medieval state. 
Trials, which in the Middle Age took place mostly in the name of treason and heresy,  were held 
jointly by religious and state power and had death as a probable outcome. Apologists would, if at 
all, receive their chance to speak only after the verdict had been brought in. They then had the 
option to choose whether or not to defend themselves, but their 'apology' could not influence the 
verdict any more. Thus, “[a]ccepting one's fate, welcoming one's death, and convincing oneself 
of the forgiveness of God merged to form the substance of medieval apologia.” (Downey 1993: 
49).  Besides, the practise of Christian confession plays a vital part in the beginnings of the 
apology  of  regret  (Ellwanger  2009:  43).  The  ritual  of  confession  has  existed  and  changed 
throughout Christian history but, as Tentler (1977) points out, four vital criteria of confession can 
be recognised over the centuries: 
[C]onfessants must “feel sorrow at having lapsed,” they must explicitly name the act 
that  is  the source of that  sorrow, they must perform some “penitential  exercises” 
whether  by  choice  or  force,  and  they  must  be  ceremonially  absolved  by  some 
religious authority. (1977:3, referred to in Ellwanger 2009: 44)
The parallels between confession and apology of regret can easily be identified30. As Ellwanger 
points  out,  the  only  difference  lies  in  the  absence  of  institutional  power,  which  led  to  the 
consolidation of point two and three.  Nowadays, one does not perform 'penitential exercises' 
prescribed by an authority– rather, the penance is seen in the articulation of the apology itself 
(2009: 59).
When  “the  monolithic  nature  of  religious  and  state  power”  (Ellwanger  2009:  52) 
dissolved, transgressions were responded to separately by state and church and “the categories of 
sin and crime were extricated” (ibid.). The Catholic church's  response to sin was a system that 
compels the wrongdoer to confess, and offers forgiveness in exchange for confession. The state 
on the other hand, gradually established new standards and stopped relying on confession for 
proving  someone's  guilt.  The  investigation,  which  shows  belief  in  the  power  to  produce 
knowledge from observation, was introduced to courtrooms, as well as the accused's right to 
speak for herself (Ellwanger 2009: 53)  Thus, 
30 Also, for example, by comparing these  four criteria to Lazare's four components of an apology, which are: 
Acknowledgement of the offence; Communication of remorse and related attitudes of forbearance, sincerity and 
honesty; Explanation; and Reparation. (2004: 79)
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[t]he tradition of apologia as a rhetorical phenomenon was reborn in the Modern era, 
but it was no longer understood as apology. The Medieval conflation between the 
discourses of defense and regret had fostered a public conception that to apologize 
was to repent and beg forgiveness. (Ellwanger 2009: 53).
This is visible not only in most people's understanding of the term “apology” but also in the 
work of researchers who deal with it. The aspect of regret is placed in the foreground, and it is 
argued (Ellwanger 2009: 36) that this is because of the assumed outstanding connection between 
the  apology of  regret  and forgiveness.  However,  forgiveness,  as  Ellwanger  claims,  does  not 
require apology.31 You can be forgiven without having apologized and you can apologize without 
being forgiven (2009: 10).  Forgiveness may be granted for 'forgivable offences' or for political 
reasons, or not at all. Also, a person who through her defence shows that she is not to blame and 
is exonerated, is in some way 'forgiven' (2009: 37).
When Aaron Lazare32 looks at apologies and finds that most of them are empty, shallow, 
hollow and cheap (2004: 8), this is because he established criteria for authentic apologies before 
analysing the several functions that apologies can have. (Ellwanger 2009: 13). By disregarding 
apology of defence Lazare only gets one half of the picture, which quite likely is the reason for 
why he sees examples of failed apologies everywhere (ibid.). 
Ellwanger argues for a reunion of the two concepts of apology and shows that apology of 
regret and apology of defence are not as different as many scholars claim. They both are “speech 
that responds to crisis” (2009: 34) and have the common potential to achieve conciliation (2009: 
37).  He argues  for  a  “hybrid  model  of  analysis  that  does  not  impose  such  a  rigid  division 
between apologia and apology” (2009: 8).
The main implication of understanding apology as any discourse that responds to 
crisis  is  that  one must  understand apology not  as  one image restoration strategy 
among others, but as synonymous with “image restoration” writ large. All apologies 
deal with defense, regret,  or both; and therefore, accounts, excuses, justifications, 
denials,  mortifications,  and  pleas  for  forgiveness  should  all  be  considered  sub-
categories of apology, not simply as alternatives to apology for maintaining one’s 
image.”  (Ellwanger 2009: 35f) 
However, the use of apology as the umbrella term for all sorts of response to crisis is not widely 
accepted yet. So far,  most researchers use the term apology only in its meaning of apology of 
31 This thought is also represented in Norrick's definition of apology : “apologizing has the social function of 
admitting responsibility for a state which affected someone in an adverse way and thereby implicating contrition 
and sometimes, asking to be forgiven” (1978: 284 in Wierzbicka 1987: 216)




 4 Public Apology
While private apologies have been common in the Western world for centuries, public apologies 
are said to have become popular only recently. The wide use of “extraordinary public acts of 
contrition” has brought forward terms like  apology-mania (Taft  2000: 1135) and it  has been 
argued that we are now living in the  age of apology (Kampf 2008, Harris 2006, Brooks 1999, 
Meier 2004), where public apologies “have become a vital part of the global culture” (Mills 
2001: 113). In this  age,  marked by social  and global tension, “apology has taken on a new 
ethical importance as a formalized discursive means to achieve conciliation and heal the cultural 
rifts hewn by the troubling events of our era” (Ellwanger 2009: 2). Public apology has been 
defined as an apology that  
is expressed in the public domain on the assumption that it is relevant to the public at 
large  and not  solely to  the  victims of  the  wrongdoing.  Public  apologies  may be 
issued by individuals purely as individuals, or by individuals acting as spokespersons 
for groups or institutions. (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002: 67f) 
This basically means that the offender in her apology not only addresses the addressee (i.e., the 
offended) but also has to consider a number of participants – who were not involved in the 
offence but nevertheless are an audience to the apologetic discourse.33  Lazare (2004: 38) shares 
this opinion when he maintains that public apologies are those made in the presence of a broader 
audience.  Harris,  Grainger  &  Mullany  (2006:  720)  report  that  applying  models  of  private 
apology to the use of public apology is both “difficult and instructive” because most people's 
experiences of apology lie only in the private domain. 
 4.1 Differentiation of terminology
 4.1.1 Apology
First, let us deal with the term apology, which has previously been discussed in chapter 3.7. It is 
widely used for statements of contrition, in which the apologizer admits that he is responsible for 
an offence and regrets it. Benoit, whose theory of image repair work is of importance in the field 
of public image repair, also defines apology this way (1997: 254).  However, taking into account 
33 Clark and Carlson (1982: 333) maintain that all illocutionary acts with more than one hearer present are not only 
directed towards the hearer (addressee), but also towards these other hearers (who they call participants), 
however, with a different message. The terms addressee and participants appear to be of value also for the public 
speech act of apology. 
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the two forms of use of  apology (i.e.,  apology of defence and apology of regret) throughout 
history and the various inconsistencies that  emerge through a biased use of the term, one is 
tempted to define apology as speech that responds to crisis, and thus include both – the aspects 
of defence and regret. 
 4.1.2 Public vs. political apology
Second, the terms  public apology and  political apology need to be described. They are 
sometimes used as synonyms, like for example by Ellwanger (2009: 4). Meier (2004) uses both 
terms but does not remark on whether or how they are different, which could mean that she also 
sees  these  terms  as  interchangeable.  Harris,  Grainger  & Mullany (2006)  deal  with  political 
apology as a subcategory of public apology and define it in terms of four characteristics: 
(1) Political apologies are in the public domain and, as a consequence, are highly 
mediated.[...]  
(2)  Political  apologies  are  often  generated by (and generate  further)  conflict  and 
controversy. […]
(3) Both an explicit IFID (illocutionary force indicating device) and a form of words 
which indicates the acceptance of responsibility and/or blame for the ‘offence’ by the 
apologizer appear to be crucial component parts of political apologies in order for the 
media and viewers to perceive them clearly as valid apologies. [...]
(4) Because they are usually in the public domain and, thus, highly mediated as well 
as often involving substantial differences in status and power between the apologizer
and the ‘victim’,  it  is  rare for the response to a political  apology to contain any 
explicit form of absolution. (2006: 720f)
These characteristics show that Harris, Grainger & Mullany's concept of political apology is the 
same as Ellwanger's (2009) concept of public apology. The only difference lies in the fact that 
Harris,  Grainger  & Mullany (2006:  719)  assume that  their  characteristics  are  valid  only for 
public apologies which “centrally involve a politician (or other prominent figure associated with 
political life) as the perceived apologizer”. Ellwanger does not impose such a restriction on his 
concept: the mechanisms that he finds to be working in the discourse of public apology he sees 
as valid for public apologetic discourse at large, regardless of the occupation of the apologizer. 
Kimoga's (2010) understanding of  political apology also does not stand in conflict with 
Ellwanger's  public apology.  Even though Kimoga and Ellwanger deal with apology in different 
ways,34 they appear to refer to the same concept when defining  public and  political apology. 
Thompson (2008), who also tackles political apology,  offers the following definition: 
34 Kimoga analyses a political letter and focuses on what the offender achieves by giving a remorseless apology. 
Ellwanger presents the to and fro between the offended and the person asked to apologize and focuses on how 
this discourse is damaging for the offender. Kimoga's work will be discussed in chapter 4.2. 
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A political  apology  is  an  official  apology  given  by  a  representative  of  a  state, 
corporation,  or  other  organised  group  to  victims,  or  descendants  of  victims,  of 
injustices committed by the group’s officials or members. (2008:31)
Her idea is different in so far as the person offering the apology has to stand for a  structured 
organization  (2008:  37).  This  differentiates  her  concept  of  political  apology  from  that  of 
Ellwanger (2009) or Harris, Grainger & Mullany (2006) who do not insist on this aspect. 
 4.1.3 Corporate apology
A third  term one  encounters  frequently when dealing  with  apology in  the  public  domain is 
corporate apology.  The wide use of this  term may be due to Benoit's  (1997a) image repair 
theory35 which deals mainly with  corporate image crises and  corporate image repair efforts. 
Benoit gives advice on how organizations can deal with attacks on their image and clarifies that 
by organizations he means “corporations, gov-ernment [sic] bodies [and] non-profit groups”. He 
(1997a: 255) also offers a differentiation of public apology into  political apology,  corporate  
apology and entertainer apology. He claims that the same rhetoric options are open to all three 
groups but that there are differences concerning what is appropriate and useful in each group.  
 4.1.4 Other concepts
Courtright & Hearit (2002: 349) use the term  organizational apologia, which not only 
includes “large, for-profit organizations” but also public and religious institutions. 
Cunningham (1999: 285) makes an attempt at a typology based on who is offering an 
apology.  His  typology consists  of  apologies  uttered  by (1)  individuals;  (2)  professional  and 
commercial organizations; (3) religious organizations; (4) spiritual leaders; (5) governments; and 
(6) heads of state. 
All these terms and definitions show that upon reading a new article about public apology 
one  is  likely to  be  confronted  with  new terminologies  and definitions.  If  this  has  not  been 
sufficiently  demonstrated  in  the  paragraphs  above,  the  following  selection  of  terms  should 
further illustrate this point:  State-to-State apology,  governmental apology (Bilder 2006),  state 
apology (Gibney & Roxstrom 2001), celebrity apology (Ingham 2007), organizational apology 
( Courtright & Hearit 2002), corporate apology (Benoit 1997a), etc. 
35 Benoit (1994) first called the topic of his study the “theory of image restoration strategies” which is also present 
in the title of his main work  Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration Strategies  
(1995). In the course of time, however, he discarded  this term and started referring to his work as the theory of 
image repair strategies (for further information see Benoit 2000). 
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 4.1.5 Conclusion
In view of this  variety of concepts,  I  suggest the use of the term public apology for 
apologies uttered in the public domain as outlined above by Govier & Verwoerd (2002), Lazare 
(2004) and Ellwanger (2009). Thus,  public apology serves as an umbrella term to which more 
specific  terms,  e.g.  political  apology (as  described  by  Thompson  2008)  or  organizational 
apology (as outlined by Courtright & Hearit 2002), are subordinate. The advantage of this is that 
the term public apology is clear and uncontroversial, and further differentiation can be achieved 
by assigning topical concepts (like those mentioned above) to subcategories.36
 4.2 Differences between public and private apologies
Some authors are of the opinion that private and public apology are very much alike because 
they are uttered to fulfil similar needs, follow the same structure and have the same sincerity 
conditions. Lazare (2004), being one of these, nevertheless also sees vital differences between 
private and public apology. 
First, he claims that in a public apology sincerity does not play such an important role.37 
Public  apologies  are  uttered  “for  the  record”  and  if  they  achieve  their  aim,  which  is  the 
restoration  of  the  offended  party's  public  dignity,  sincerity  is  not  an  issue.  Second,  public 
apologies  are often prepared with the help of others and subject to the influence of third parties, 
which makes them less spontaneous and less emotional. Also, as the focus lies on their exact 
wording, public apologies are often carefully prepared in advance. Another important factor is 
that  public  apologies  often  are  offered  in  response  to  public  pressure  and  not  because  the 
offender deems it  important to apologize.38 Lastly,  with public apologies it  is  sometimes not 
obvious  who the  offender  and the  offended were,  and  who in  fact  uttered  the  apology,  the 
offender himself or a spokesperson. (2004: 38f) Further on, Lazare (2004: 178) also mentions 
differences concerning the timing of public and private apologies39
36 There are many subcategories which have been dealt with thoroughly and I find it hard to draw the line as to 
which parts to  include in my thesis and which to leave out. Thompson (2008), for example, discusses the 
features vital to genuine political apology and Bilder (2006) highlights the reasons which governments have for 
giving an apology or for refusing to apologize. Brooks (1999) shows how state apology is closely intertwined 
with the question of compensation and analyses how this issue has been dealt with in history. All these are highly 
interesting aspects of public apology, which, however, cannot be discussed here as this would go beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
37 Sincerity in private apology, even though deemed very important by Lazare and like minded authors, is not a 
widely agreed on necessity.  Ellwanger (2009) or Kramer-Moore and Moore (2003), for example  consider the 
question of sincerity as one which cannot be answered and therefore need not be raised in the first place. (see 
also 3.5)
38 This  will be dealt with in greater detail when talking of Ellwanger's theory. 
39  Which are discussed in detail in chapter 4.3.2.3.2. 
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These  are,  one  might  argue,  excessively  strong  deviations  for  considering  the  two 
concepts as “more alike, than different”, as Lazare does (2004: 39). It is therefore important to 
point out that his focus lies on the common aim that public and private apologies have, namely 
that of conciliation, which in his point of view eclipses the different circumstances and means by 
which it is sought to be achieved.
However, this idea that public and private apologies pursue the same aim has been met 
with doubt (cf. Ellwanger 2009, Howard-Hassmann & Gibney 2008, Hearit 2006, Kimoga 2010, 
Tavuchis 1991). It has been argued, that “the more remote the apologizer the less meaningful the 
apology” (Howard-Hassmann & Gibney 2008:  6)  and that  public  apology is  a  new form of 
Realpolitik, a symbolic diplomatic move so to speak, which the apologizer performs only if it is 
in  her  own interest  (ibid.).  Howard-Hassmann  & Gibney (2008:  8)  even  consider  that  “the 
politics  of  apology  is  [...]  merely  a  cynical  type  of  symbolic  politics,  meant  to  erase  real 
injustices  from  public  memory  and  exculpate  their  perpetrators”.  McLaughlin  (1997  in 
Thompson 2008: 32) is amongst the harshest critics of public apologies when he claims that they 
are “symbolic and meaningless gestures made by leaders who have no intention of avoiding 
similar acts in the future”. It has been claimed that “apology has become a form of political 
speech with increasing significance and power” (Luke 1997: 344). Kimoga (2010) follows this 
line of thought when he claims that under certain circumstances, apology ceases to be a moral 
statement and becomes a political action (2010: 2185). This happens, for example, when apology 
is used by leaders (like heads of state) who need to appear competent and honest even in the 
trickiest of situations. In case their public image is threatened they would make any statement 
capable  of  restoring it.  To define  the political  action which he claims  apology has  become, 
Kimoga  describes  politics  as  “a  struggle  for  power  between  those  who  seek  to  assert  and 
maintain their power and those who seek to resist it” (ibid.). He claims that “the whole political 
process is a contest  and tension between power asserters and power resisters” (ibid.).  Power 
itself, he argues, can be seen from two opposing points of view: First, as the capacity to achieve 
a goal regardless of resistance; and second, as the ability to act with the approval of a group 
(ibid.).  How one chooses to see power dictates one's view on politics as well because power lies 
beneath  any political  action.  Politics  itself  “lies  at  the  centre  and  base  of  society and  thus 
permeates every social action.” An individual who shapes society is always also influenced and 
nurtured by society, which means that this individual's actions are not only of social nature but of 
political  nature  too  (ibid.).  The  language used  by such  individuals  is  political  language and 
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“concerned with presenting and selling ones positive image to others”. Apology used in such a 
context could be a “functionalistic strategy of restoring a tarnished image and reselling it to 
others”,   thus becoming “a tool of asserting and maintaining power by the offender” (ibid.). 
Apology used  in  such a  way obviously stands  in  total  contrast  to  the notion of  apology as 
reconciliatory discourse. 
This relates to Ellwanger's (2009) observation that the purpose of apology as claimed by 
many scholars (i.e., reconciliation) and the actual purpose of public apology do not coincide. 
But instead of deploring the abuse of apology and enumerating its failures, Ellwanger calls out 
for a “critical apparatus  that is attuned to what a given apology does do (and how it does it)” 
(2009: 15, original emphasis). Finding the real purpose of public apologetic discourse therefore 
lies at the heart of his work which is outlined in the following chapter. 
 4.3 Public Apologetic Discourse
In his dissertation The rhetoric of public apology, Ellwanger argues that the public use of 
apology does not focus on reconciliatory functions.  Public apology, he emphasizes, is indeed 
very different from private apology (i.a., 2009: 64)
Ellwanger observes “a new faith in the power of public apology and a willingness of the 
demos40 to solicit  such statements [of apology] from public figures who are thought to have 
committed some offense” (2009: 2f). Possible reasons for this new faith are far from obvious, he 
claims, but argues that they might be found in the following line of thought: Society holds those 
people who “live in the public eye and who enjoy an unusual degree of power (whether it be 
cultural, financial or political)” (2009: 64) to a higher standard of behaviour than private persons. 
Public figures are, however, not better at living up to such high standards, which means that they 
are more likely to commit actions perceived as offensive.  Also,  we believe that they have a 
higher obligation to stand up for their transgressions and to rectify them. Furthermore,alternative 
media (e.g. blogs) and websites (e.g.  youtube) have facilitated spreading words, which means 
that more  potentially offensive statements can be received by a larger audience (2009: 27).41 
Mass media play a role when they broadcast statements which they represents as offensive. Also, 
they  provide  a  platform  for  offended  individuals  by  broadcasting  the  resulting  call  for  an 
apology.  The apology (or the refusal to apologize) then again is distributed through the media. 
40 Ancient Greek, meaning the population or the common people.
41 Cf. also Hearit (1999: 203):  “[T]he rise of the Internet in general and newsgroups speciﬁcally have, in effect, 
greatly increased the speed by which latent publics are likely to become activist ones”.
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Ellwanger claims, that “[t]he repetition of such scenarios in the media produces a public hunger 
for these apologetic dramas” (2009: 3f). But what do such dramas achieve and who profits from 
their enactment?  These questions are answered in the following chapter. 
 4.3.1 Purpose of public apologetic discourse 
Ellwanger  (2009:  220)  observes  that  reconciliation  is  hardly  ever  the  outcome  of  public 
apologetic discourse. He claims that the reason for this is that the process of public apology has 
nothing  to  do  with  seeking  reconciliation.  On  the  contrary,  public  apologetic  discourse  is 
frequently “tense, agonistic and combative” and probably “wholly incapable of performing the 
conciliatory  work  that  private  apologies  accomplish  so  easily”  (2009:  85).42 Ellwanger  sees 
beyond the misleading common name of private and public apology and is able to discard the 
idea that public and private apology are of the same nature, i.e. striving for reconciliation. Quite 
the opposite, as he finds that public apologies are called for in order to 
punish offensive speech that is thought to negatively affect the power and status of 
particular groups within democratic society. In other  words, citizens and the media 
utilize  the  rhetoric  of  reconciliation  to  punish  individuals  whose  free  speech 
threatens a certain conception of the liberal humanistic public sphere (2009: v). 
Free speech is (said to be) of high value in the Western democratic world, which implies that 
offensive or discriminatory statements are not, and cannot, be legally prosecuted. Still, there are 
limits to what can be said publicly without causing an uproar – in the game of  Who can say 
what? (2009: 116) public figures often transgress the boundaries of the acceptable, but not those 
of the law. A solution as to how to deal with these dilemmas is offered in public apologies. They 
covertly punish legal (but intolerable) actions in the public sphere. The successful 
call elicits an apology that establishes guilt in the very moment it punishes through 
the  humiliating  spectacle  of  a  mediated  statement  of  regret  –  a  statement  that 
ultimately signifies a total submission of power to the moral authority of the masses. 
[…] Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the apology’s punitive operation is that it 
conceals its aims through the rhetoric and pretense of conciliation. (Ellwanger 2009: 
6). 
Thus, even though democratic societies claim to advocate free speech, intolerable statements and 
minor  offences  in  the  public  sphere  can  be  responded  to  with  the  “extremely  cunning 
punishment” (2009: 65) of public apology. Through the public expression of guilt the offender 
humiliates  herself and the whole apologetic spectacle suggests that she is unworthy of the power 
42 This is also represented in  Harris, Grainger & Mullany's second characteristic of political apology. 
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that allowed her to make such statements in the first place (ibid.). Also, through this discourse 
the offended parties show that they possess “the power to punish acts that would marginalize 
certain persons on the ground of their difference” (2009: 166). This refers to the “perhaps most 
remarkable aspect” of public apology: the fact that the relatively powerless are apologized to by 
powerful  actors  and  institutions  (Howard-Hassmann  &  Gibney  2008:  2).  This  way  they 
demonstrate to “the public at large the cost of disrespect, and in doing so, they illustrate the harm 
they are capable of inflicting upon those who enact such transgressions” (Ellwanger 2009: 167). 
In short,  public apology resembles  “a  discursive torture  that  enforces punishment via  public 
humiliation”  (2009:  211)  and  as  such  functions  as  a  deterrent  “that  resolves  (but  does  not 
reconcile) the crisis by ensuring against the repetition of the offense in question” (2009: 86). 
 4.3.2 Constituents of the public apologetic discourse
 4.3.2.1 The offence
The impetus for the apologetic spectacle is usually an extra-judicial offence like an action or 
speech perceived as “racist,  sexist, discriminatory, or intolerant in some way” (Ellwanger 2009: 
220). This still “unmediated event […] may or may not be perceived as offensive by its  primary 
audience” (2009: 27). Only when the media represents it  as an offence to an audience much 
larger than the primary one, is the need for a public apology aroused. Later, the event may be 
reconstituted in the calls for apology – and then another time in the apology that responds to such 
calls  (ibid.).  This  means,  that  the  original  offence  is  not  stable  but  often  represented  in 
contradicting  ways  by  the  various  people  who  refer  to  it  throughout  the  public  apologetic 
discourse (2009: 28). 
 4.3.2.2 The call for apology
The apologetic discourse is initiated by the call for apology which demonstrates the offensive 
character of the speech or deed in question to the  public (Ellwanger 2009: 125). This accusatory 
statement, or call for apology, plays a major role in the differentiation between public and private 
apologies, and has even been called “integral to the apologetic dynamic” (2009: 220). It is voiced 
by  “representations  of  the  demos (the  media,  private  citizens,  political  groups  and 
conglomerates)” (2009: 87) in order to re-establish a code of behaviour that has been broken by 
the offender. 
The call for apology intends to communicate to the offender “You cannot say that!” and 
aims at identifying him “with an existing social group or type, one that cannot (in good taste) 
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perform the speech or action in question” (2009: 126). The accusers aim to imbue the offender 
with a limiting ethos,43 one which “disallows specific  possibilities  for public speech” (2009: 
126). Also,  this ethos has to be seen as “the essential  identity of the individual in question” 
(ibid.). For example, it is especially inappropriate for white people to use the word nigger.44 If 
they use it anyway, it is likely to cause offence – and part of the offence lies in the fact that the 
speaker took the right to say something, which a member of his social group cannot say.45 Anger 
is  “the  dominant  emotion  caused  by  an  offence”,  Ellwanger  (2009:  87)  claims,  and  public 
apology can serve well for calming down this anger. There are certainly vengeful aspects in the 
call for public apology, he maintains, and further emphasizes that this call for apology is a charge 
of offence in itself and more powerful than a mere accusation because it communicates to the 
offender  that  she  owes  an  apology  (2009:  64).  Thereby  it  “covertly  assumes  the  need  for 
conciliation and dictates the ways that resolution might be achieved” (ibid., original emphasis). 
It  has  been  argued  that  calls  for  apology  are  “sanctimonious  demands  for  further 
punishment and public humiliation” (Tavuchis 1993: 56) or even “rhetoric trap[s]” (Hearit 2006: 
85). Furthermore it has been claimed that these accusatory statements are rarely uttered with 
reconciliation in mind but nevertheless, in the name of reconciliation, coerce the offender into 
apologizing (Ellwanger 2009: 220). Keeping this in mind, achieving harmony, which has been 
identified as the social goal of private apology (Leech 1983 in Olshtain 1989: 157) can not be 
said to be the motivational factor behind the call for public apology. Rather, as Ellwanger (2009: 
87) argues, it is used to “challenge, reduce, or question the social power and authority of the 
accused”. 
 4.3.2.3 The apology or the refusal to apologize
An accusatory statement leaves the offender with two options: she can publicly apologize or 
choose not to do so. Ellwanger argues that either option actualizes the limited ethos bestowed 
upon her by her accusers (2009: 130). Choosing to apologize equals an admission of guilt and 
“the final proof to the accusers' claim of transgression” (ibid.). Hereby the limited identity of a 
transgressor is imprinted on the apologizer and established publicly. Also, through the process of 
her “painful public confession” the offender suffers public humiliation, a punishment brought 
43 Ethos is a rhetorical concept, which, according to Reynolds (1993: 326), “encompasses the individual agent as 
well as the location or position from which that person speaks or writes”. 
44 As it is for men to refer to women as hos (as in Ellwanger's example on page 115) ; or for the able-bodied to 
refer to the disabled people as idiots; etc. 
45 Ellwanger (2009: 132) also claims that this identity game can work in favour of a person using insensitive 
speech in public: “e.g. 'It's OK that she said that; after all, she's insert identity category here)”. 
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upon her by those who called for her apology (ibid.). 
The accused's second option is to resist apologizing, be it because she believes that she 
has said or done nothing wrong or for pragmatic reasons. Those accused of an offence would 
obviously prefer “to avoid the pains [that the] […] (non-mandatory) punishment [of apologizing 
publicly]  entails.” (2009: 87).  It  is,  however,  not  easy to escape from this  public  apologetic 
discourse. Even silence in response to the call for apology is a public act and will be interpreted 
by the media. Explanations will be sought as to why the accused  reacted the way she did. Thus, 
in case she remains silent upon a call for apology she may be portrayed as “insensitive and 
unwilling to  seek reconciliation”  (2009:  131),  which also  draws an unfavourable  image and 
bestows upon her a limited ethos. 
An opportunity to get out of this dilemma is seen in equivocal communication (Tyler 
1997: 59) which has been defined as “the response chosen when all other communicative choices 
in the situation would lead to negative consequences” (Bavelas, Black, Chovil & Mullet 1990: 
54).  In  our  case,  such  equivocal  communication  could  take  the  form  of  an  expression  of 
sympathy which does not express any guilt. “I am sorry if what I said offended you” is actually a 
widely used answer to calls for apology and often leads to a discussion of whether an apology 
has  been  offered  or  not.46 Kampf  (2009)  focuses  on  such  public  non-apologies47 and  finds 
fourteen “different creative forms of apologetic speech [which are used] in order to minimize [...] 
responsibility  for  misdeeds”  (2009:  2257).  Researchers  on  apology  mostly  dismiss  such 
statements as insincere or morally wrong (e.g., Taft 2000: 1159), which, however, does not wane 
their popularity. This is, one might argue, because such non-apologies are useful to an offender 
just because of their ambiguity. By offering them, offenders may hope to be let off the hook 
without  losing  face  in  public.  Additional  to  the  issue  of  whether  and  how  the  offender 
apologizes, the questions of whom she apologizes to and when she apologizes are said to be of 
importance. Therefore, two sub-chapters are devoted to these topics. 
 4.3.2.3.1 The audience of the apology
In case the accused chooses to give a statement in response to the accusatory call, the question 
arises to whom this statement is addressed and thus also, in whose (or which) interest it is given. 
Lazare argues that apologies directed at the wrong audience (i.e. not the victim of the offence) 
should be analysed in regard to what the apologizer gains from such a statement (2004: 101). 
46 Cf. Harris, Grainger & Mullany (2006: 739) for an example of such a discussion. 
47 A term also used by Gill (2000: 13)
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Apologies directed towards those capable of punishing the offender or to third parties with whom 
the offender wishes to maintain relationships, can be said to be performed only in the interest of 
the  accused  and therefore  not  pursuing  reconciliation.  Lazare48 (2004:  101)  and Ellwanger49 
(2009: 106) both give examples of public figures apologizing to those who could deprive them of 
their livelihood rather than to the victims of their offences. The accused utter such an apology “to 
manipulate the situation to protect themselves rather than to reconcile with the victim” (Lazare 
2004: 101). 
When it comes to corporate apologies, the question of audience is even more demanding 
because a  company has  obligations  towards several  interest  groups,  like e.g.  “local  citizens, 
governmental  regulators,  stockholders,  employees,  pressure  groups  and  politicians”  (Benoit 
1997b: 178). The consideration of these multiple audiences can leave the company in a dilemma, 
as  “considering  only  the  interests  of  the  victims  of  a  crisis  may breach  the  [...]  important 
obligations [which a company has towards its stockholders and creditors]” (Kaufmann, 1994: 35 
in Tyler 1997: 59). Tyler argues that making an admission of guilt is unwise and “perhaps even 
immoral”  (ibid.)  because  it  can  lead  to  legal  liability  and corporate  extinction  which  harms 
shareholders.  In short, any public apologetic statement could potentially soothe the anger of one 
interest group while at the same time inflame that of another because of the different, and often 
even mutually exclusive interests,  concerns and goals of each group. Hearit  agrees when he 
writes that 
the  central  tension  in  responding to  criticism [for  a  company]  is  the  balance  of 
stockholder and stakeholder interests. Said another way, a company that responds to 
criticism  of  its  actions  must  maintain  a  careful  balance  between  being  socially 
responsive  to  its  community  and  fiducially  responsible  to  its  investors  (Epstein, 
1972).  The same is  true for institutions – they must  balance social  with liability 
concerns;” (Hearit 2006: 208)
This statement shows well how the accused (company) has to set priorities regarding whom is 
addressed primarily in a public apologetic statement. This insight results in the explicit advice 
for  crisis  communicators  to  “identify  the  most  important  audience  (or  prioritize  important 
48 After biting off a part of Evander Holyfield's ear in 1997, Mike Tyson apologized to “his family, the Nevada 
State Athletic Commission, the judge responsible for his probation, and others but did not give significant 
mention to the actual victims -Holyfield and the home audience who had paid a premium to watch the match on 
pay-per-view” (Ingham 2007: 37)(Lazare 2004: 101). 
49 Michael Vick, quarterback of the Atlanta Falcons, has financed and participated in dog fights and the killing of 
animals. First, he apologized privately to the owner of the Atlanta Falcons. Only later, when his plea of guilty 
was accepted by the court (but before he had been sentenced),  he offered a public apology  (Ellwanger 2009: 
106). The owner of the falcons has the power to limit Vick's future options and probably therefore has been the 
recipient of the first apology. 
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audiences)”  ( Benoit 1997b: 178) . 
 4.3.2.3.2 The timing of the apology
Time “is a situational constraint that is particularly powerful in apology”, Ellwanger (2009: 67) 
argues, and with these words represents the many authors who claim that timing is a critical 
factor in apology (e.g.,  Frantz & Bennigson 2005, Lazare 2004, Cohen 1999). 
Ellwanger points out that the timing of the offence itself is influential and argues that 
“whether or not a statement or act is perceived as offensive often depends on the moment in 
which it occurs” and gives examples of public offences which probably would not have caused 
an uproar had it not been for the specific moment at which they were made public (2009: 104f). 
Timing is also of importance in the call for apology, which must come relatively quickly in order 
for people to appear genuinely upset and not moved by ulterior motives (2009: 67). 
It  has  been  argued  that  there  are  differences  between  private  and  public  apologies 
regarding  the  timing of  the  apologetic  statement.  “In  the  private  realm,”  Lazare  (2004:178) 
claims, “the offender often has the luxury of time and reflection in order to deliver an appropriate 
apology”. Not only is time helpful for considering the wording of one's apology, also the victim 
needs time: Frantz & Bennigson (2005: 202) argue that apologizing too quickly is not effective 
because victims first need a chance to express themselves and feel understood. If the victim feels 
that he has been unheard, it is too early to give an apology. In the public realm, however, “an 
unambiguous apology [is  demanded]  as soon as the offense becomes known” (Lazare 2004: 
178). Should the offender wait too long before giving an apology, it may be suggested that he has 
other motives than genuine regret (Ellwanger 2009: 68). Patel & Reinisch (2003: 22) agree when 
they suggest that “the nearer the apology is to the event in question, the more likely that the 
apology will be regarded as sincere and result in positive consequences”. Support for this can be 
found in Blaney & Benoit's (2002: 387) study of Firestone's image repair, where they argue that 
Firestone's campaign was appropriate, but would have had to be implemented earlier in order to 
achieve the desired outcome. 
In case an offence can be prosecuted in court, an early apology is advised as it “may 
prevent an injury from turning into a dispute” (Cohen 1999: 1049). A delayed apology on the 
other hand, “risks hardening the victim's response to the harm and rendering it immutable to 
change” (Shuman 2000:  186 in  Patel  & Reinisch 2003:  23).  Nevertheless,  for  legal  reasons 
(which are discussed in chapter 4.4.2.2), Patel & Reinisch (2003: 23) advise giving a statement 
of sympathy at first and leaving it “until a later stage to make a full apology that admits fault and 
35
expresses remorse”. 
 4.3.2.4 Outcome and effects of public apologetic discourse
So far, we have seen how an offence, if taken up by the media, can cause a call for apology 
which aims at eliciting an apologetic statement. In this chapter we will deal with the question of 
what such an apologetic statement effects and what it can achieve for the public at large, the 
media, the offended and the offender. 
As shown above, the apologetic statement has the potential to embarrass the offender in 
public  –  Ellwanger  (e.g.  2009:  220)  repeatedly states  that  it  is  a  humiliating  experience  to 
publicly  accept  guilt  and  acknowledge  one's  wrongdoing.  The  fact  that  inconsiderate  and 
offensive speech can bring people into such humbling situations may work as a deterrent against 
such speech and reaffirm to the insulted group of people that what has been done to them is not 
tolerated by society. Even though this is an important message to send, the question remains 
whether  public  apologetic  discourse is  capable  of achieving the goal  it  presumably pursues: 
reconciliation. While with private apologies reconciliation lies in the hands of the offended and 
the offender, there are more aspects to consider in the case of public apology. 
 At the first instance of the offence, i.e. before it has been mediated, the offended group is 
most often of a manageable size. But as soon as the media disseminates the offence, the offender 
is confronted with a much larger group of people. Furthermore, the media constructs the offence 
not  merely as  offensive  to  the  victim and the  primary audience,  but  as  offensive  to  “every 
individual  who  values  an  inclusive  and  diverse  democratic  society”  (2009:  173,  original 
emphasis). By broadcasting such offences, the media “exposes new audiences to the very pain 
and suffering that it attempts to dissolve” and leaves them
with  no way to communicate or reconcile with the offender. The public apology that 
the  media  elicits  seems  to  be  a  cheap  consolation  prize  aimed  at  compensating 
citizens for their  outrage – an outrage produced by the media’s re-staging of the 
private offense as a public one. (Ellwanger 2009: 208)
Thus, the media enlarges the group of offended people to whom the accused has to reach out to 
achieve the goal of reconciliation. Also, these people hardly ever have an option of acting upon 
the offence they encounter through the media. Upon hearing of the catastrophic results of the 
tsunami, people can help by donating money (2009: 175) – but upon hearing about offensive 
speech, what can they do? Ellwanger exploits such options and comes to the conclusion that 
media and public calls for apology do not work towards reconciliation as they merely create a 
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bigger number of offended people. Furthermore, those who are upset by what they hear in the 
media are likely to have “different ideas about what an adequate or authentic apology would look 
like“ (2009: 176) and about what the offender could do to reconcile. Thus, it is “very improbable 
that a heterogeneous group of citizens who perceive a wrong can effectively bestow forgiveness” 
(2009:  87)  which  means that  some of  the  people  who were offended will  never  experience 
reconciliation. 
Additionally,  the  cases  analysed  by  Ellwanger  show that  some  of  those  propagating 
public apologies are openly admitting that they are thereupon pursuing their need for revenge  – 
which they, however, do not always find to be satisfied with a mere apologetic statement (2009: 
168). Still, asking for a public apology is the only means they have to quench their thirst for 
revenge:  free  speech  is  of  high  value  in  democratic  societies  and  loss  of  face  is  the  only 
punishment that through the media can be inflicted on someone accused of offensive speech. 
Lastly,  let us deal with the question of which motivation the offender could have for 
participating in his  own punishment.  As mentioned above,  the aim of those pressing for his 
apology is  to  leave  him with  the  limited ethos  of  a  transgressor  (2009:  118).  The offender, 
however, is not obliged to play along that game and to give a humiliating statement just because 
his  accusers have asked him to do so.  Much rather,  his own interests  lie in cleaning up his 
tarnished reputation and in being conceived by the public as a valuable member of society who 
can be trusted to respect its norms and values. Therefore, he may apologize in order to ensure the 
public that in future he will abstain from the inappropriate behaviour which initiated the call for 
his apology. How the offender can influence public apologetic discourse in his favour has been 
analysed in closer detail by Benoit and his various co-authors (e.g., 1994, 1997a, 1997b, 1999, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008). Benoit's theory of image repair work, which is the base of all 
these case studies, will now be explained. 
 4.4 Image Repair Discourse50
While Ellwanger's discussion of public apologetic discourse is located in the field of sociology 
(it deals with apology as a tool for clarifying and reaffirming the norms and values of society and 
the use of apology for reaffirming a transgressor's membership in a group – interests, which 
according to  Ingham (2007:  6) fall  in the study of sociology),  we are now analysing public 
50 Five years after publishing his theory of image restoration, Benoit (2000: 40) claims that he sees the term image 
repair as more appropriate because  "'restoration' might imply that one's image has been restored to its prior 
state”. In his later publications (e.g. 2002) he uses both terms alternately, but in his most recent papers (e.g. 
2009) he writes of image repair exclusively. 
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apology as a tool of crisis management in public relations. 
It  is  widely  believed  that  the  most  valuable  commodity  an  organization  has  is  its 
reputation  (Amiso  &  Evuleocha  2003:  11).  Therefore  it  is  not  surprising  that  numerous 
researchers  work  on  finding  how reputation  can  be  protected  and  repaired  (e.g.   Amiso  & 
Evuleocha  2003;Benoit  1995;  Coombs  1998;  Frantz  &  Bennigson  2005;  Hearit  2006; 
McLaughlin, Cody & O'Hair 1983). The two approaches which I find to be most pertinent to this 
thesis  are  Benoit's  (1995)  and  Coombs'  (1998).  Benoit's  theory  is  appropriate  because  it 
considers the image repair work of organizations and individual public figures alike and gives 
advice  to  both  when  possible.51 Coombs  criticises  and  elaborates  upon  Benoit's  theory  and 
empirically examines some of his conclusions. Therefore, it is their insights that are dealt with in 
the following paragraphs: 
The fact  that  image is  essential  to  organizations  as  well  as  to  individuals  is  the  key 
premise  to  Benoit's  study and often  emphasized  at  the  beginning  of  his  articles  (cf.  Benoit 
1997a,  1997b,  1999,  etc.).  Image  repair  theory  is  based  on  the  two  assumptions  that 
communication is a goal-oriented activity and that the maintenance of a favourable image is a 
primary goal of communication (Benoit 1995: 93). Benoit (1999: 145) describes image as “the 
perception of a person (or group, or orga-nization [sic]) held by others” and argues that it “is 
influenced by one’s own words and actions, as well as by the discourse and behavior of others” 
(ibid.). Having a positive image (or reputation) is “important to our emotional well-being” as 
well as “in our dealings with others” (1999: 146) and therefore, whenever our image is at threat, 
we attempt to repair it (ibid.).  According to image repair theory, our image is threatened under 
the following conditions: an offensive act has occurred and one is accused of being responsible 
for that act (Benoit: 1997b). Benoit (ibid.) further claims that it is not a condition that one is 
actually responsible for the act – as long as one is thought to be responsible, one's image is at 
risk: “perceptions”, Benoit argues, “are more important than reality” (ibid.).52
Image repair theory focuses on the message options the accused has when facing a crisis (1997b: 
178) and names five general rhetorical options to those who need to repair a damaged image: 
denial,  evading  responsibility,  reducing  offensiveness,  corrective  action,  and  mortiﬁcation 
51 This differentiates it from the work of many others (e.g. Hearit (1997, 2006,...), Amiso & Evuleocha (2003)) 
which focuses on image repair by corporations only. Corporate image repair work  is a very interesting topic but 
it is out of the range of this thesis to devote space to solely this aspect.
52 Also Blumstein et.al (1974: 558) conclude that “people do not react so much to what we do, but rather to the 
interpretation we provide for our acts”. Meier (2004: 11) applies this conclusion to apologies and argues that by 
“assigning an interpretation to our misdeeds, [apologies][...]assume a great deal of power”. 
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(Blaney & Benoit 2001: 16). As some strategies have subcategories, Benoit offers the accused a 
total of fourteen specific options for repairing their image.53 These options are outlined in table 1.
Table 1  Benoit's Image Repair Strategies in Blaney & Benoit (2001: 16)
Strategy Key Characteristic Example
Denial
Simple Denial Did not perform act I did not do it
Shift the blame Another performed act My accountant did it
Evading Responsibility
Provocation Response to another's act Opponent attacked first
Defeasibility Lack of information/ability Did not know about bill
Accident Mishap Miscalculation was an accident
Good Intentions Meant well Tried to reduce deficit
Reducing offensiveness of event
Bolstering Stress good traits Look at accomplishments
Minimization Act not serious Only twenty million
Differentiation Less offensive than similar 
acts
Not a tax increase, a revenue 
enhancer
Transcendence More important values Tax evasion as protest, not 
dishonesty
Attack accuser Reduce accuser's credibility Witness is a liar
Compensation Reimburse victim Return illegal funds
Corrective action Plan to solve/prevent 
recurrence of a problem
New policy on accepting 
campaign contributions
Mortification Apologize I'm very sorry
Len-Ríos & Benoit (2004: 96) emphasize that all these strategies pursue the common aim of self-
defence, or, in another word, apologia. According to this categorization, mortification (which 
subsumes statements accepting responsibility for the offensive act, apologizing and/or asking for 
forgiveness) is one of fourteen strategies for self-defence in a crisis.
 4.4.1 Terminological discord: Image reparation vs. public 
apologies
 The fact that Benoit names apologize as the key characteristic of mortification does not go well 
53 Benoit (1997c: 155) claims to have based his work on the three key approaches to image restoration, i.e. Burke 
(1970), Ware & Linkugel (1973) and Scott & Lyman (1968). His approach, he argues, offers a balance between 
the extremes of too few and too many options for image repair. 
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with Ellwanger's view on the topic. Ellwanger insists that  apology  is synonymous with  image 
repair  writ large, because apology contains all the aspects of regret and defence and aims at 
resolving  a  dispute,  regardless  of  which  aspect  is  in  the  foreground,   As  mentioned  above, 
Ellwanger (2009: 36) advocates the use of the term apology as “any discourse that responds to 
crisis” - implying that all of Benoit's image repair strategies are sub-categories of apology, and 
not,  as outlined by Benoit,  “alternatives to apology for maintaining one's image” (Ellwanger 
2009: 36).
 As I see it, this discrepancy is only one of terminology: What Benoit calls apology and 
deals with under the name of  mortification is the same concept that Ellwanger understands as 
apology of regret. Because Ellwanger encourages an “inclusive view of apology” (2009: 35), he 
would like to see apology used as an umbrella term for all image repair strategies. On the one 
hand, I agree that it makes sense to unite the two historically separated aspects of apology under 
their mutual name and regard apology as a concept that contains regret and defence. But, on the 
other  hand,  the  term  apology nowadays  is  widely  understood  as  apology  of  regret  only  – 
meaning that  whenever  one  deals  with  apology one  has  to  clarify  whether  it  is  used  in  its 
ordinary sense as remorseful apology or in a broader sense including all strategies that can be 
used to achieve reconciliation. Interestingly enough, this issue was also relevant nearly twenty 
years earlier,  when Meier  (1992:  48) decides  which term she would use to refer  to  “speech 
phenomena which serve the same intent (i.e. image maintenance)”. She discards apology because 
of “the potential confusion with apologize used as a performative verb and its subsequent use as 
a cover-term for a broader range of strategies one of which is  often also labelled 'apology'” 
(ibid.). Her other option, remedial work, she finds inappropriate because of the frameworks and 
studies that it is associated with. Thus, she decides to stick to  Repair Work, a term which she 
finds to be uninfluenced by previous concepts.
At this stage I would like to make the point that the term apology has not only evolved 
until it reached the meaning that we are acquainted with today,  but it is still evolving. There is 
no reason to assume that it has reached its final meaning now, especially in regard to the current 
effort  (Ellwanger  2009:  35f)  put  into  finding  and  establishing  apology's appropriate  use  in 
academic discourse.  In the context of this thesis one view of apology needs to be established and 
I will argue that apology as an umbrella term for image repair work is the most sensible concept 
here. This is, because the focus of this thesis lies in apologies given in the public realm in order 
to repair the image of the offender. The research I have done so far (e.g. Harris, Grainger & 
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Mullany 2006, Ellwanger 2009) warns me that only a very small proportion of these apologies is 
likely to be of the sincere and remorseful kind as praised by Lazare (2004), Gill (2000) and 
others.  The  majority  of  offenders  will  apply  all  the  strategies  at  hand  (defence,  accounts, 
justifications, regret, etc.) in order to repair their image. However, the offended will not call for 
the offender to do some image repair work but for him to offer a public apology. In order to 
analyse open-mindedly the 'public apologies' that follow these calls and the larger discourse that 
surrounds them, I need a framework that allows for this and does not force a bilateral distinction 
between successful apologies that allow for reconciliation and failed apologies that do not abide 
by the guidelines for apologies as laid out by researchers.  Therefore, public apology with all its 
different strategies is the focus of my thesis. 
 4.4.2 Advice on image reparation
Having established which strategies exist for repairing one's image, Benoit analyses the image 
repair discourse of various corporations, e.g. AT&T (Benoit & Brinson 1994), Texaco (Brinson 
& Benoit 1999) and Firestone (Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal 2002); and public figures, e.g. Hugh 
Grant (Benoit 1997a), Queen Elizabeth (Benoit & Brinson 1999), Bill Clinton (Blaney & Benoit 
2001) and President Bush (Benoit & Henson 2009). He uses the conclusions drawn from these 
examples, together with results from a study concerning the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
image repair strategies (Benoit & Drew 1997c) to offer the following assumptions as to which 
strategies are helpful in certain situations. 
 4.4.2.1 Specifications in regard to the offender's profession
Let us start with Benoit's (1997a) distinction of entertainment image repair from political 
image repair. He argues that politicians have to worry about attacks from opposition parties – and 
even from political leaders of the same party who want to “avoid getting tainted” (Len-Ríos & 
Benoit  2004: 104) – something that is  irrelevant for entertainers who do not have to expect 
accusations from other entertainers. Also, a politician's opposition would be interested in keeping 
the offence in the public eye for as long as possible54, hoping that the voters will remember this 
incident at the next elections. An entertainer need not worry about such attempts either. The most 
relevant difference Benoit points out is that the way an entertainer performs her job has “no 
serious impact on our lives” (1997a: 255).  Politicians, however, “make decisions on a daily 
basis that affect all of their constituents” and potentially decide between the saving or spending 
54 And gives the example of the Whitewater hearings as the longest in U.S. history (1997a: 255). 
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of huge amounts of money (ibid.). Therefore, admitting responsibility for a serious mistake can 
have serious consequences  for  the future career  of  a  politician,  but  not  for the career  of  an 
entertainer, meaning that mortification as an image repair strategy is probably more advisable for 
entertainers than for politicians. 
Benoit also outlines how entertainment image repair is different from corporate image 
repair. The key difference, he argues,  lies in the fact that corporations are not people who have a 
private life in which they could perform offensive speech or actions. Only its employees can do 
such  things,  and  employees  can  be  replaced  -   they  are  separate  from the  corporation.  An 
entertainer, however, “can't fire himself, [and] can't easily distance himself from his own acts.” 
(1997a: 256). Further, he argues that even though to a lesser extent than politicians, companies 
still have to expect attacks from competing companies and gives the cola wars (Pepsi-Cola vs. 
Coca-cola, Benoit 1995) as an example. Entertainers, on the other hand, are less likely to battle 
each other.  Also, corporations (like for example airlines) and their decisions have influence on 
the lives of people – thus leaving mortification as a less attractive option for corporate repair 
work. Benoit further points out that a corporation is likely to “face litigations along with the 
threat  to  its  image”  which  restricts  it  in  its  choice  of  image  repair  strategy,  because  using 
mortification would risk “providing evidence of guilt for plaintiffs suing them” (1997a: 256). 
 4.4.2.2 Remorseful apology in image repair work
The issue of remorseful apology (which is also referred to as contritious/ regretful apology or 
apology of regret) in public discourse has provoked discussions and research with a particular 
focus on the question of whether lawyers should advise accused companies or individuals to 
offer a regretful apology. On one hand, it is argued that it can soothe the feelings of the offended, 
promote settlement and therefore prevent a lawsuit from being filed. On the other hand, there is 
the fear that the statement of apology will be admissible at trial and that jurors and judges take it 
as  an  admission  of  responsibility.  (Robbennolt  2003:  461).  While  Japanese  (legal)  culture 
considers remorseful apology to be “an integral part of every resolution of conflict” (ibid.) and 
thus also encourages apology in court, US legal culture is said to discourage apology on the 
grounds that “paying the damages or accepting punishment ends further responsibility and that 
there is no need for personal contrition or apology” (Wagatsuma & Rosett 1986: 462). However, 
with the growing awareness of the healing power of remorseful apology, it has been argued that 
apology should start playing a role in US legislation (Taft 2000, Robbennolt 2003, Cohen 1999). 
But  because  an  apology contains  an  admission  of  responsibility  that  the  offended  may use 
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against the accused in court, lawyers frequently advise their clients against giving an apology.
In order to give the defendant an option to say that they are sorry without having to fear 
consequences, attempts have been made to establish safe harbours or safe apologies as part of 
the US legal system. So far, expressions of sympathy – like I am sorry you have been hurt – are 
“inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability” (Robbennolt  2003: 471) in some US 
states,55 and it is has even been considered protecting all components of a remorseful apology 
(i.e., expression of sympathy and responsibility) from being  allowed as evidence in court (ibid.). 
The discussion of the pros and cons of such safe harbours have led to different conclusions. Taft 
(2000), argues that a person who is truly repentant would not avoid the consequences of her 
actions  but  accept  them as  part  of  the  authentic  expression  of  contrition.  Safe  apologies,  in 
contrast,  support offenders in the use of apology for mere strategic purposes. Taft claims that 
[w]hen the apology is shrouded with legal protection, when it cannot be considered 
an  admission,  when  no  legal  consequence  can  attach  to  the  party  through  the 
apology, apologetic discourse moves from potential to actual corruption. The moral 
process of apology in such a protected environment is now subverted (2000: 1156). 
 This claim is repeated by Cohen (1999: 1067) who argues that an apology sounds empty if it is 
uttered with the precondition that it must not be used to make the apologizer pay for his offence. 
Wagatsuma and Rosett (1986: 487) also share this opinion when they state that an apology which 
does not offer reparation is hollow. But there is also another line of argument to be considered: 
Cohen (1999)  claims  that  safe  apologies  can help  prevent  needless  conflict  by allowing the 
offender to apologize and thus avoid “the insult of not saying one is sorry from adding to the 
already  existing  injury”  (1999:  1067).  He  argues  that  safe  apologies  convey  two  separate 
messages: First, an admission of wrongdoing and regret, and second, the invitation to have a 
“different conversation about liability” (1999: 1068, original emphasis).  Thus, in his point of 
view, an apology should be able to be given without worries about legal issues, and the question 
of reparation dealt with separately. Cohen (1999: 1022) further emphasizes the importance of an 
early apology to calm down the victim's anger and claims that the risk that is involved in giving 
an apology (i.e., providing proof of one's liability) may be beaten by the risk that not apologizing 
brings along (i.e.,  that  the victim sees a lawsuit as the only option to calm down anger and 
receive justice). To conclude, a safe apology can be seen as a kind of safety net for the offender – 
it allows him to be perceived as being sorry and responsible without having to stand up for these 
55 I.e., in Massachusetts (which was the first state to allow for this rule in 1986), Texas (1999), California (2000), 
Florida (2001) and Washington (2002) (Robbennolt 2003: 471). 
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statements  in court. While some see such safe apologies as morally wrong, others welcome them 
as means to prevent unnecessary lawsuits. 
Even without such judicial background (i.e., without safe apologies), it has been argued, 
apologizing is less of a threat than has previously been assumed (cf. Ingham 2007: 22). Patel & 
Reinisch  state that 
[w]hile an apology might strengthen a plaintiff's  case (to the disadvantage of the 
apologist), the evidence indicates that an apology has equal, or even greater, potential 
to make a positive contribution to an apologist's legal strategy. (2003: 9f) 
Also keeping concerns for possible litigation in mind, Benoit (1997b: 183) advises companies 
that are at fault to admit this fault immediately. In the analyses of various image repair discourses 
(e.g.  Texaco (Brinson & Benoit 1999), AT&T (Benoit & Brinson 1994) Hugh Grant (Benoit 
1997b), etc.), mortification – combined with other strategies –  has been found to be an effective 
image repair strategy which “can be vital to image restoration efforts” (Len-Ríos & Benoit 2004: 
104).  
 4.4.2.3 Mortification and corrective action in image repair work
It  has  been  argued  that  mortification  on  its  own  is  only  acceptable  when  it  comes  from 
individuals and that institutions who use this strategy are expected to present corrective action56 
along with it (Courtright & Hearit 2002: 355). In various case studies (i.a., AT&T (Benoit & 
Brinson 1994), Texaco (Brinson & Benoit 1999), President Reagan (Benoit, Gullifor & Panici 
1991)  corrective  action  has  been  found  to  be  a  strategy  that  works  well  together  with 
mortification.  A combination of these strategies is advised especially to those “who are forced to 
take responsibility for a problem” (Benoit & Brinson 1994: 87) but nevertheless Benoit warns 
that the application of both strategies cannot assure success (Benoit 1997b: 184). In particular 
companies who want to fight a legal battle should abstain from using these strategies (Brinson & 
Benoit  1999:  507).  To  further  support  the  results  of  these  case  studies  Benoit  conducts  an 
empirical  study  to  find  which  image  repair  strategies  work  best  in  interpersonal  conflict 
situations. This study shows mortification and corrective action to be more useful than any other 
option (Benoit 1997c: 159). 
 4.4.2.4 Criticism of the advice given on the basis of  image repair analysis 
Most of Benoit's conclusions are built on case studies and this implies certain limitations: 
56 “Corrective action can take two forms: fixing the damage from the wrongful act and/or taking steps to assure that 
the problem never occurs again” (Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal 2002)
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As he admits himself, case studies only focus “on the source, on the source's options, and on 
discourse (texts) from the sources” (Benoit 2000:40). This makes their findings very specific and 
it has been argued that Benoit's results are a conjecture and his conclusions cannot be generalized 
(Sheldon & Sallot 2009: 28). Other critics of image repair theory point out that it “is actually a 
taxonomy and not a true theory in the sense of making predictions” (Coombs & Schmidt 2000). 
They argue that its strength lies in identifying the strategies used in crisis situations but certainly 
not in interpreting the success of these strategies. This is, they claim, because no guidelines for 
researchers are  established to  judge the success of a strategy and therefore there is  no hard 
evidence to support the researchers' findings (2000: 165). 
Being sceptical of the results of the Texaco case study (Brinson & Benoit 1999), Coombs 
& Schmidt (2000) conduct an empirical study in order to investigate the usefulness of Brinson & 
Benoit's  results  -  in  particular  concerning  the  supposed  superior  role  of  mortification  and 
corrective  action  in  image  reparation  (in  comparison  to  bolstering,  shifting  blame  and 
separation57) (1999: 507). The next chapter deals with the concept on which this study is based 
and its results. 
 4.4.2.5 A different view on image repair work: Coombs' defensive-
accommodative continuum of crisis-response strategies 
Coombs (1998)  takes  various  crisis-response strategies  developed by other  researchers58 and 
groups them into seven categories which he places on a defensive-accommodative continuum. 
“The responses on the defensive end of the continuum seek to protect the organization [and deny 
the crisis], whereas the responses on the  accommodative end seek to address victim concerns 
[and accept responsibility]” (Coombs 2001: 165). See figure 1 for the strategies and their place 
on the continuum. 
Figure 1: Defensive-accommodative continuum of crisis-
response strategies (Coombs 1998: 189, grey text added 
from the running text)
Figure 2: Continuum for the analysis of 
crisis situations (Coombs 1998: 189)
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The strategies used by Texaco can be placed on the accommodative end of the continuum, with 
mortification and corrective action being the two most accommodative strategies and bolstering 
and  shifting  blame  (internally)  being  forms  of  ingratiation,  the  third  most  accommodative 
strategy (Coombs & Schmidt 2000: 167). Coombs & Schmidt argue that such strategies show 
concern for the victim and display regret  – attributes which to their  mind indicates that  the 
company “has learned its lesson and will work to prevent a repeat of the crisis” (2000: 175). 
They further suggest that it  is not any of the strategies in particular which is responsible for 
Texaco's  successful  image  repair,  but  the  victim-centred  “accommodative”  tendency  that  is 
displayed in Texaco's approach. To prove this, they empirically research the impact of the five 
strategies and find that “any of these five strategies would produce the same positive effects” 
(2000: 173). Therefore, Coombs & Schmidt argue that it is not necessary for a company to take 
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the legal risk which a full  apology implies because any other victim-centred accommodative 
theory can achieve the same social effects (2000: 176). A similar study conducted by Coombs & 
Holladay (2008) also comes to the conclusion that “sympathy and compensation can be just as 
effective in producing a favorable reaction from stakeholders who are not victims of the crisis” 
(2008: 255). 
Coombs sees the final goal of his research in giving useful advice to crisis managers 
(Coombs 1998: 178). To do so, he provides them with the means to identify the characteristics of 
the crisis situation and the means to choose appropriate response strategies. Crisis responsibility 
appears  to  him  to  be  the  “natural  link  between  crisis  situation  and  CCS  [i.e.,  crisis 
communication  strategies]”  (Coombs  1998:  180).  Therefore  he  devises  a  continuum  with 
endpoints of low and high personal control59, on which crisis types can be placed (cf. figure 2). 
Coombs argues, that once a crisis is identified according to “the degree to which the organization 
itself could control the crisis event” (1998: 182), a second factor needs to be considered. This 
factor is called performance history; it describes whether the company is dealing with a one-time 
crisis or whether there have been crises before. Negative performance history (i.e., there have 
been crises before) intensifies “perceptions of crisis responsibility and image damage for the 
accident and transgression crisis types” (1998: 187), implying that an accident or transgression 
which is part of a history of accidents or transgressions needs to be located closer to the high 
responsibility end of the crisis continuum. Coombs admits that this system of analysing a crisis is 
crude (Coombs & Holladay 2001: 322) but claims that nevertheless it can help crisis managers 
choose an appropriate response strategy: When an organization is perceived to be responsible for 
the crisis, accommodative strategies are advised – if not, defensive strategies are claimed to be 
useful. Thus, once the crisis type is identified on the scale, the appropriate crisis communication 
strategy can  be found in  figure  1.  Coombs (1998:  190)  argues  that  this  system helps  crisis 
managers respond fast to a crisis – and that fast responses are useful, is, as far as I found, one of 
the  few undisputed aspects  in  crisis  communication  research (cf.  Conlon 1996:  1051,  1053; 
Brinson & Benoit 1999: 504). 
Having gained an insight into the concepts relevant for organizations and individuals in 
need of image work, I will now move on to the practical part of this thesis.





The purpose of this study is to analyse the speech act of apology in public apologetic discourse 
in Austria and the United Kingdom and compare possible differences in how public apology is 
being used. It builds on the proposition that there is a connection between language and society, 
and  that  this  connection  is  also  valid  in  the  area  of  public  apology.  By  analysing  public 
apologetic speech, I hope to come to conclusions that provide further insight into what kind of 
values are of importance in each culture. 
Further, I am interested in the notion that dealing with the public (e.g. with customers, 
consumers or the public  at  large) is  more carefully handled in the UK than it  is  in Austria. 
Meier's (1992: 93) conclusion that Austrians are more self-oriented in restoring their image than 
Americans are (Americans were found to verbally express more concern for the hearer) can be 
seen as supportive of this idea. By analysing public apologetic speech, I hope to be able to come 
up with assumptions regarding this topic.  First,  however, it  is important to see what kind of 
research has already been done in this area and which conclusions have been drawn. 
 6 Previous Research 
My research builds on the premise that there is a connection between language and society. This 
premise is widely-supported, for example by Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984: 197), who assume 
that cross-cultural variability is one of at least three factors influencing a speaker's choice in 
speech act realization.60 Another proponent of such an assumption, Wierzbicka (1985a), claims 
that “communicative behaviors cannot be fully understood without reference to cultural values” 
like “relational harmony and communication styles” (Park 2009: 69). She further argues that 
social attitudes and the style of social interaction can be revealed through language (1986a: 352) 
and that the following four aspects of language are particularly culturally revealing: “1) forms of 
address; 2) expressive derivation; 3) illocutionary devices of different kinds, such as interjections 
and particles;  and 4) speech act verbs” (ibid.).  When dealing with speech act  verbs, such as 
apologize,  Wierzbicka  analyses  how exactly the speech act  verb is  used in  a certain  culture 
applying her semantic metalanguage (cf. chapter  3.1.2) and investigates  whether it is used in 
other cultures as well and which differences exist.61 
60 The other two factors are intra-cultural situational variability and individual variability (ibid.). 
61 She found, e.g., that apologize has no equivalent in Aboriginal culture and offers an explanation for why this is 
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Other researchers focus on how apology strategies, usage and frequencies vary according 
to culture and how being unaware of these cultural differences in apology behaviour can “lead an 
individual in one culture to appear an incompetent communicator in another culture” (Park & 
Guan 2009: 66). It has been argued that while a language learner's phonological, syntactic and 
lexical errors are justified with the learner's low command of the foreign language and easily 
being forgiven, this is not the case with pragmatic inadequacies. These, in the eyes of native 
speakers, are often seen as rude behaviour (Dalmau & Gotor 2007: 288)62. Thus, an apology 
which “is not offered in the socially correct manner, […] might result in increased resentment” 
(Gibney & Howard-Hassman 2008: 7). In order to better understand which differences exist and 
to  help  language  learners  communicate  effectively in  the  second language,  researchers  have 
examined the realisation patterns of apologies (i.e., apology strategies) and the role of contextual 
factors (e.g., the severity of the offence or the relationship between the interlocutors) influencing 
the choice of strategy (cf. Deutschmann 2003: 47). 
 6.1.1 Research on private Apologies 
Mono-cultural  studies  have  investigated  private  apologies  in,  amongst  others,  the 
following languages: Akan (Obeng 1999), American English (Bean & Johnstone 1994), Austrian 
German (Meier 1997), British English ( Aijmer 1995, Deutschmann 2003, Davies, Merrison & 
Goddard  2007,  Owen  1983),  German  (Vollmer  &  Olshtain  1989),  Fijian  (Hickson  1986), 
Indonesian  (Wouk  2006),  Mexican  Spanish  (Wagner  2004),  New  Zealand  English  (Holmes 
1990),  Persian  (Afghari  2007,  Shariati  2007),  Sudanese  Arabic  (Nuredden  2008),  Tunisian 
Arabic (Jehabi 2011) and Vanuato (Meyerhoff 1999). 
Studies which compare private apologies cross-culturally include comparisons of British 
English to Danish (Trosborg 1987) and German (House 1989); American English to Austrian 
German (Meier 1992), Chinese (Park & Guan 2009), Chinese and Korean (Guan, Park & Lee 
2009), Hebrew (Cohen & Olshtain 1981), Jordanian Arabic (Baitaneh & Baitaneh 2008), Polish 
and Hungarian (Suczcyńska 1999), Singaporean and Australian (Wong 2002)63 and Venezuelan 
Spanish (García 1989); and English to Setswana (Kasanga & Lwanga-Lumu 2007), English to 
Italian (Lipson 1994) and South Korean to Australian (Kim 2007). Further, a number of studies 
has  compared apologies  of  EFL students  to  apologies  of native speakers of English,  mainly 
focusing on the transfer of sociopragmatic strategies from the native to the foreign language. In 
(cf. Wierzbicka 1986a: 365).
62 This idea is also expressed in Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984: 196)
63 Wong  does not focus on the apology itself but on the reaction towards apology in service settings. 
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this  area data includes analyses of Catalan (Dalmau & Gotor 2007),  Chinese (Chang 2010), 
Danish (Trosborg 1987), German (House 1989) Hebrew (Cohen & Olshtain 1981),  Jordanian 
(Baitaneh & Baitaneh 2006) and South Korean EFL apologies (Kim 2008). Of particular interest 
for  this  thesis  is  the  data  concerning  British  and  (Austrian)  German  apologies,  which  is 
discussed in the following chapters.
 6.1.1.1 Findings on British English private apology
 Analysing which forms “remedial moves” made by British speakers take, Owen (1983) finds 
that forms explicitly containing the words  apology,  apologies or  apologize (type i) are rarely 
used in spoken English (1983: 63f), while remedial moves including the key word sorry (type ii) 
are the most common types (1983: 65). The third type of remedial moves are expressions using 
I'm afraid (type iii), which according to Owen (1983: 88f) are “less clear-cut” than the other two 
cases. Native speakers asked to label these three types describe expressions of the first group as 
full-blown apologies, and expressions of type iii as apologetic. 
In  Britain,  the  use  of  apology  “may  be  a  way  of  signalling  your  social  identity 
linguistically” concludes Deutschmann (2003: 206), and argues that “its use is primarily part of a 
middle-class  sociolect”  (ibid.).  Further,  apology  may  be  a  way  of  signalling  high  status: 
Deutschmann (2003: 208) finds that “relatively powerful speakers were seen to apologise more 
to those with relatively less power than vice versa” and argues that such downward politeness is 
used in egalitarian societies as a sign of solidarity towards social inferiors (2003: 209). Thus, it 
“paradoxically becomes a linguistic marker of power” (ibid.). Deutschmann further finds that the 
presence or absence of an audience affects the use of apology form (i.e., more participants in a 
conversation lead to a more frequent use of apology) (2003: 206), and concludes that apology is 
being used as a politeness formula in public situations with the aim of  “presenting oneself as 
'respectable'” (ibid.). This is backed up by Deutschmann's finding that an apology given in front 
of a larger audience often functions as a “disarmer of statements which somehow contradicted 
the opinions expressed by another interlocutor ” (2003: 210). 
 6.1.1.2 Findings on Austrian German private apology 
So far, apology behaviour in Austrian German has not been very well researched. I encountered 
two studies dealing with Austrian apology (Meier 1992 and 1997). This is what they find: 
First,  it  has  been  concluded  that  “an  interplay  of  factors  (e.g.,  symmetry  in  the 
interlocutor  relationship,  chances  of  future  interaction,  face-to-face  contact,  and  perceived 
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seriousness of the offense)” is relevant for the choice of repair work strategy (Meier 1997: 200f). 
Seriousness of offence by itself is not as connected to the choice of apology strategy as has been 
thought. Meier's data refutes the claim that a more serious offence calls for a more elaborate 
apology (1997: 201). Rather, in Austrian German the situation perceived as most serious is the 
one which most frequently elicited no response at all. 
Further, Meier finds that routine formulae (i.e.,  “highly conventional forms that could 
hardly be construed as anything other than RW”, e.g. Es tut mir leid.) are most frequently used in 
asymmetrical  relationships, something that she claims has also been found valid for German 
speakers  by Vollmer  & Olshtain  (1989)  (1997:  201).  Another  similarity  in  data  of  Austrian 
(Meier  1992:  87)  and  German  (House  1989:  322)  speakers  also  regards  the  use  of  routine 
formulae. German speakers use a greater variety of formulae to apologize when compared to 
English  speakers,  who use  “one  highly routinized  all-purpose  token  (sorry)  with  overriding 
frequency” (House 1989).
 6.1.1.3 English and German apology compared
Comparing  the  speech  act  of  apology  between  speakers  of  Austrian  German  and 
American English,  Meier  (1992) finds that  the main difference lies in the orientation of the 
speaker to the hearer. “Austrians most often employ[...] a strategy of “bringing” the H[earer] to 
the S[peaker], whereby the onus is put on H to see things S's way, to step into S's shoes. This is 
in contrast to S moving towards H, involving a more H-supportive orientation” (1992: 83). 
Further, Meier (1992: 89) finds that Austrians use excuses more than Americans do and 
argues that reasons for this may lie in the country's political history: 
The more one can plead lack of responsibility, the less one can be held to blame. 
Where there is less personal choice, there is in turn less personal responsibility (cf. 
Ringel 1991:17). The former Habsburg Monarchy, in establishing a tradition of state 
provision and imposing a myriad of rules and regulations upon its 'children,' limited 
personal choice, and thus, personal responsibility (cf. Ringel 1991:17). (Meier 1992: 
90)
House, however, finds that German speakers express responsibility more frequently than English 
speakers do. She describes German apologetic behaviour in the following way:
German subjects  tend to  be more verbose,  selecting more self-directed strategies 
(such as grounding and justifying moves) in their attempt to express responsibility 
for an offence, and in general use expressions of responsibility more frequently than 
English speakers. (2006a: 251)
But House uses only data acquired from German speakers in Germany. This supports the idea 
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that  there  are  fundamental  differences  in  the  speech  behaviour  of  Austrians  and  Germans, 
because  a  preference  for  excuses  (which  admit  the  wrongfulness  of  the  act,  but  not  one's 
responsibility for it) and a preference for expressions of responsibility are not easily combined 
under the name of one German communicative style. Whether one German communicative style 
can be argued for in other cases is discussed in the next chapter. 
 6.1.1.4 English and German communicative styles compared 
House  (2006a)  provides  an  insight  into  the  cultural  differences  in  communicative  styles 
“preferred by members of the German and Anglophone linguistic and cultural communities”. 
Such broad terms include native speakers from all over the world and therefore also Austrian 
speakers of German and British speakers of English. However, the studies that are referred to 
throughout this paper analyse German German culture and language (House 1996, 1998, 2006b) 
and  the  question  arises  whether  conclusions  drawn  about  the  German  variety  of  German 
language and culture are relevant for the Austrian variety of German language and culture as 
well. 
Arguments can be found for both sides. On the one hand, Meier (1992) assumes that the 
values held by Austrians may be closer to those of its Slavic neighbours than to those of German 
German speakers – which implies that German German data is not helpful for providing insights 
into  Austrian  culture.  Also,  the results  on apologetic  behaviour  by Meier  (1992)  and House 
(2006a), as discussed above,  lead to believe that Austrian and German communicative behaviour 
differs. On the other hand, Meier (1992) does find similarities between German German and 
Austrian German,  which could be interpreted as a  hint  of  similarity in  cultural  background. 
Therefore the question arises whether, under the proviso that the researcher does not blindly trust 
the data, parts of the conclusions drawn about German German can be consulted when dealing 
with Austrian German. 
I  believe that  at  least  some of House's  (2006a) conclusions are  valid  for all  German 
speakers. An example to support this belief is her assumption based on the lack of a German 
word for small talk. House found German speakers to be “generally less likely and less willing to 
engage in  'small  talk'”  than the English speakers  and argues that  the lack of  “an equivalent 
German expression” for small talk is indicative of that behaviour. As there is also no equivalent 
expression for small talk in Austrian German, this could mean that her thoughts on that particular 
aspect  of  vocabulary  are  valid  for  Austrian  German  speakers  as  well.  Another  example 
supporting this belief deals with the German interpretation of rules. House claims that German 
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people see them as “fixed and valid, regardless of non-predictable, changing circumstances”. To 
explain, she tells us about German bike paths which are for cyclists only (even if no cyclist is in 
sight) and the Germans' affinity to stick to this rule and point it out to people who are breaking it. 
A similar behaviour has been observed in the Austrian culture by Haywood & Walker (2008), 
authors of the lonely planet guide.  They advise: “Don't cross the traffic lights when the figure is 
red, even when there is no traffic in sight. Austrians rarely do it, and the cops can instantly fine 
you for jaywalking” (2008: 41). These examples may show that there are some values held dear 
by both German and Austrian culture. Most importantly, however, House (2006: 249) herself 
states that her paper deals with the “German linguistic and cultural community”; a community 
which includes Austria. In the hope that her work is, partly, a resource to fall back on when 
considering my cases I will now provide an overview of her thoughts on German and Anglo-
Saxon language behaviour.  
To begin  with,  I  will  cite  the  paragraph which  sums up her  conclusions  on  German 
language behaviour. House argues that
being polite in German often involves saying what one means and meaning what one 
says (directness); engaging more and sooner in ‘serious talk’ than carefully preparing 
the ground for such seriousness with ‘small talk’ (focus on content); focussing in 
detail on matters relating to both self and the topic in hand (orientation towards self 
and  content);  and linking  utterances  with  their  speciﬁc  content  in  certain  speech 
events (ad hoc formulation). (2006: 263)
She presents these thoughts in the following dimensions of cross-cultural differences between 
English and German (figure 3). 
Figure 3: Dimensions of cross-cultural differences (German – English) (House 2006: 252)
German English
Directness Indirectness
Orientation towards Self Orientation towards other
Orientation towards Content Orientation towards Addressees
Explicitness Implicitness
Ad-hoc Formulation Verbal Routines
The German preference for direct speech can be seen in the unproblematic use of the imperative 
form in German. In German, the imperative is used without causing offence. To “members of the 
Anglophone  cultures”,  however,  the  imperative  sounds  unfriendly,  rude  or  even  aggressive 
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argues House (2006: 255).64 Also Wierzbicka (1985: 150), who compares Anglo-Saxon to Polish 
culture, finds that there are heavy restrictions on the use of the  imperative in English. Further, 
Wierzbicka describes Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition the following way: 
[It is] a tradition which places special emphasis on the rights and the autonomy of 
every individual, which abhors interference in other people's affairs (It is none of my 
business),  which  is  tolerant  of  individual  idiosyncrasies  and  peculiarities,  which 
respects   everyone's  privacy,  which approves of compromises and disapproves of 
dogmatism of any kind. (1985: 150)
German speakers are also found to be more explicit  in conveying messages, and are said to 
prioritize the content of their message over the addressees' feelings (House 2006: 256). Further, 
House claims that German speakers expect their interlocutors to mean what they say65 (2006: 
257f), just as they themselves mean what they say and say what they want (2006: 258). She also 
argues that German speakers do not use verbal routines as frequently as English speakers do, 
which the latter consider unfriendly, especially in service situations (where they miss the verbal 
concern expressed in addressee-centred routine formulae like How are you?) (2006: 256). These 
characteristics, as portrayed in figure 3, stand in contrast to what is deemed as polite by speakers 
of  English.  Further  differences,  according  to  House,  regard  the  “Anglo-Saxon  ‘Etiquette  of 
Simulation’“ which implies 
that  one ‘must sound (and act) as if one meant it’ when expressing,  for instance, 
thanks,  apologies,  compliments  and other  ‘face-lifts’ […].  This  kind  of  effective 
‘impression management’ tends to be both underdeveloped and less strongly valued 
by German speakers. (2006: 263)
To conclude, I would like to remind the reader that all the differences pointed out in this chapter 
are assumptions and hypotheses, as the authors themselves readily admit (e.g. House 1996: 358). 
Nevertheless,  it  is  assumptions  like  these  that  can  help  support  cultural  understanding  and 
enlighten  cultural  clashes  (Wierzbicka  1985:  177)  –  which  makes  them  “vital  to  human 
concerns” (1991: 283). 
 6.1.2 Research on public apologies 
The spectrum and use of apologetic strategies has also been investigated in the area of public 
apologies with the aid of examples taken from various areas of public interest – apologies from 
64 It  needs  to  be  mentioned  that  Wierzbicka  (1985:  175)  explicitly  warns  against  the  use  of  “terms  such  as 
'directness' or 'indirectness'” as they are “much too general, much too vague to be really safe in cross-cultural 
studies, unless the specific nature of a given cultural norm is spelled out”.
65 E.g., when exchanging numbers and promising a call, a German speaker would take the promise literally and 
expect the call, whereas a British/American speaker would simply understand this as an indication meaning “I am 
well disposed to you” (House 1996: 353).
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religious  institutions  (Hearit  2004,  etc.),  state  institutions  (Roberts  2006,  etc.  ),  corporations 
(Benoit 2002, etc. ), and figures of public interest (Benoit 1999, etc.) have been investigated. 
Researchers like Benoit (1995), Coombs (1998) and Hearit (1997) aim to draw conclusions as to 
which strategies work best in certain scenarios and give advice to those who need to apologize in 
public. 
 Interest has also been taken in analysing the role of public apology cross-culturally. Such 
efforts include the comparison of US-American and Israeli public apology speeches (Liebersohn 
2003), the analysis of apologies between US-American and Chinese diplomats (Glinert 2010, 
Zhang 2001), the public apology that the Japanese prime minister directed to the Chinese in 2005 
(Mok & Tokunaga 2009) and the analysis of the misunderstandings between Japan and the UK 
concerning Japan's apology to the UK in 1995 (Murata 1998). However, I have not encountered 
a study that examined cross-cultural public apology between Austria and the United Kingdom. 
 7 Research approach and design
In the course of this study I will analyse public apologies66 (and the surrounding discourse) by 
public entities in Austria and the United Kingdom in response to similar crisis situations for 
which they are directly responsible. By doing so, I will strive to answer the following research 
questions:  Which differences are there in public apologetic discourse between Austria and the 
UK? Can these differences be linked and explained in context with conclusions drawn from 
research on each culture's singularities? I will now explain how I aim to find answers to these 
questions. 
 7.1 Method
This study aims at exploring a so-far not very well researched area (i.e., cultural differences in 
public apologetic discourse between Austria and the UK) which is why a qualitative study is the 
most appropriate method. Qualitative research, as Dörnyei (2007: 39) points out, is “an effective 
way of exploring new, uncharted areas” and providing a repertoire of possible interpretations of 
human experience (rather than providing a generalizable correct interpretation) – thus making it 
a  useful  tool  for  researchers  who  venture  on  a  “journey  into  the  unknown”  (2007:  40). 
Drawbacks of qualitative research are that it can only provide an insight into a phenomenon and 
that its specific conditions and insights probably do not apply broadly to others (2007: 41). Also, 
because of lack of methodological rigour, qualitative studies can appear unprincipled and fuzzy; 
66  As defined in chapter 4.4.1
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and the results of qualitative research depend on the perceptions of the researchers – they are 
always  influenced  by  her  biases  and  idiosyncrasies.  Another  problematic  aspect  is  called 
anecdotalism. It describes the fact that the researcher has to state convincingly that her findings 
are based on critical investigation and not dependent on a few well chosen examples (Silverman 
2005: 211).
In order to conduct a useful study despite such restrictions, the qualitative researcher has 
to ensure that quality criteria are heeded: The researcher must strive to assess and document the 
legitimacy of the findings. Also, as the researcher herself is the instrument of the study, she has 
to convince the audience that she is a scholar with principled standards and integrity (2007: 56, 
59). She should identify her own biases and the role they play in her conclusions. She should 
also give alternative explanations a fair hearing and explicitly point out aspects that run counter 
to the conclusion of the study (2007: 59). Further, she should offer a detailed and reflective 
account of the steps taken to achieve the results and present the findings in rich contextualised 
detail (ibid.). 
The best method available to answer my research questions appears to be a case study. 
Dörnyei (2007: 155) states that it is “an excellent method for obtaining a thick description of a 
complex social issue embedded within a cultural context”. There are three types of case study 
(Stake 1995:  3):  First,  the intrinsic  case study,  which deals  with a case which is  interesting 
because of its own value. As Baxter & Jack (2008: 548) point out, the intent in intrinsic case 
study  is  to  better  understand  the  case  itself  and  not  some  “abstract  constructs  or  generic 
phenomenon”. Second, there is the instrumental case study, which provides insight into a wider 
issue while the actual case is of secondary interest. The case merely “plays a supportive role, 
facilitating our understanding of something else.” (Stake in Baxter & Jack 2008: 549)  Third, we 
have the multiple case study (which is an instrumental case study extended to several cases), 
where a number of cases are studied jointly in order to investigate a phenomenon or general 
condition. Of these three types the instrumental case study best fits my purpose because I will 
analyse the public apologetic discourse (of entities in the two cultures) in order to gain insight 
into the underlying cultural values that influence this discourse.
 7.2 Data
Dörnyei  (2007: 151) emphasizes that  a case “constitutes a single  entity with clearly defined 
boundaries”. Thus, my first task is to define how I choose my case.  In my study, a case consists 
of  the  pieces  of  information  and  news  given  throughout  the  public  apologetic  discourse 
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surrounding the crisis  of  a  public  entity.  Because  I  compare  the apologetic  discourse cross-
culturally, I need to ensure that I find two similar cases, one occurring in Austria, the other in the 
UK. In order for the cases to be comparable, they should be dealing with similar crisis situations. 
I will obtain my cases by the method of criterion sampling (cf. Dörnyei 2007: 128). I will 
use only a situation which fulfils the following criteria as a case: A public entity (e.g., a celebrity, 
politician or company) experiences a crisis (which, for whichever reason, is of public interest) 
and has to deal with this crisis. A similar situation must have happened in both Austria and the 
UK (in order for me to compare the cases) and the crisis and public apologetic discourse needs to 
be documented well so that I have sufficient material to conduct an analysis.  
 8 Case study: Police and crisis management in Austria and 
the United Kingdom
Table2  Case study overview
Austria UK
Victim Foreign (US-American) citizen who 
has been  residing in the country for 
several years
Foreign (Brazilian) citizen who has 
been  residing in the country for 
several years




The crisis is portrayed as a 
transgression by the victim and as an 
accident by the police. That the 
incident was in fact a transgression is 
supported by the verdict against the 
police.
At the beginning it is not quite clear 
whether the murder is in fact a 
transgression or the legitimate 
outcome of a police action.  The guilty 
verdict against the Met and the open 
verdict at the inquest prove that the 
killing was in fact a transgression of 
the law. 
Offence Grievous bodily harm Murder
What happened Victim was injured because of a mix-
up at Spittelau tube station 
Victim was killed because of a mix-up 
at Stockwell tube station 
 8.1 Case #1: Austrian Police and crisis management: The case of 
Mike Brennan
 8.1.1 The incident
On the  11th of February 2009 the black US-American Mike Brennan, who works in Vienna as a 
teacher at  the VIS (Vienna international School), was mistaken by the Viennese police for a 
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drugdealer and brought to the ground with physical force. As a result, Brennan suffered from 
bruises, swellings, and hairline fractures in two of his vertebrae. These are the facts that the 
police and Brennan agree on. How that incident occurred, however, is heavily disputed and could 
not even be solved satisfactorily in court. 
Brennan's  version  is  as  follows:  He  was  on  the  underground  train  U4  to  meet  his 
girlfriend. Because he had a bad feeling about how some people were acting on the train he sent 
her a text and then gave her a call.67 He was still on the phone to her, talking loudly, when he left 
the train at Spittelau station and expected to meet her on the platform. As he stepped out, a man 
in street clothes immediately jumped at him. Brennan fell on his back, his head hit the ground 
and the man kept punching him without saying a word. The attacker was joined by a second man 
who also punched Brennan. At this point, Brennan did not know if he was being robbed or what 
was going on. When he screamed they told him to “Stop screaming”. They kept hitting him for 
three or four minutes. Brennan's girlfriend, Birgit, arrived and tried to pull the first attacker off 
Brennan, but he pushed her away, told her not to interfere and jumped back on Brennan. One 
attacker shouted “Polizei, polizei!”. Brennan wondered why the man was calling for the police, 
and who he was and, if these men were the police, why they were beating him. After the attack, 
the men pulled Brennan to his feet. One of them took his phone and bag and searched it. The 
other one asked him for his passport and Brennan gave them his Vienna international school ID, 
which was never returned.  After that, they seemed to realise that he was not the man they were 
looking for. Throughout this, Birgit kept asking the attackers in German who they were and to 
show her  their  badge.  Only when she  was  on  the  phone  calling  the  police,  did  one  of  the 
attackers pull out his police ID, flashed it at her face and put it back. Brennan felt serious pain in 
his back and dropped back down to the ground upon which one of his attackers commented “So 
machen die das immer” (Mas/APA/derstandard.at 2009).68 Brennan understands this as a racial 
comment.  Later,  when he yelled “Please call  the ambulance,  someone please help me!”,  his 
girlfriend called the ambulance, which later took him to hospital. Brennan sees this incident as an 
unprovoked act of police brutality and racism (Brennan 2010; Die Grünen Wien 2009; Mas/APA 
2009, Peters 2009a, 2009b).
This is the police's version:69 
67 For a more detailed account cf. Die Grünen Wien 2009. 
68 According to the style sheet for papers in linguistics (Version April 2009, Institut für Anglistik und 
Amerikanistik der Universität Wien) German quotations need not be translated into English (2009: 5). 
69 Upon my request, the spokesperson of the police, Iris Seper, let me know that “for legal reasons” I am denied 
access to the official police protocol which was sent to the Staatsanwaltschaft. What I cite here is only a part of 
it, as read out in Club2 (ORF 2009b Min.7:35).
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Wir haben uns als “police” vorgestellt. Als der Brennan den Beamten als Polizisten 
erkannte zeigte er eindeutige Anzeichen eines sich anbahnenden Fluchtverhaltens. 
Brennan  verspannte  seinen  gesamten  Körper  und  war  im  Ansatz  begriffen  sich 
wegzuducken um an Revierinspektor S. vorbeizugelangen. Die Aufforderung “Stop 
Police!” wurde wiederholt,  zeigte allerdings keine Wirkung bei den[sic]  Brennan. 
Revierinspektor S. ergriff den SA70 mit seinen beiden Händen an der Oberbekleidung 
um  den  bevorstehenden  Fluchtversuch  zu  unterbinden.  Brennan  versuchte  sich 
loszureißen und weiterzugehen. Die abermalige Aufforderung “Stop Police!” wurde 
erneut ignoriert. Der SA fuchtelte mit seinen Händen vor dem Gesicht des Beamten 
herum. Schließlich führte Revierinspektor S eine rasche Bewegung nach vorne und 
unverzüglich gleich wieder nach hinten durch um den Brennan durch die plötzliche 
Gewichtsverlagerung  aus  dem  Gleichgewicht  zu  bringen.  Mit  maßhaltender 
Körperkraft wurde er zu Boden gebracht. (transcribed from ORF 2009b Min.7:35).
 The policeman did not intend to injure Brennan, he just wanted to bring him to the ground and 
keep him there until reinforcement arrived. Later, when Brennan was up again,  he dropped to 
the ground suddenly and unexpectedly,  causing a sensation at the platform. When the police 
realised the mix-up they apologised immediately.  When Brennan said that he was in pain,  a 
policeman called the ambulance but hung up again when he realised that Brennan's girlfriend 
was on the phone to call the ambulance at the same time (APA  2009; APA-DeFacto 2009b; 
2010; Klenk 2009; Windwarder 2009). 
These two reports  are  contradictory and no consent  was  reached as  to  what  actually 
happened. Not even the CCTV cameras (which are in operation at the platform) could be used to 
solve the case. If recordings exist, it is not sure what happened to them. As only the police can 
request access to the Wiener Linien's CCTV recordings, Brennan's lawyer got in touch with the 
public prosecutor's office and asked for them to obtain the recordings (ORF 2009m). In August 
2009 Der Standard writes that the recordings are judicially seized (Simoner 2009). However,on 
the  16th of  February  2009  the  same  newspaper  had  reported  that  due  to  specific  technical 
circumstances  no  recordings  were  available  (APA 2009b)  and,  in  an  article  on  the  17th of 
February, that there is only live surveillance at Spittelau and that therefore no recordings of the 
incident  exist  (Brickner  2009).  In  court  no  camera-evidence  was  used  which  reinforces  the 
assumption that recordings indeed do not exist. 
Without recordings it is impossible to reveal what actually happened. Nevertheless, an 
offensive act has occurred (or has been reported to have occurred) and the police are accused of 
being responsible for that act. As Benoit (1997b, cf. Chapter 4.4)  argues, regardless of whether 
the accused are in fact responsible or not, being accused puts their image at risk. In this case, the 
70 SA is an abbreviation used by the Austrian police. It stands for Schwarzafrikaner.
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police are accused of racism and unprovoked brutality and I will now show what they said and 
did in order to repair their image. 
 8.1.2 The public apology
The police informs its own department BBE, i.e. Büro für besondere Ermittlungen, which is led 
by a secretary of Polizeipräsident Gerhard Pürstl (Klenk 2009). On February 12, the BBE sends 
their  report  to the public  prosecutor's  office.  On the same day the  Menschenrechtsbeirat71 is 
informed. No public statements are given. 
(1)72 On February 11 a female member of the police calls Brennan's partner and tells her that she 
regrets the incident and that this is the first time such an incident has occurred in Vienna. She 
invites them to come to  a police department  so that the police can explain how the mix-up 
occurred. The next day the police try to call again, but do not get through (Windwarder 2009). 
(2)  The  press  office  of  Vienna's  police  states  on  February 15  that  giving  statements 
concerning this incident is not their responsibility but that of the public prosecutor's office. By 
the evening, Vienna's Landespolizeikommandant73 Karl Mahrer asks for understanding that he 
cannot say anything about the allegations  (APA DeFacto: 2009). He claims that three aspects 
need to be explored: First, has the man been mistaken for a dealer, and if so, how could this 
happen? Second, what is the deal with the injuries? Third,  how was the case communicated 
internally? (ibid.) Mahrer promises that "Sobald alles geprüft ist, wird es ganz, ganz schnell klare 
Konsequenzen geben” (ibid.) and claims that "Wer mich kennt weiß,  dass  ich für eine  Polizei 
stehe, in der Rassismus keine Chance hat." (ibid.). He adds that the allegations against the police 
are taken seriously and would be looked into as soon as possible (APA 2009c). Further, he says: 
Ich möchte erst dann mit dem Opfer sprechen und mich entschuldigen, wenn die 
internen Ermittler ihre Untersuchung abgeschlossen haben. Das wird aber schon in 
den  nächsten  Tagen  der  Fall  sein  […]  Aber  bei  einer  Amtshandlung  sofort 
zuzuschlagen ist selbstverständlich nicht Standard der Polizei. (Möseneder 2009) 
(3) In the meantime, Brennan's call for apology is printed in several newspapers: “Ich 
erwarte, dass die Polizei ihren Fehler zugibt und sich entschuldigt. Ich möchte nicht, dass so 
etwas mir oder jemand anderem nochmals widerfährt" (e.g. APA 2009c, APA DeFacto 2009). 
Brennan is not the only one who criticises the police for failing to apologize. Brickner, journalist 
71 For the task of the Menschenrechtsbeirat see:  http://www.menschenrechtsbeirat.at/cms15/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=33&Itemid=9
72 The single steps of the public apology or reactions to it are numbered for easier identification in the next chapter. 
73 Because the titles of Austrian police officers differ from title of British police officers I will keep the Austrian 
title when no adequate translation can be found. 
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of Der Standard writes: 
Wobei - drittens - Mahrer und anderen Polizeioberen kein Zacken aus der Krone 
fiele, würden sie sich mit dem geschockten US-Bürger jetzt sofort in Kontakt setzen. 
Doch der Polizeichef will mit dem Schwerverletzten erst reden, wenn der Übergriff 
intern bewiesen ist: eine Scheu, sich etwas zu vergeben, die Korpsgeist statt Mut zur 
Transparenz zeigt. (Brickner 2009b) 
(4)  On  February  16  the  Viennese  BPD  (i.e.,  Bundespolizeidirektion)  issues  a  press 
release74 which states that the Viennese police regrets the mix-up: 
Die Wiener Polizei bedauert die stattgefundene Verwechslung. Unmittelbar nach der 
Amtshandlung  erfolgte  eine  Kontaktaufnahme  mit  dem Betroffenen,  um sich  zu 
entschuldigen, wobei lediglich die Lebensgefährtin erreicht wurde.
Grundsätzlich sind Verwechslungen von Personen mit  ähnlicher  Statur,  Kleidung, 
etc. nicht auszuschließen. Durch  Einhaltung der Mitwirkungspflichten seitens der 
Betroffenen  an  der  Klärung des  Sachverhaltes  kann  ein  derartiger  Irrtum jedoch 
rasch geklärt werden. (BPD 2009) 
(5) Brennan's lawyer, Alexander Hofmann is scandalized by the police's press release. 
"Wie hätte mein Mandant auf die Verwechslung hinweisen sollen, nachdem man sich auf ihn 
gestürzt und auf ihn eingeprügelt hat?" he asks. (Red 2009). The anti-racism association ZARA 
calls the police's statements “more than cynical” (TT/APA 2009). 
(6) The police union states that “manche Vorwürfe [sind] zwar nicht entschuldbar, aber 
erklärbar […] die Szene wird immer härter ... die Polizistinnen und Polizisten müssen auch an 
ihre eigene Sicherheit denken".  Der Standard  reports this with the heading “Im 'Fall Brennan' 
werden seltsame Schlüsse gezogen” (Red 2009).
(7)  On  February  25  Gerhard  Pürstl  (Polizeipräsident)  and  Karl  Mahrer 
(Landespolizeikommandant)  respond to the accusations.  They say that “the alleged victim of 
racism clearly exaggerated a bit” (APA-DeFacto 2009b). The policemen indeed addressed the 
supposed  dealer  with  the  words  “Stop  police  you  are  arrested”.  Also,  they  did  apologize 
immediately after they realized the mistake (ibid.) . 
(8) On February 25 the ORF programme Club 2 “Was ist los mit unserer Polizei?” is 
broadcast. In this context Gerhard Pürstl, Vienna's Polizeipräsident, apologizes to Brennan for 
the mix-up. This is a transcription of Pürstl's statement in Club2: 
Pürstl: “Es kam am Bahnsteig zur Verwechslung. Das ist unbestritten. Ich möchte an 
dieser  Stelle  das  auch  ausdrücklich  bedauern.  Verwechslungen  im  Zuge  von 
Fahndungen, das kanns polizeilich immer wieder geben. Das kommt in den besten 
Polizeien vor. Soll nicht sein, aber wanns passiert ist,  dann muss man auch dazu 
74 The full press release in German can be found in the appendix.
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stehen und das bedauern. Dafür entschuldige ich mich aber ausdrücklich. Es gehen 
aber  dann  die  Darstellungen  unserer  Beamten  und  die  bisherigen  Erhebungen 
deutlich von dem ab was wir eben gehört haben und was eben geschildert wurde 
[i.e., Brennan's portrayal of what had happened], denn ich gehe davon aus, dass die 
Polizeibeamten  mit  “Stop  Police  you  are  arrested”  sich  als  Polizeibeamte  zu 
erkennen gegeben haben. Das ist an und für sich eine Floskel die eintrainiert ist, die 
für  solche  Amtshandlungen  eintrainiert  ist,  und  die  immer  am  Beginn  einer 
Festnahme  eines  Suchtgiftdealers  steht,  den  ja  die  Beamten  vor  sich  glaubten” 
Presenter: “Brennan, war das das erste das sie gehört haben “Stop police you are 
arrested”? Brennan: “No, that's not the first thing I heard.” (ORF 2009b, Min.2:10) 
(9) In Club 2 Brennan does not comment on Pürstl's apology at all and I also could find 
no other immediate response by Brennan. However, towards the end of the year,  Der Falter 
writes that Brennan does not accept the police's apology because it only refers to the mix-up and 
not to the uncouth method of the apprehension (APA-DeFacto 2009c). 
Barbara Liegl, the manager of anti-racism association ZARA, also claims that the police 
misunderstand the problem. “Nicht die angebliche Verwechslung der Männer ist das Problem, 
sondern - so sich die Vorwürfe bestätigen - die Unverhältnismäßigkeit des Polizeieinsatzes", she 
says (Leonhard 2009). 
The  Neue Kärntnertageszeitung points out that the police's apology goes hand in hand 
with  accusing  Brennan  and  writes  “Wirklich  bedauerlich  ist,  dass  man  nach  mehr  als  zwei 
Wochen  noch  immer  nicht   soweit  ist,  die  Hand  zu  einer  (ordentlichen!)  Entschuldigung 
auszustrecken - zu einer ohne Wenn und Abers. Die ist nämlich längst überfällig.” (Zacharias 
2009). 
(10)  In  April  2010  one  of  the  policemen  is  charged  with  bodily  injury  caused  by 
negligence. Legal proceedings are held on June 24 at the Bezirksgericht Josefstadt (i.e., the court 
of the Viennese district Josefstadt). At the hearing, the policeman says: “Es war ein bedauerlicher 
Zwischenfall, was mir an und für sich auch leidtut.”(APA 2010), and "Es war ein 30-Sekunden-
Fehler, der mich jetzt als rassistischen Polizisten darstellt” (Wasinger 2010b). However, judge 
Margaretha  Richter  believes  that  the  way  the  policeman  approached  Brennan  was  not  in 
accordance with the regulations and she cannot  rule out  that  the policeman injured Brennan 
deliberately (APA 2010). Therefore, the policeman is charged with grievous bodily harm and the 
case taken to the Viennese Straflandesgericht (i.e., the Viennese criminal court) (Bernold 2010).
(11) When Brennan is asked in July whether he has heard anything from official sources 
yet, he answers: 
Gar  nichts.  Bis  heute  nicht.  Ich  finde,  die  Polizisten  sollten  sich  entschuldigen. 
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Verantwortung  übernehmen  für  ihr  unprofessionelles  Vorgehen  und die  schweren 
Folgen.  Auch  wenn  es  eine  Verwechslung  war:  Darf  man  einen  Drogendealer 
krankenhausreif prügeln? Aus meiner Sicht nicht. (Kurier 2010)
(12)  In  October  2010  proceedings  are  held  at  the  Straflandesgericht.  The  policeman 
testifies 
Ich habe den Mann mit den Worten ,Stop! Police! You are arrested!' angehalten. Er 
hat überhaupt nicht reagiert. Für mich hat es ausgeschaut, als ob er sich unter mir 
durchducken  und  davonlaufen  will.  […]  Dass  ich  von  einem  Fluchtverhalten 
ausgegangen bin, war mein großer Fehler. Kann sein, dass er mich nicht gehört hat. 
Das Verhalten, das er gesetzt hat, habe ich falsch interpretiert. […] Ich habe einen 
menschlichen Fehler gemacht. (APA 2010b; Seeh 2010)75
His lawyer argued that "Hätte der US-Amerikaner keinen Widerstand geleistet, wäre die ganze 
Situation gar nicht eskaliert." and further says that the scrapping was justified (Wasinger 2010). 
On January 11, Judge Patrick Aulebauer finds the policeman guilty of negligent grievous bodily 
injury and charges him with a fine of 2800€. The policeman comments 
Es ist traurig, wie die Berichterstattung über diesen Fall gelaufen ist. Ich war vom 
ersten Tag an schuldig.  Es hat genau ins System gepasst:  auf der einen Seite ein 
unschuldiger Schwarzer und auf der anderen Seite die Polizei (APA-DeFacto 2011). 
The verdict is called “mild” in several newspapers (e.g., Simoner 2011, Wasinger 2011). 
(13) In an interview after the verdict was delivered, Brennan says to the Falter: 
Ich habe nicht das Gefühl, dass es dem Beamten leidtut  – oder sonst jemandem. 
Während des Prozesses vermied er Augenkontakt. Es war schockierend für mich zu 
sehen,  dass  er  nicht  den  Eindruck  machte,  als  wäre  er  sich  irgendeines  Fehlers 
bewusst. (Gepp 2011)
 8.1.3 Analysis
What is most striking about the police's crisis management, is that they took a long time to speak 
out in public. The “mix-up”, as they refer to this incident, happened on a Wednesday afternoon 
and it took the police four days, until Sunday evening, to address the media and thus the public. 
The police's reluctance to give statements concerning the incident allows for the victim's version 
of  the  incident  to  be  published  without  the  voice  of  the  offender  being  heard.  Policeman 
Windwarder (2009), who is a member of the Kriminalisten76, argues that it was the poor to non-
existent  crisis  management  of  the  police,  which  allowed  for  the  mix-up  to  turn  into  the 
75 Different chunks of the message were printed in various newspapers and I was quite surprised that the wording 
was not exactly the same in all versions. What I cite here are sentences taken out of two articles. 
76 A club, aiming at the promotion of public relations for the profession of detectives
63
international scandal it has become. Kurier-journalist Grolig (2009) also claims that the police's 
crisis management is not efficient. He notes that the police's “moment of shock” lasted fourteen 
days and  points out that Pürstl's comments (cf. 8) were not enough to win a victory for the 
police. 
According  to  Ellwanger  (cf.  Chapter  4.3.2.2),  the  call  for  an  apology  means 
communicating to the offender that  he cannot say what he said or do what he did, which is 
exactly the function that the call for apology takes in this case. In Brennan's call for apology the 
police are accused of having done a serious wrong: Using violence against an innocent person, 
without identifying themselves or giving the person a chance to speak out for himself. They are 
now put under pressure to repair their image, which after this incident is that of a racist force that 
inappropriately resorts to violence (Müller 2009). 
In  the  statement  (cf.2)  which  is  given  by Karl  Mahrer,  Landespolizeikommandant of 
Vienna, the police react to that call for apology, but not in the way wished for by Brennan and 
probably the media (which portrays the story from Brennan's viewpoint). In his speech Mahrer 
stresses  the routines and values of the police by stating that the incident is taken seriously and 
being  investigated.  He  claims  that  once  the  case  is  investigated  there  will  be  immediate 
consequences.  He  highlights  that  instantaneous  beating  is  not  a  policy  of  the  police.  By 
promising  an  apology,  he  could  be  showing  that  apologizing  is  an  option  that  the  police 
considers in case of wrongdoing. However, Mahrer does not address Brennan but the public at 
large, thus giving reason to believe that his statement is aimed at creating a more favourable 
image of Austrian police and not at reconciling with the offended individual. It becomes clear the 
next day that the statement does not improve the situation of the police in the media, which 
criticises the police for postponing making contact with Brennan and for not apologizing to him 
(cf.3). 
The police press release from February 16 further aggravates the image of the police in 
the media (cf.3). The police merely regret the mix-up, but do not apologize for the unjustified 
violence against Brennan. Also, they try to shift the blame for the incident onto him (by accusing 
him  of  neglecting  his  duty  to  resolve  a  mix-up).  Brennan's  lawyer  and  ZARA who  are 
scandalized by the police statement are given voice in newspapers (cf.5). 
This  does  not  influence  the  police  to  change  their  procedure.  High  police  officials 
(Mahrer and Pürstl) accuse Brennan of exaggerating (cf.7) which can be seen as an attempt to 
make him look like an unreliable witness of the incident in public. On February 28, the police 
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further attempt to undermine Brennan's trustworthiness by stating that his injuries are not as bad 
as he says. The police claim to have obtained this information from a witness, whom they keep 
anonymous  at  his  request  (APA 2009d).  Mahrer  and  Pürstl  further  state  that  the  policemen 
involved in the incident did indeed apologize to Brennan (cf.7). After the promise of an apology 
(cf.2) and the report of a failed apology (cf.4), this is another mere report of an apology (cf.7). 
Thus, the word 'apology' is used by the police several times. A statement of apology however is 
not given in public. 
In TV-programme Club2 (cf.8) Pürstl finally offers an apology, but it concerns the mix-up 
only (just like the police's press release (cf.4) which merely utters a regret for the mix-up). It is 
immediately followed by comments of doubt concerning Brennan's version (or an accusation of 
lying, depending on how one chooses to interpret the statement).  The same tune is repeated by 
the policeman who injured Brennan in the court hearing when he says that he is sorry for the 
regrettable incident (cf.10). These apologies cannot be said to be an attempt to reconcile with the 
victim.
The crisis  management  of the police provokes  a  reaction from ZARA-manager  Liegl 
(cf.9) who points  out that  the police do not understand the real  problem. Also, a newspaper 
article in the  Neue Kärntnertageszeitung describes the author's  regret  that  the police are not 
offering the already overdue “proper” apology (cf.9). The police, however, turn a deaf ear to 
such calls. Throughout the whole time they maintain their defensive crisis response strategies 
excuse (cf.4,8) and attack accuser (cf.7,8,).77  
In July 2010 Brennan points out in an interview that he has neither been contacted by the 
police nor received an apology (cf.11). The police could have reacted to that, but did not. When 
Brennan is interviewed again in January 2011 he has still not received an apology. He is also 
under the impression that neither the policeman nor anyone else is sorry for or aware of the 
mistake that was made (cf.13). This shows that the crisis management of the Austrian police did 
not lead to reconciliation with the victim. In the following chapter I will analyse how the British 
police manages a similar crisis situation. 
 8.2 Case #2: British Police and crisis management: The case of Jean 
Charles de Menezes
In this case, allegations against the police are brought up as the truth of what had happened 
77 Cf. chapter  4.4.2.5
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slowly emerges. It therefore makes sense to tell the whole case as it unfolds and not, like above, 
split the incident from the public apologies that are made. 
 8.2.1 The incident and public apologies
 8.2.1.1 The Met kills an innocent man
On July 7 2005, 52 people are killed by suicide bombers on London public transport. On July 21 
there is another attack, but the bombs fail to explode. On July 22 Jean Charles de Menezes, a 
Brazilian  living  in  London,  is  mistaken  for  a  suicide  bomber  and  shot  dead  by  the  Met 
(Metropolitan police) at Stockwell tube station. 
(1) Head of the Metropolitan police, Sir Ian Blair says at a press conference on July 22 
that the shooting is directly linked to the anti-terrorist operation (Siddique & Sturcke 2007): 
The information I have available is that the shooting is directly linked to the ongoing 
and expanding anti-terrorist operation. I need to make clear that any death is deeply 
regrettable. But as I understand the man was challenged and refused to obey police 
instructions. (transcribed from BBC 2005b). 
(2) The next day, July 23, the Met tell the media that the dead man was not a terrorist. Ian 
Blair gives this statement: 
This is a tragedy. The Metropolitan Police accepts the full responsibility for this and 
to the family I can only express our deep regrets. But I think it is also important to 
recognize  that  the underlying causes of this are not a police action or a police policy 
or procedures but actually the fact that we have terrorists using suicide as a weapon 
on the streets of London and below the streets of London. (transcribed from BBC 
2005c)
 He said there was no reason to believe the four men sought over the failed bombings 
- whose images caught on CCTV were released on Friday - had left the country.  He 
acknowledged  "somebody  else  could  be  shot"  as  the  hunt  continued,  but  added 
"everything  is  done  to  make it  right".  But  he  said  the  "shoot  to  kill"  policy for 
dealing with suspected suicide bombers would remain in force. (BBC 2005)
“We're quite comfortable the policy is right but these are difficult times. They (the 
rules) have to be that. There's no point in shooting at someone's chest because that's 
where a bomb is likely to be. […] There's no point in shooting anywhere else if they 
fall down and detonate it. This is drawn from experience from other countries. The 
only way to deal with it is to shoot to the head. […] Somebody else could be shot. 
But everything is done to make it right. […] This is a tragedy. The Metropolitan 
Police accept full responsibility for this. To the family I can only express my deep 
regrets.  […]  This  is  a  terrifying  set  of  circumstances  for  individuals  to  make 
decisions. We have to recognise is [sic] that people are taking difficult decisions in 
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life  threatening  situations.  [...]  It  wasn't  just  a  random  event.  There's  nothing 
gratuitous going on, nothing cavalier here, no conspiracy to shoot people. There are 
still officers out there having to make those calls as we speak. […] We have to take 
this tragedy, deeply regret it and move on to the investigation which is proceeding at 
an extraordinary pace.” Declaring that his men were "racing against time", he added 
later: "What would have happened if these officers had not shot, and that man had 
been a bomber and got on the Tube. It would have been absolutely dreadful." (Prince 
2005)
(3) “London's mayor Ken Livingstone calls  the killing a 'human tragedy'.  'The police 
acted to do what they believed necessary to protect the lives of the public. This tragedy has 
added another victim to the toll of deaths for which the terrorists bear responsibility,' he said.” 
(Dennis 2005)
(4) On the same day, Home Secretary Charles Clarke tells the BBC:
It's  a  tragedy for  Mr  de  Menezes  and  his  family.  I  very  much  regret  what  has 
happened. The police were trying to do their very best in very difficult circumstances 
to protect the people of London from suicide bombers. They have my full support. 
[…] In this tragic case, a mistake was clearly made which will be regretted for ever. 
(Prince 2005) 
In this tragic case a mistake was clearly made which will be regretted forever. But I 
don't think that means that they're wrong to have a policy to deal with these appalling 
circumstances. I wish we didn't have to, I wish we didn't have suicide bombers, but 
we do. (transcribed from BBC 2005c)
"I very, very much regret what happened. "I hope [the family] understand the police 
were trying to do their very best under very difficult circumstances."  On the ongoing 
bombings  investigation,  "good progress"  was  being  made  thanks  to  "tremendous 
support" from the public. Mr Clarke said he was postponing joining his family on 
holiday because of the current crisis. (BBC 2005) 
(5) These statements are reported under headings such as “Police chief 'sorry' over death” 
(BBC 2005), “Sorry..But we're right” (The Mirror: Prince 2005),  “Regrets, but no apology, in 
London subway shooting” (NYtimes: Sciolino 2005) or “Death of an innocent man” (Guardian 
2005). The NYtimes further write that “Sir Ian Blair, the London police commissioner, stopped 
short of an outright apology as he expressed "deepest regrets" and accepted "full responsibility" 
for the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes”. It is further reported that “About three dozen people, 
apparently  Brazilians,  demonstrated  in  front  of  Scotland  Yard  in  central  London,  holding  a 
banner that read, 'Sorry is not enough'”. (Sciolino 2005) The Guardian, on the other hand, after 
pointing out the police's most obvious mistake is killing an innocent man and criticising Jack 
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Straw's comment that “this was not a serious setback for the police”, recognizes the police's 
apology:
To their  credit,  the  police  did  break  with  their  earlier  tradition  of  prevarication, 
coming out with an unequivocal statement on Saturday that the man they had shot 
had no connection with the four attempted bombings on Thursday.  There was an 
apology to Mr De Menezes's family and a sincere sense of regret. (Guardian 2005)
(6)  De  Menezes'  cousin  Alex  Pereira,  who  is  acting  as  the  family  spokesperson, 
comments  on  the  statements:  "Apologies  are  not  enough.  I  believe  my cousin's  death  was 
result[sic] of police incompetence." (BBC 2005). "I ask all the people to ask the Metropolitan 
Police and Tony Blair, 'What kind of job are they doing?'” (Sciolino 2005). 
“The police explanation is that they had to kill someone to show the population that 
they are making the country safe.[...] Jean was a 100 per cent good guy who never 
did anything wrong and had no reason to run. His English is good, he did not fear the 
police, and he had nothing to hide. […] He wasn't fanatical about anything and didn't 
know any Islamic extremists. He enjoyed pubs, clubs and socialising. He kept out of 
trouble and was never in any wrongdoing.” Alex identified his cousin's body and 
broke the news of Jean's death to his appalled mother Maria, 50. He said: "The police 
have tried to apologise. But they should all be ashamed. They have shown they are 
incapable and stupid. There's no explanation for what they have done. […] If Jean 
had been blown up by Muslim fanatics I could understand it and move on. But to be 
shot by the police five times at close range? […] I don't get it. Someone needs to pay. 
I want answers. Don't give a gun to someone with a brain the size of a three-year-
old." (Prince 2005) 
(7) On July 25, British foreign secretary Jack Straw and his Brazilian counterpart, Celso 
Amorim meet. It is reported that the following was said: 
"I profoundly regret the circumstances in which we had to hold this meeting," Straw 
said in a joint news conference with Amorim. "I would personally like [to] take this 
opportunity to offer my own condolences to Mr. Menezes' family and friends, and 
condolences to the Brazilian government and people." (CNN 2005)
Mr  Straw  said  he  "profoundly  regretted"  the  death.  Security  sources  have  said 
electrician Mr Menezes was in the UK on an out-of-date student visa. Mr Straw said 
he  did  not  know  Mr  Menezes'  precise  immigration  status  but  said  it  was  his 
"understanding that he was here lawfully". (BBC 2005d)
Mr Amorim said the dead man's family wanted his body quickly returned to Brazil. 
And he said compensation from the Metropolitan Police was important for what was 
a "humble" family.  "It would not lessen the shock and concern at the death of this 
innocent person but it would be something concrete in addition to the apologies that 
have been made verbally," he said. (BBC 2005d)
Jack Straw, in a joint press conference with his Brazilian counterpart, Celso Amorim, 
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made an unreserved apology on behalf of Britain last night. He said: "My own sense 
of loss was made more poignant because I happen to live in this part of London, 
where  I  have  lived  for  over  25 years."  Mr  Straw also said a  claim from Mr de 
Menezes' family for compensation would be treated "sympathetically and quickly". 
(Morris, Brown & Lakey 2005)
In a BBC interview Amorim says: 
I did not expect to be told very much at this stage in terms of details. I came here to 
express what we already said in our note, official note yesterday, that the Brazilian 
government and actually the Brazilian public opinion is shocked and perplexed by 
these events cause it's now cleared it was a peaceful and innocent person who was 
killed. I reiterated that of course Brazil is totally in solidarity with the UK and with 
everyone else in the fight against terrorism. But of course, even in the fight against 
terrorism we should also be cautious to avoid the loss of innocent life and that's what 
apparently happened. I heard expressions of regret, deepest regret by Lord Triesman 
[Foreign  Office  Minister  with  responsibility  for  relations  with  Latin  America].  I 
actually had asked to see the foreign secretary but he was not in town. But in the 
course of our conversation also Jack Straw came to the phone. And he said the same, 
more or less the same words, of deep regret and he ensured that there would be a 
thorough investigation, that this may take a little while but it will be a very thorough 
investigation. (transcribed from BBC 2005e)
It is further reported, that Amorim said "We cannot recover the life of the Brazilian citizen who 
died but it is very important to know all the details" (AP 2005). 
(8) On July 25 prime minister Tony Blair gives a statement regarding the killing of de 
Menezes:
We are all desperately sorry for the death of an innocent person. And I understand 
entirely the feelings of the young man's family. But we also have to understand the 
police  are  doing  their  job  in  very,  very  difficult  circumstances.  And  I  think  it's 
important that we give them every support.  And that we understand, that had the 
circumstances been different and for example this had turned out to be a terrorist and 
they had failed to take these actions, they would have been criticised the other way. 
At the same time therefore,  in expressing our sorrow and deep sympathy for the 
death that has happened, it is important that we allow the police, and support them in 
doing the job they have to do in order to protect people in this country. (transcribed 
from BBC 2005f). 
(9) De Menezes' cousins criticise Blair's apology for including a defence of the British 
police. Arialva Pereira, a cousin, says “His apologies aren't easing our pain […] He's not saying 
anything about punishing the police who did this, it's  more like he's supporting them." (NY 
Times 2005). In Gonzaga, de Menezes' home town, hundreds of people are protesting, saying 
that the “apology did not go far enough” (BBC 2005d) and that “Apologies don't help, we want 
justice”(NY Times 2005). The people demand the arrest of the police officers who killed de 
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Menezes (ibid.). Gonzaga's mayor Júlio de Souza refers to Menezes' death as an assassination 
and says that "It's easy for Blair to apologize, but it doesn't mean very much […] What happened 
to English justice and England, a place where police patrol  unarmed?" (ibid.).  The Landless 
Rural  Worker's  Movement  states that  “Menezes 'was assassinated in  cold blood, a victim of 
intolerance' and call for the British withdrawal from Iraq” (ibid.).
 8.2.1.2 The Met did not tell the truth after the killing
(10) On July 28 2005 the Met admit that contrary to their report de Menezes did not wear a bulky 
jacket (in which a bomb could have been hidden) and also did not jump the ticket barrier (but 
used his oyster-card). He did not behave suspiciously (Honigsbaum 2005).
In its report the Guardian does not spell out that the police must have lied to the public 
when first reporting the incident. Other newspapers do so and use headlines like “Menezes police 
chief ‘misled’ public” or  “How the public was misled” (Mailonline 2005a). Bloggers who cite 
the Guardian's article invent new headlines: "We are going to kill people for fun, lie about it and 
then do it  again" (AnonymousCoward 2005), “London police are lying about why they shot 
Brazilian man” (Myreader 2005) or “London Police Chief 'Sir' Ian Blair is a Bloody Liar, Should 
be Stripped of Title” (Mathaba 2005).
De Menezes' cousin, Vivien Figueiredo, “condemn[s] the shoot-to-kill policy which had 
led to her cousin's death and vow[s] that what she call[s] the 'crime' would not go unpunished” 
(Honigsbaum 2005). Another cousin, Patricia da Silva Armani says that “'An innocent man has 
been killed as though he was a terrorist,' [...] 'An incredibly grave error was committed by the 
British police.'” (ibid.). 
 8.2.1.3 Leaked documents accuse Met 
(11)  On  August  16  leaked  documents  from  the  IPCC  (Independent  police  complaints 
commission),  which  is  investigating  Menezes'  killing,  state  that  the  Met  made  a  series  of 
“catastrophic blunders” (BBC 2005g, Edwards & Brough 2005, Tendler & Ford 2005) and that 
“Mr de Menezes died because of misjudgements, errors and bad decisions even more grave than 
first thought” (Alleyne 2005). Amongst other things, it is revealed that Ian Blair “tried to block 
an independent  inquiry into the shooting of  Jean Charles de Menezes  because [...]  it  would 
impede the police's terrorist investigations” (The Sunday Times 2005). 
Thereupon,  the family's  call  for truth is  repeated by cousin Allessandro Pereira:  "My 
family deserve the full truth about his murder. The truth cannot be hidden any longer. It has to be 
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made public. […] They killed my cousin, they could kill anyone, any English person." (BBC 
2005f).  Also,  De  Menezes'  family  demand  a  public  inquiry  into  his  death  and  that  those 
responsible for the shooting are jailed for life (BBC 2005e). They claim that “Sir Ian and Tony 
Blair share the officer's culpability. 'They are the really guilty ones'” (Cowen, Dodd & Norton-
Taylor  2005).  The  family's  lawyer,  Harriet  Wistrich,  claims  that  “the leak  'raises  very,  very 
serious  questions  about  the  shoot-to-kill  policy'”  (Williams  &  Wright  2005)  and  urges  the 
government and police to review this policy (BBC 2005f). She also calls for  Sir Ian Blair to 
resign (BBC 2005e). She says "He should go. Lies have been put out and nobody has corrected 
them." (Edwards & Brough 2005). This is repeated by Alessandro Pereira:  “My family want the 
truth. For the sake of my family, for the sake of the people of London. In Jeans [sic] name I say 
that those responsible should resign. Ian Blair should resign.” (Pereira 2005)
(12) Norman (2005) of  The Independent  notices that because of a lost game, football 
manager Eriksson gives a heartfelt apology; And points out that such words would not be heard 
from
Sir Ian apologising for misleading the public, and more pertinently Mr de Menezes's 
grieving  family,  with  the  bizarre  untruths  told  (perhaps  unwittingly)  about  the 
electrician's  clothes,  demeanour  and  refusal  to  obey police  commands.  (Norman 
2005)
The article includes the following call for apology: 
Nothing humanises a public figure like humility; nor dehumanises one so much as 
wilful and dishonest intransigence in the face of overwhelming evidence. If Sir Ian 
could  only  grasp  this  and  issue  a  genuine  and  unqualified  apology  -  not  the 
traditionally  grudging  "I  have  to  take  responsibility  because  it  happened  on  my 
watch" - to the de Menezes family, and promised to do everything in his power to 
learn from this fiasco, he might even cling on to his job. As it is, his refusal to admit 
the blindingly obvious will further antagonise his former fan club in the right-wing 
press to the point at which Charles Clarke has no choice but to give him the boot. 
(Norman 2005). 
(13) While some high Met officials claim that the leaks are an embarrassment for the 
Met, and that Sir Ian Blair would be put under pressure to go, the Met and the Home Office  state 
that it would be inappropriate to comment (BBC 2005f). Ian Blair admits a month later that 
more could have been done to set the record straight, but he denied misleading Mr de 
Menezes'  family.  […] He admitted  that  he had considered resigning  after  Mr de 
Menezes' family called for him to step down. "I certainly did," he said. "But I don't 
think it was right for the organisation, or for the country, or for London to do that. 
The big job is to defend this country against terrorism. (Bowcott, Cowan, Travis & 
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Jones 2005). 
 8.2.1.4 Met “ex gratia” offer to family
(14) On August 20, de Menezes' parents make public that on August 1 they received an offer of 
£15.000 in addition to funeral costs or travel expenses from the Met. The offer and the way the 
offer was made did not help improve relations between the Met and the family: De Menezes' 
parents  state  they  were  “pressurised  into  agreeing  to  the  meeting  with  Deputy  Assistant 
Commissioner John Yates at their home in the remote town of Gonzaga, with less than a day's 
notice” (Carrell  2005). Also, the letter  that  contained the offer was written in complex legal 
English – de Menezes' parents only speak Portuguese. “[T]he police letter advised them to get 
advice from the family's lawyers in Britain, [but] the [family] claim their requests to postpone 
the meeting until their lawyer could get to them were turned down by Mr Yates.” (Carrell 2005). 
The family tell the media that they felt insulted by the Met offer and that they rejected it. 
Mrs. de Menezes says "I thought it was disgusting for this policeman to be talking about money 
when my son was only just buried. I did not like having to sit near such a man." (ibid.). De 
Menezes' brother states 
They thought we were poor people, stupid people. We may be poor but we are not 
that stupid. We will not exchange money for my brother's life - but we will punish 
them […] We do not want money in exchange for Jean's life, but we want to punish 
them - so we want a lot of money. We are also concentrating on making sure these 
policemen go to prison (Carrell 2005). 
The family's solicitor, Gareth Peirce, “describe[s] the approach by the Met as 'disturbing'” (BBC 
2005h)  and  says  that  “[i]t  might  have  been  a  'deliberate  attempt  to  ensnare  families  into 
inappropriate agreements or inappropriate decisions'” (ibid.). 
The Met confirm that this offer was made but stress that that “it was intended to be an "ex 
gratia" payment, which would not affect any further compensation or legal action” (BBC 2005h). 
Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott responds to the allegations: “I haven't seen the letter and I 
think it would be terrible if it was done that way […] It does sound not a very sensitive way to 
deal with such a difficult matter." (BBC 2005h). 
 8.2.1.5 Shoot-to-kill policy will be carried out in future
(15)  Ian Blair first comes face to face with the Menezes' family on September 13 2005 when 
giving  evidence  to  the  Commons  home  affairs  select  committee  inquiry  into  the  London 
bombings.  “He  apologized  for  [Jean  Charles  de  Menezes']  death  and  said  the  police  were 
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'extremely sorry'” (Travis 2005). Regarding the shoot-to-kill policy he says: 
We made a small number of administrative changes, but the essential thrust of the 
tactics remains the same. There is no question that a suicide bomber, deadly and 
determined, who is intent on murder, is perhaps the highest level of threat that we 
face and we must have an option to deal with it. (Morris 2005). 
He further states that the Met need a policy to deal with suicide bombers and that the shoot-to-
kill policy is the “least worst option”. He says that it will be carried out even though the official 
inquiry into the death is not yet completed (Travis 2005, Morris 2005). 
Three cousins of de Menezes are present at the hearing. They are offered a meeting with 
Ian Blair in person but turn down the offer. They read out this statement: 
We are horrified to know that the shoot-to-kill policy is still in operation today. It 
remains  a  secret  policy that  has  never  been  discussed  in  parliament.  It  must  be 
suspended until the investigation is completed (Travis 2005). 
 8.2.1.6 Investigation into Ian Blair's behaviour
(16) On October 11 2005 de Menezes' family make an official complaint to the IPCC claiming 
that Ian Blair “had misled the family and the public immediately after Jean's death”, that he 
“bears ultimate responsibility for the Menezes killing and that he deliberately tried to cover up 
what really happened after Jean's death” (Justice4Jean 2005).
(17) On November 28 2005 the IPCC announces that it will investigate Sir Ian Blair's 
conduct following the death of de Menezes (Cowan 2005). This second investigation is called 
“Stockwell 2” and follows the complaint made by the de Menezes family. A Met commissioner 
states the following:
We wish to make it clear that whilst the further complaints raised clearly involve the 
commissioner, they are not solely about him. They specifically ask that the IPCC 
investigate where any misleading accounts relating to the tragic events of July 22 
originated from, and how and why they were put into the public domain. (Cowan 
2005)
The de  Menezes'  family is  “delighted”  about  this  announcement.  Cousin  Alex  Pereira  says: 
“"This is fantastic news and a great victory for our campaign." (Justice4Jean 2005).
 8.2.1.7 Public Apologies
(18)  In  November  2005,  Ian  Blair  talks  to  the  Guardian.  This  interview,  concerning  his 
“tempestuous year in office” is published on January 30 (Dodd & Katz 2006). In it, Blair admits 
that  the  Met  made  a  “serious  mistake”  by  failing  to  correct  reports  that  Menezes  behaved 
suspiciously. Ian Blair further says:
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Clearly the Met could have taken the decision on the Saturday when we recognised 
that we had killed an innocent man, we could have put the record straight. Although 
we did put the record straight by saying he wasn't connected, we didn't put the record 
straight about all the issues around him jumping over barriers and heavy coats and so 
on ... In a terrible way, the Met was transfixed on other things. It was transfixed on: 
where  are  these  bombers?  And  therefore,  in  a  dreadful  way,  we  didn't  see  the 
significance of that. That was our mistake. It was. It was a bad mistake. (Katz 2006)
(19)  On  March  9  2006,  after  discussing  the  Stockwell  shooting  with  the  Brazilian 
president, Tony Blair says the following in a press conference: “Once again let me say that we 
offer our deepest regrets to the family for this very tragic event and I, of course, assured the 
President  that  the  proper  investigations  and  procedures  would  continue  through  to  their 
conclusion.” (Jones & Burleigh 2006).
Cousin Alex Pereira responds: "I won't accept Blair's apology because he's killing people 
- he apologised but at the same time they will still carry on with their shoot-to-kill policy." (ibid., 
BBC 2006). Regarding the meeting of Tony Blair with President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the 
family expressed hope that “the Brazilian government's involvement would help break down 
barriers in their search for justice” (ibid.). 
 8.2.1.8 Met is charged under health and safety laws
(20)  The  Crown  Prosecution  Service  (CPS)  receives  the  IPCC  report  over  the  De 
Menezes shooting in January 2006. In July 2006 it decides that there is “insufficient evidence” to 
prosecute any individual and that instead the Met will be charged under health and safety laws 
“for 'failing to provide for the health, safety and welfare' of Mr Menezes on 22 July” (BBC 
2006b,  CPS  2006).  Cousin  Alex  Pereira  states  that  “the  decision  [is]  'unbelievable'  and 
'ridiculous'" (BBC 2006b). The Met are “concerned and clearly disappointed” with the decision 
to prosecute the Met but “acknowledge and support“ that no officers will be prosecuted (BBC 
2006b).
(21) On May 11 2007, before a verdict is reached under the health and the safety charges, 
the IPCC announces that none of the eleven police officers involved in Mr. Menezes' death will 
face disciplinary action. It further states that a decision regarding the four senior officers will be 
made only after the health and safety trial. IPCC chairman Nick Hardwick adds that “the grief of 
Mr de Menezes’ family was 'entirely understandable', but there is no realistic prospect of the 11 
officers being disciplined” (Times Online 2007). 
 Cousin Patricia da Silva Armani tells the media that the family is bitterly disappointed 
(Times Online 2007):
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It is disgraceful the IPCC can make such a decision - they are letting the police get 
away with murder. […] First officials killed my cousin, then they lied about it and 
now the officers are walking away without any punishment. It is a travesty of justice 
and another slap in the face for our family. [...]The police officers lives'[sic] go on as 
normal while we exist in turmoil, fighting to get the answers and justice we deserve. 
(ibid.). 
A spokesperson of the family says: 
We can see no advantage in making this early announcement, other than to provide 
relief to the officers facing potential disciplinary charges […] Whilst the officers are 
spared that ongoing anxiety, the family are given no relief to their own agony, grief 
and  anxiety  caused  by  their  lack  of  access  to  all  the  evidence  surrounding  the 
shooting of their loved one […] We hope ultimately that all the officers about whom 
evidence  emerges  of  wrongdoing  that  led  to  this  wrongful  death  are  ultimately 
rendered fully accountable. (Gill 2007)
 The de Menezes legal team points out that “it is 'highly unusual' for the disciplinary decision to 
be made prior to the conclusion of criminal proceedings” (Times Online 2007). 
 On the other hand, the Met welcomes the IPCC's recommendation and states: 
The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes is  a matter  of very deep regret  to  the 
Metropolitan Police Service and our continued thoughts are with his family. […] We 
have apologised publicly and in private to them and we would again like to take this 
opportunity to say sorry for this tragedy. (Gill 2007)
We welcome this move forward and are pleased for these officers and their families 
who have faced much uncertainty. (Times Online 2007)
(22) On November 1 2007 the Met is “convicted of health and safety breaches and fined 
£175,000  with  £385,000  costs”  (Evening  Standard 2007).  The  verdict  says  that  the  police 
operation was “carried out 'so badly that the public were needlessly put at risk'” (Sturcke 2007). 
However, the Stockwell shooting is judged to be a “corporate failure, not an individual failure” 
and  no  individual  police  officer  is  charged  with  criminal  offences  (Wright  2007).  The  de 
Menezes  family solicitor  says  that  the  family is  pleased  with  this  outcome but  they do not 
approve of the police's defence team which “descended to the gutter, seeking to shift the blame 
onto the innocent victim of their wrongdoing. We deplore the tactics of the defence and the 
smearing of Jean Charles’s name […] Any attempt to salvage the image of the Metropolitan 
Police by those in senior positions, publicly apologising for their errors, has been undermined by 
the defence put forward.” (BBC 2007, Naughton 2007).
(23) The guilty verdict against the police again brings up voices asking for Sir Ian Blair's 
resignation. De Menezes' mother says "Sir Ian should now think about what his men have done 
to my son and consider resigning." (Wright 2007). Also, Shadow Home Secretary David Davis, 
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the Tory party and the Liberal democrats demand Blair's resignation (ibid., Edwards & Steele 
2007). Sir Ian Blair says the following after the Met is found guilty:
The death of Jean Charles de Menezes was a tragedy. He was an innocent man. The 
Metropolitan  Police  service  has  apologised  to  the  family  and  friends  of  Mr  de 
Menezes many times in the past. Once more I express my deep regrets for his death. 
[…] What we are going to do now do is to take time to consider whether and how 
any  of  our  current  operating  practices  need  to  be  altered  in  the  light  of  this 
conviction. [...] It is important to remember that no police officer set out that day to 
shoot an innocent man. I am certain that this death was the culmination of actions by 
many hands, all of whom were doing their best to handle the terrible threat facing 
London on that day - a race against time to find the failed suicide bombers of the day 
before.  […]  the  difficulties  shown  in  this  trial  were  those  of  an  organisation 
struggling, on a single day, to get to grips with a simply extraordinary situation - its 
greatest  operational  challenge  in  a  generation.  The  judge  noted  that  this  was  an 
isolated  breach  of  law  in  quite  extraordinary circumstances.  […]  This  case  thus 
provides no evidence at all of systematic failure by the Metropolitan Police service 
and I therefore intend to continue to lead the Met in its increasingly successful efforts 
to reduce crime and to deter and disrupt terrorist activities in London and elsewhere 
in the UK. At the same time, it will be my personal task to ensure that the lessons 
learnt from the death of Mr de Menezes are incorporated into our training, our policy 
and our operations. (BBC 2007b) 
This statement is not received favourably by Brian Paddick, a senior police officer, who writes a 
Daily Mail article about the verdict. Paddick criticises Blair's demeanour after the Met was found 
guilty: 
There was no apparent remorse or humility. Instead he was bullish, saying that, as no 
systemic failure had been identified, he would carry on. If ever there was a time for 
reflection and nothing more than a repetition of the apology made two years ago to 
the de Menezes family and the public, that was it.  Ian missed the point; it is not 
about being convicted or not, it is about public trust and confidence. (Paddick 2007)
Paddick writes that “Nothing Sir Ian has done since the event suggests any sincere regret for 
what happened under his watch; only a view that his own skin should be saved” and demands his 
resignation (McKie 2007). Commenting on the press coverage over the Met's conviction, Pauli 
(2007) titles “Ian Blair sacked by the press”. The Daily Mail pushes ahead by calling Ian Blair a 
“man  without  honour”  (Wright  2007),  and  calls  his  speech  a  “textbook  exercise  in  blame 
avoidance” (Wright 2007). The Daily Mail (2007) further writes new lyrics to Gloria Gaynor's I  
will survive, changing the chorus to “I won't resign”.  Other newspapers also would like to see 
Blair  resign.  (Pauli  2007,  McKie  2007).  However,  Blair  has  the  “full  confidence”  of  Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown and Home Secretary Jacqui Smith (Sturcke 2007). 
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 8.2.1.9 Resignation of one police officer
(24) Andy Hayman, Britain's most senior counter-terrorism officer, who was found to be guilty 
of misleading the public in the Stockwell 2 report, resigns on December 4 2007. The de Menezes 
family “welcome the fact that [he] is no longer in office” but is “disappointed that by resigning 
Hayman is effectively evading formal punishment for his wrongdoing” (Justice4Jean 2007b).
His  resignation  makes  Hayman  the  only  police  officer  so  far  to  suffer  personal 
consequences over the Stockwell shooting. The policemen who killed De Menezes remain on 
firearm duty and one of them killed another person in  November 2006 (Justice4Jean 2007). 
Cressida Dick, the officer in command of the operation in which De Menezes died, is promoted 
in  February 2007. The de Menezes  family heavily criticise  this  promotion and argue that  it 
“send[s]  out  a  message  that  these  police  officers  are  above  the  law and have  already been 
exonerated” (Justice4Jean 2007). 
 8.2.1.10 IPCC: No one will be charged over de Menezes' death
(25)  On December  21  2007 the  IPCC announces  that  also  none  of  the  four  senior  officers 
involved in De Menezes' killing will face disciplinary charges. The family reacts “with anger” 
(Justice4Jean 2007b) and says:
It is nothing short  of a public scandal that  despite two lengthy and critical  IPCC 
reports and a damning jury verdict at the Old Bailey, the IPCC and the MPA still 
cannot find any reason to bring disciplinary action against a single person for the 
shooting dead of Jean Charles de Menezes. The IPCC has shown it is no better than 
the  discredited  Police  Complaints  Authority  that  it  replaced  in  holding  police  to 
account. The cynical and disgusting timing of this announcement is a clear attempt to 
bury bad news. It is clearly time for the government to review the effectiveness of 
the IPCC. (Justice4Jean 2007b)
 8.2.1.11 Apology by the marksman
(26) One of the policemen who shot Jean Charles de Menezes, known as Charlie12, addresses 
the family directly during his hearing at the inquest. Before giving details of how he shot de 
Menezes, he says:
I am trying to be as delicate as I can for the benefit of the family but there are some 
things that need to be said. […] I know this is, quite frankly, an awful time for them 
and I will try to be as sensitive as I can [...]My sincere regrets, I can't put myself in 
the position that they are faced with […] I'm a family man myself, and to lose a son 
or any member of the family in this situation... I just can not believe and I offer my 
sincere condolences, I really, really respectfully do that  […] If there had been any 
other alternative, you must believe me, I would have taken it. But I didn't believe I 
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had any alternative and if I didn't act then members of the public would have been 
killed, my colleagues would have been killed and I would have been killed. I had a 
duty to protect the public. (Clements 2008). 
The Mirror reports that Charlie 12 (C12)  had apologized to the family (Clements 2008), while 
other newspapers do not use the word  apologize  to describe his words. The  Evening Standard 
and  the  Guardian  merely  state  that  C12  had  offered  his  “sincere  regrets”  or  “sincere 
condolences” for the family's loss (Cheston 2008, Laville & Dodd 2008). 
 8.2.1.12 Ian Blair resigns
(27) On December 1 2008, Ian Blair resigns. He states that his resignation is due to a lack 
of support from London mayor Boris Johnson (BBC 2008). The de Menezes family say that "Ian 
Blair should have resigned three years ago when he and his men killed the wrong man." and add 
that that “for Sir Ian to state he had resigned not through any failings reinforced their belief the 
Metropolitan Police still refused to accept responsibility” (Skynews 2008). 
 8.2.1.13 Inquest into de Menezes' death
(28) At the inquest into de Menezes's death, the Coroner Sir Michael Wright rules out the jury's 
option to decide his murder was an unlawful killing, leaving the options of lawful killing and an 
open verdict. Upon that, the family withdraw their legal team from the case and four cousins 
protest in T-shirt's that read “Unlawful killing” “Your legal right to decide” (Randhawa 2008). 
After the court protest, cousin Patricia da Silva Armani says “After three months of evidence, 
100 witnesses and millions of pounds, the coroner,  Sir Michael Wright,  has presided over a 
complete  whitewash  […]  He  has  failed  on  every  count  of  the  purpose  of  an  inquest 
investigation." (Randhawa & Cheston 2008). Cousin Vivien Figuerdo says: "For three and a half 
years we have had one simple request, that all the evidence be put in front of the jury and for 
them to be allowed to decide [...] We have faced a system which has repeatedly blocked, silenced 
and stopped all the avenues we have tried in order to get justice." (Edwards & Rayner 2008)
(29) On December 12 2008,  the jury decides  on an open verdict,  the “most  critical” 
option available after an unlawful killing-verdict had been ruled out (Laville & Siddique 2008). 
The jury thus show that they do not trust the statements made by police officers in the hearing – 
the Independent prints the headline “Menezes: Did the police lie?” (Hughes 2008) and it is stated 
that the verdict is “highly damaging to the Metropolitan police” (ibid.). 
(30) De Menezes' mother expresses the family's gratitude to the jury and anyone who 
helped them in this difficult time (BBC 2008b). She says:
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I am very happy with the verdict. Since the moment the coroner ruled out unlawful 
killing,  I  was feeling very sad.  But  today I  feel  reborn.  I  am so happy with the 
verdict, and want to thank everyone - the legal team, campaign group and the jurors. 
I think that Jean's name has been cleared from all the accusations that he behaved in 
a suspicious way. (Laville & Dodd 2008b).
 The family is relieved that the jury did not return a “lawful killing” verdict and claims that “the 
jury would have gone further  and recorded a  verdict  of  unlawful  killing 'had they not  been 
gagged by the coroner'."The jury's verdict is a damning indictment of the multiple failures of the 
police and the lies they told,"(Laville & Siddique 2008). Cousin Patricia da Silva Armani says: 
"An unlawful verdict was what we were expecting. After the verdict that we had today I can only 
say that we will carry on with the struggle." (Edwards & Rayner 2008).
(31) The acting Commissioner of the Met, Sir Paul Stephenson, says the following (for 
his full statement cf. Rayner 2008): 
We have heard  the jury's  conclusions  and now need to  take  time to  give proper 
consideration to them. I also note the coroner's intention to make a report on his 
recommendations  for  any future  action  we may need to  take.  The death of  Jean 
Charles de Menezes was a tragedy. He was an innocent man and we must, and do, 
accept  full  responsibility  for  his  death.  For  somebody to  lose  their  life  in  such 
circumstances is something that the Metropolitan Police Service deeply regrets. In 
the face of  enormous challenges faced by officers  on that  day,  we made a  most 
terrible mistake. I am sorry. I wish to once again express my profound condolences 
to the family of Jean Charles. They have suffered the most dreadful of losses.  July 
2005 brought with it unparalleled challenges for the Met and the people of London, 
including the unique situation where there were four failed suicide bombers on the 
run. Our priority that day was to arrest these terrorists before they could commit 
further atrocities and potential acts of mass murder. No one set out that day to kill an 
innocent man. […] our priority is to protect Londoners by stopping those who are 
intent on terrifying us all. In doing that, we must learn from the terrible tragedy of 
Jean Charles's death. (Rayner 2008)
The  Daily Mail  writes that  Sir Paul “issued a full and frank apology”,  and also that he was 
“forced to issue a grovelling apology for the July 2005 shooting”. The Daily Mail further states 
that by saying “I am sorry” Sir Paul “seemed to go one stage further” than Sir Ian Blair who 
expressed his “deep regrets” (Gill 2008). The  Sun reports that Stephenson apologized to Jean 
Charles' family (France 2008) and the Guardian states that “the verdict drew a personal apology 
from  the  acting  commissioner”  (Laville  &  Dodd  2008b).  The  BBC (BBC  2008b),  the 
Independent (Hughes 2008) and the Telegraph (Rayner 2008) cite Stephenson verbatim and do 
not label his speech. 
Home Secretary Jacqui Smith also speaks out after the verdict is returned. She offers her 
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“deepest sympathy” to the family and says that "What we have learned from the accounts of the 
tragic events that day reminds us all of the extremely demanding circumstances under which the 
police work to protect us from further terrorist attack" (Laville & Siddique 2008)
Nick Hardwick, IPCC chairman, says: 
The  death  of  Jean  Charles  de  Menezes  was  a  truly shocking  event.  An  entirely 
innocent man on his way to work was shot and killed by our police while he sat on 
the tube. We now know there was nothing in his actions which justified this fate. He 
had no opportunity to defend himself or protest his innocence. I would like to repeat 
on  behalf  of  the  IPCC my sincere  sympathies  to  the  family of  Jean  Charles  de 
Menezes. (BBC 2008b)
 8.2.1.14 Legal settlement
(32) On November 23 2009 the de Menezes family and the Met reach a legal settlement. They 
publish the following joint statement: 
The commissioner of police of the metropolis and representatives of the De Menezes 
family are pleased to announce that all litigation between them arising out of the 
tragic death of Jean Charles de Menezes has been resolved. […] The members of the 
family are pleased that a compensation package has been agreed which enables them 
to put these events behind them and move forward with their lives. […] In view of 
the physical and mental distress caused to the members of the family by these events 
and the understandable publicity and press interest, it has been agreed that it is in the 
best interests of the family that no further statement in relation to this settlement will 
be made either by them or the commissioner […] The commissioner would like to 
take this opportunity of making a further unreserved apology to the family for the 
tragic  death  of  Jean  Charles  de  Menezes  and  to  reiterate  that  he  was  a  totally 
innocent victim and in no way to blame for his untimely death. (Dodd 2009)
The actual amount of money the family receives is covered by a confidentiality clause (Wright 
2009),  but  it  is  believed  that  the  Met  will  pay the  family  “just  above  £100,000”  and their 
“substantial legal costs” (Dodd 2009). 
The Daily Mail  calls this a “paltry sum” and argues that, if this assumption is true “the 
Metropolitan  Police  will  have  escaped  extremely lightly"(Daily  Mail  2009).  The  newspaper 
further states that "[t]he bitter truth is that under our compensation laws the poorer you are, the 
less you get" (ibid.). The Guardian states that both, the family and the Met, refuse to comment 
on the claim that the family received less money than they would have if they were not poor 
(Dodd 2009).
The Daily Mail compares the compensation sum for the family to the pay-off of Sir Ian 
Blair.  The  newspaper  points  out  that  Blair  “faced  calls  to  resign  over  the  shooting,  was 
condemned by the Independent Police Complaints Commission and heard his marksmen branded 
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liars by an inquest jury” (Wright 2009). It further denounces that still, Blair received four times 
the amount of money when he left the Met, than the de Menezes family did as compensation for 
Jean Charles' death. It further states that £100,000 is a final insult to the family and concludes: 
“To pay Mr and Mrs de Menezes so much less than the sum awarded to the man who bears 
corporate responsibility for Jean-Charles' death is, quite simply, grotesque” (Dailymail 2009). 
The  Daily Mail  also criticises Ian Blair and makes a point very similar to the one that 
Paddick (2007) made concerning Blair's speech after the verdict against the Met: 
As the man in overall charge of anti terrorist policing at the time, Sir Ian should have 
expressed  sorrow  and  humility  and  committed  himself  to  ensuring  that  such  a 
disaster could never happen again. Instead he acts as if it was little more than a bad 
day  at  the  office  for  him and  his  officers.  He  initially  blocked  the  independent 
external  investigation  into  the  shooting,  and  still  refuses  to  admit  any  fault  or 
shoulder any blame.  (Daily Mail 2009). 
 8.2.1.15 Ian Blair receives life peerage
(33) In May 2010 Ian Blair is given life peerage. Cousin Vivian Figueiredo says: 
We are disgusted at this decision. […] As commissioner, we believe Ian Blair was 
ultimately accountable for the death of Jean, for the lies told and the cover-up. […] 
He  even  tried  to  stop  the  IPCC  [Independent  Police  Complaints  Commission] 
investigating our cousin's death. This is a final slap in the face for our family. (BBC 
2010). 
In response to the criticism Ian Blair says: 
First of all, there is a terrible amount of pain in the de Menezes family and I cannot 
imagine what that feels like. [...]I have always said that I am now and always was 
accountable for the death of Mr de Menezes. What I have also said was that I was 
not responsible for it. […] [T]he death of that man remains with me. All of us regret 
it. (BBC 2010b)
It is further reported that at this occasion Blair 
also described the "unprecedented hunt" days after the London bombings which led 
to the innocent man being mistaken for a suicide bomber.  Sir Ian said police had 
made the "worst error of all" by failing to make it known publicly when the error was 
found.  He  added  that  attempts  to  block  a  later  Independent  Police  Complaints 
Commission investigation was "an error" (BBC 2010b). 
 8.2.2 Analysis
The first public statement that the police make after the killing is given by the head of the Met 
and  expresses that “any death is deeply regrettable”. This is a phrase which is widely agreed 
upon but does not relate to this particular death and also does not say that it is the Met or the 
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speaker who are the ones feeling regret.  Such a general comment is maybe uttered to create 
rapport with the public. Also, by describing the murdered man as a person who refused to obey 
the police, the statement places the murder in a context in which the public is more inclined to 
understand and forgive the police action (cf.1). 
When on the next day it turns out that the victim was not a terrorist, Blair has to revise 
this statement (cf.2). He now calls the event a tragedy and expresses the Met's full responsibility 
and the Met's deep regrets to the family. This statement, which on its own would be an outright 
apology (on behalf of the organisation, not on behalf of Blair), is weakened by the acquittal of 
the Met's actions and shift of blame to the terrorists in the next sentence. Blair expresses the 
Met's full responsibility in the first sentence and denies it in the second. Blair further denies the 
Met's guilt by justifying the shoot-to-kill policy and not even considering its temporary abolition. 
Thus, the police action that led to the death is, previous to any investigative results, justified by 
Blair. The question remains how the acceptance of “full responsibility” and the expression of 
“deep regrets” are compatible with such a denial of guilt and the unwillingness to revise the fatal 
policy. In chapter 4.4.2.3 it is pointed out that mortification (i.e. apologizing) is only acceptable 
from institutions if they present corrective action along with it. Ian Blair expresses the Met's, an 
institution's, responsibility and regret but does not state that anything will be done to prevent 
such a killing from happening again. Rather, he denies that the institution's policies are faulty. 
The Met's  guilt  is  also denied by London's  mayor Livingstone -  he calls  the event  a 
tragedy and blames the terrorists for it (cf.3). Home Secretary Clarke gives a statement of regret 
and sympathy to the family but follows it up immediately with a justification of the police (cf.4). 
When Clarke states that the police were trying to do their best to protect the people one can see 
Coombs'  ingratiation strategy being applied.  This  ingratiation strategy is  repeatedly used by 
officials when apologizing for the death (cf.8 Tony Blair, cf.23 Ian Blair, cf.26 Home Secretary 
Smith, cf. 26 Met Commissioner Stephenson)
Journalists interpret Blair's statements in various ways. It is reported that the police broke 
with “their earlier tradition of prevarication” and apologized, but also that the police stopped 
short of an outright apology (cf.5). The family interprets Blair's statement as an apology but 
states that “apologies are not enough”. Cousin Alex Pereira is reported to have said “the police 
have tried to apologize. But they should all be ashamed” (cf.6). From this statement I understand 
that  for  Pereira  to  perceive  the  apology  as  meaningful,  the  police  would  have  needed  to 
communicate feelings of shame, i.e. humiliate themselves in public. Their simple expression of 
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regret does not soothe his feelings. Other parts of his statement also show that he would like to 
see the police humiliated: He calls them “stupid” and “incapable” and ridicules the marksman as 
“someone with a brain the size of a three-year-old”.  This cousin's anger and thirst for revenge 
cannot be satisfied with a simple statement of regret. 
 The list of officials who publicly state their regret over the death grows longer as Foreign 
Secretary Straw and Foreign Minister Triesman offer their condolences (cf.7). Brazilian Foreign 
Secretary  Amorim,  to  whom these  words  are  directed,  states  that  he  heard  “expressions  of 
regret”. Amorim's statement (cf. BBC 2005d, BBC 2005e, CNN 2005) suggests that Straw did 
not downplay his condolences by defending the police, like Blair, Livingstone and Clarke did. 
Such an unequivocal statement is an exception in this case. However, I do not have access to a 
full record of the conversation and it may be that Amorim left out some of Straw's statements 
when reporting their conversation to the press. Prime Minister Tony Blair also makes a public 
apology, but after he states his regret he claims to understand the family's feelings, justifies the 
police's action and speaks of the importance to give the police every support. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, this statement is not one that the family can appreciate. Cousin 
Arialva Pereira does not accept this apology because Blair is not “punishing  the police who did 
this” but supporting them (cf.9). He states that such an apology is not “easing our pain”. In the 
family's home town Blair's statement is criticised further: People say that the apology did not go 
far enough and that apologies don't help and justice is what is needed (cf.9). The mayor of the 
home town says that it's easy for Blair to apologize, but it does not mean very much (cf.9.) So, 
Blair's apology is rejected on many levels: For supporting the police and for being an “easy 
apology” which “does not go far enough”. I assume that the critical point here is that Blair's 
statement does not promise any corrective action (cf. Table 1), i.e. any plans to prevent such a 
killing from happening again. It is easy to be “desperately sorry” for de Menezes' death – surely 
many Londoners who have nothing to do with the killing also feel “desperately sorry”. But for 
the head of government, in whose power it is to work towards preventing a killing in the future 
and who is seen as one of the “really guilty ones” by the family (cf.11) , for him to express 
nothing but sorrow and sympathy is understood to be “not enough”. 
When it is made public that the police's initial statements were false, journalists write that 
the police “misled” the public, while bloggers write that the Met (and Blair) were lying (cf. 10). 
The Independent publishes an article which heavily criticises Ian Blair's “blithe refusal to own up 
to  a  sequence  of  terrible  mistakes”.  There  is  no  immediate  response  by  the  Met  or  Blair. 
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However, in an interview a month later, Blair says that “more could have been done to set the 
record straight”, but he does not admit to misleading the public (cf.13). In November of the same 
year,  Blair  states that  the Met made a “serious mistake” in not correcting the reports  which 
slandered de Menezes (cf. 18) and that this mistake was able to happen because the police were 
transfixed on finding the bombers. In Benoit's terms (cf. Chapter 4.4), Blair is using the strategy 
of bolstering to repair the Met's image. Only in 2010, when Blair is no longer head of Met, he 
admits that the police made the “worst error of all” by failing to make it known publicly when 
the error  was found (cf.33).  This  supports  the assumption that people admit guilt  once they 
cannot suffer personal harm from it. 
When documents describing the Met's “catastrophic blunders” leak, there is evidence that 
the Met's actions should not have been justified before having been questioned. There are now 
documents stating that the Met did make mistakes and the death of de Menezes cannot simply be 
blamed on external factors. Nevertheless, none of the officials who stated full support for the 
police, withdraw this support. The family, who now have evidence that the police did not do the 
best  they could to save de Menezes'  life, are demanding a public inquiry into the death and 
repeatedly  call  for  the  truth  to  be  brought  to  light.  They  also  call  for  Ian  Blair  to  resign. 
Interestingly enough, the family never ask for an apology. They demand the truth and the sacking 
or the imprisonment of the ones responsible. The call for an outright apology is only made by 
journalists (cf.12). 
Four days after the leaked documents are published and no response is given by the Met, 
the family decide to publish the letter they received from the Met shortly after de Menezes' death 
(cf.14). I argue that by publishing this letter at that time, the family put pressure on the Met to 
finally comment on their treatment of de Menezes and his family. Bringing up this letter also 
allows the family to show the anger they feel towards the Met: The family state they feel insulted 
by the offer. The mother says she feels disgusted by the policeman who brought the offer and a 
brother tells the media that the family want to punish the police and put the policemen into 
prison. The Met admit to writing this letter, but stress that the family could have taken the money 
without being legally bound (cf.14).
A month later,  when Blair  justifies the shoot-to-kill  policy,  he also apologizes for the 
death again (cf.15). It seems that whenever officials refer to the de Menezes case, an apology is 
obligatory  before  the  actual  statement  can  be  given.  On  this  particular  occasion,  Ian  Blair 
confirms that the shoot-to-kill policy is the best way to respond to suicide bombings, meaning 
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that it will be carried out even though the official inquiry is not yet completed. This is another 
inconsistent statement on behalf of the Met. Surely, if the police are as sorry as they claim to be, 
they would not hold on to a policy that could bring them in the same situation again? At any rate, 
the family are “horrified” and turn down the apology as well as a meeting with Blair. I assume 
that the family have no interest in meeting Blair in private, because they do not care for a half-
hearted personal apology that may be used by the media in favour of the Met. 
In  2006,  upon meeting  the  Brazilian  president,  Tony Blair  again  offers  “our  deepest 
regrets to the family”. To the apology he adds the promise that “the proper investigations and 
procedures would continue through to  their  conclusion”(cf.19).  This  appears  to  be a  worthy 
apology which also states that  an effort is made to find the truth, something that the family 
desperately seek. However, the family recall that the shoot-to-kill policy is still in operation and 
on these grounds reject Blair's apology (cf.19). 
When in 2007 the IPCC announces that eleven of the police officers will not be charged 
personally for de Menezes' death – a decision which is made before a verdict is reached under 
the health and safety charges – the family are “bitterly disappointed”. They state again that they 
hope  the  responsible  officers  “are  ultimately rendered  fully  accountable”  (cf.  21).  The  Met, 
before stating their pleasure over the IPCC's decision, express their “very deep regret” over the 
shooting and let the media know that they apologised in public as well as in private to the family 
and are now “saying sorry” again. This shows again, that statements concerning the case are 
accompanied by a statement of regret directed at the family.
After the guilty verdict  is  delivered,  the family point  out how these public apologies 
which  are  meant  to  “salvage  the  image of  the  Metropolitan  police”  are  undermined by the 
defence put  forward  by the police  (cf.22).  This  way,  the  family again  communicate  that  an 
apology without appropriate measures is useless to them. Appropriate measures are also said to 
be lacking in Ian Blair's behaviour. The Met Commissioner is accused by the press of having 
done nothing that would show his sincere regret (cf.23). Words and deeds in Blair's case are two 
different things. 
In  connection  with  the  guilty  verdict,  Blair's  resignation  is  demanded  in  numerous 
newspapers  (cf.  23).  These  demands  are  further  fuelled  by the  speech Blair  gives  after  the 
announcement of the verdict. Even though his Met has been proven guilty, Blair states that all 
the police “were doing their best”, implies that the “extraordinary situation” was responsible for 
de Menezes' death and states that he will continue to lead the Met (cf. 23). There are a few 
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contradictory aspects in this speech: What Blair intends to communicate is that not the Met but 
the “extraordinary situation” is to blame for the killing - nevertheless he offers his regrets to the 
family and promises corrective action. If everyone was already “doing their best”, then how can 
the Met become even better? How can Blair offer regret and improvement if he believes that the 
Met is not to be blamed? 
When Hayman,  the officer  found guilty of  misleading the public,  resigns,  the family 
argue that he's getting off too lightly and that he should have stayed and received the formal 
punishment for his wrongdoing (cf.24). Also, when Ian Blair  resigns a year later,  the family 
criticise the way he does it: they argue that Blair should have resigned three years ago, when it 
became clear that the wrong man was killed. (cf.27) Also, the fact that Blair resigns without 
admitting any failings on his part, is not approved of by the family who see this as a sign of the 
Met's refusal to accept responsibility. Thus, it becomes clear that the family does not ask for 
Blair's resignation as an end in itself. The aim behind it seems to be to shame him in public and 
punish him.  When Blair  resigns,  citing reasons  unrelated  to  de Menezes'  killing,  this  is  not 
achieved. 
“Sincere condolences” are further offered to the family by one of the marksmen who shot 
de  Menezes.  At  the  inquest,  he  addresses  the  family  directly  and  states  that  he  “can't  put 
[him]self in the position that they are faced with”. In his speech the marksman “humanizes” 
himself – he talks in a way that may shift the jury's and family's perception of him as a killer to 
that of a family man (cf. 26). The family do not comment on the marksman's apology. 
When the open verdict is delivered, more public apologies are given (cf.26). “Deepest 
sympathy” and “sincere sympathies” are offered to the family by Home Secretary Smith and 
IPCC chairman Hardwick (cf.26). The new head of the Met, Sir Paul Stephenson, gives a speech 
in which he states the Met “made a most terrible mistake” and “accpept[s] full responsibility for 
his [de Menezes'] death”. (cf.31) He also expresses his “profound condolences” to the family. 
Interestingly enough, it is Stephenson, a man who bears no personal responsibility and is not the 
one accused by family and media, who says that he is sorry. The Daily Mail writes that by saying 
sorry he goes one step further than Blair did. But what the newspaper fails to write is how much 
easier it must be for Stephenson to admit responsibility for the killing because he most obviously 
does not bear any responsibility and could not possibly be personally held accountable. The one 
who is most clearly involved in the killing, Sir Ian Blair, does not say that he is sorry. In 2010, 
having received life peerage, Blair states that he is accountable for the death and that he has 
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never denied this – and adds that he nevertheless is not responsible. And even though the Met 
have been found guilty of having unnecessarily endangered de Menezes' life (cf. 20) and are put 
under pressure by the open verdict returned at the inquest (cf. 23), no one is ever found to be 
responsible – not even the head of the Met. This tactic of blaming the whole institution but no 
individual officer was already criticised by Paddick in 2007 (cf.23). Paddick argued that the Met 
should admit that individual officers made grave errors and hold them to account in order to 
restore the entire service's tarnished reputation (Paddick 2007). This, however, was not done. 
In 2010 the family and the Met come to a legal settlement (cf.32). A final “unreserved 
apology” is given by the commissioner, who also stresses that de Menezes was “in no way to 
blame for his untimely death” (something the police had denied in the Health and Safety trial). 
As arranged, neither the police nor the family comment on the amount of money that was paid to 
the family. Nevertheless, it is speculated in the media that the compensation money is £100,000 
and the Met are condemned in the media for paying so little to the family of the victim and so 
much to the commissioner under whose lead the killing happened (cf.32). The last words on this 
case, written in newspaper articles, call the compensation money a paltry sum and a final insult 
to the family. 
 8.3 Comparison of the public apologies in Austria and the UK
 8.3.1 Differences in the call for apology
Mike Brennan asks for the police to admit their mistake, to take responsibility for their 
unprofessional  behaviour  and to  apologize  (cf.3,11).  Furthermore,  Brennan seeks  justice  (cf. 
Akinyosoye  2010,  AP 2009,  Lindinger  2009).  A friend  creates  the  blog  “Justice  for  Mike 
Brennan”  (http://justiceformikebrennan.blogspot.com/)  in  his  name  and  keeps  its  followers 
updated on newspaper articles, interviews, etc., concerning the incident. Brennan is often asked 
by journalists whether the police have contacted him or apologized to him – a question that he 
keeps answering in the negative (cf.11). 
In contrast, the de Menezes family never demand an apology and the question whether 
they have been apologized to is not a big issue for the media either, probably, because the British 
police  repeatedly  state  their  regret  in  public.  In  response  to  these  statements  the  family 
communicate that they do not care for an apology (cf.5) and that they would like to see action 
taken on behalf of the police. They further demand that the guilty are punished (cf.6,9), that the 
policy that led to de Menezes' death is abandoned (cf.10), that justice is served and the truth is 
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revealed. They create the website Justice4Jean (http://www.justice4jean.org/) where they publish 
press releases and the family's  opinion on the process of events. The family's statements are 
rather harsh and inflammatory when referring to the police (cf. 6). 
Brennan,  on  the  other  hand,  calmly  tells  his  version  of  the  events  and  also  calmly 
responds to the accusations that he feigned injuries – he calls these accusations “outrageous 
rumours” but does not accuse the police of perpetrating them (Bischofberger 2009). He explicitly 
says that he does not have a problem with the police, only with the people who did that to him 
(ibid.). He does not insult the police like the de Menezes family do (cf. Menezes 6) and he does 
not demand resignations. Brennan is active in so far as he tries to alert attention to his case: he 
gives interviews, attends discussions, makes his own video (Brennan 2010), etc. . But he does 
not attempt to take the legal process in his hands, like the de Menezes family do. He states that 
he “hopes for justice” (AP 2009) and seems to be trusting the state to get it right. 
The de Menezes family take an active role in the development of the examination of de 
Menezes' death. They voice their doubt over the objectivity of the IPCC's investigation, they 
criticise  the  Met's  handling  of  the  death  and  ask  that  the  IPCC  investigate  the  misleading 
accounts relating to the killing (cf. 17). At their call, the Stockwell2-investigation is launched. 
The family are also very present in the media:  Their comments on the current events in relation 
to the Menezes inquiry are printed along with the police's statements and the Met acknowledge 
the family and state their regret over the killing in most of their statements. 
Both the de Menezes family and Brennan are invited to meet police representatives (cf. 
UK15,  A1)  and both  turn  down the  offer.  I  assume that  they do  this  because  they are  not 
interested in a private statement of regret – they both pursue justice and justice will not be done 
in private meetings with the police. Even though Brennan demands an apology, he is not running 
after the police (i.e. going to the police station) to get one. It appears that the demand for an 
apology is indeed the demand for the offender to humiliate himself in public. This aim cannot be 
achieved in a private meeting – which may be a reason why both victims turn it down. 
The call for apology appears to be more aggressive in the UK. The truth is demanded 
ferociously by the victims in the UK and they attempt to watch over the legal process taking 
place, demanding insight into reports (cf. Crawford 2008) and asking for further investigations 
when the ongoing one is not dealing with the questions that matter to them (cf.16). The Austrian 
victim is calmer in his public statements. He demands an apology and asks for justice to be 
served, but he is less radical in his communication with the police and his judgement of the 
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police in general. 
 8.3.2 The timing of the apologies and the question of who 
apologizes to whom
I  will  start  by  pointing  out  a  common  trait  in  the  policeforces'  reactions  to  the  respective 
incidents.  Both heads of police justify their  force and stand behind the actions taken by the 
officers. Also, neither policeforce holds the officers involved to account in order to restore the 
police's tarnished image. Benoit argues that it is advisable for an organisation to distance itself 
from the employees who committed an offensive act in order to repair its image (cf. Chapter 
4.4.2.1).  Interestingly enough, this strategy, which could have been used by both the British and 
the Austrian police, was used by neither. Both police organisations stood behind their officers 
and did not use disciplinary action against them. 
The first difference is that in the UK a public apology was given shortly after the incident 
by the head of  the  police,  and that  it  was  soon to  be followed by statements  of  the  Home 
Secretary and the mayor of London. Austrian police, on the other hand, responded slowly to 
allegations and no higher-ranking official than the Polizeipräsident commented on the incident at 
all.78 Also, in de Menezes' case there was communication between the governments: The British 
Foreign  Minister  and Foreign Secretary both  expressed their  regret  to  the  Brazilian Foreign 
Secretary and the Brazilian people. It can be argued that this action was necessary because a 
murder is a grave incident and requires more communication than committing grievous bodily 
harm. However, there are two incidents of the Austrian police killing a man they were meant to 
be looking after. In both cases policemen were found guilty of negligent homicide (News 2002; 
APA 2005): In 1999, the Austrian police killed the Nigerian refugee Marcus Omofuma during his 
deportation. There was no apology from the police or the government but it was also pointed out 
that  neither  was  an  apology demanded  by the  Nigerian  government  (Cserveny & Löwstedt 
2009). In 2003, the Moroccan Seibane Wague died “as a result of an official police operation 
with medical personnel attending” (Ghadimi 2007: 190).  His family (Wague's Austrian wife and 
his brother) demanded an apology, but received none (Ghadimi 2007: 189). In these cases of 
homicide the Austrian government and police were not as willing to give public statements of 
regret  as  the  British  government  and  police  were  in  the  case  of  de  Menezes.  Despite  the 
78 Austrian home secretary Maria Fekter only came in contact with Brennan's case when she refused to accept a 
petition which was sent to her on the occasion of Brennan's “mix-up”. It  concerned the discrimination which 
people of dark skin colour face from Austrian authorities and was started by an UNO-official. Fekter refused to 
accept it and asked for it to be sent to the Polizeipräsident instead (Der Standard 2009). 
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differences between the murders in Austria and the UK, the response of Austrian officials to 
these murders makes the assumption plausible that the Austrian government and police are less 
inclined to express regret when confronted with an image-threatening situation of such extent 
(cf. Lorenz, who says that in Austria no one has ever apologized to those who were killed in a 
police action, ORF 2009d Min. 1:45).
In both countries, the policemen who committed the offence followed the example set by 
their superiors. In the court hearing, the marksman who shot de Menezes addressed the family 
directly and offered his “sincere regrets” (cf.26). The Austrian policeman, when confronted with 
Brennan in court, did not talk to him directly but told the judge that he regrets the incident “an 
und für sich” (cf.10), thus diminishing his expression of regret. 
To conclude, it can be said that public apologies in the UK were given sooner after the 
offence and by higher officials than in Austria. As it is agreed that fast responses are useful in 
crisis communication (cf. chapter 4.4.2.5), it appears that in terms of the timing of the apology 
the British police did better. It is further noteworthy, that in the UK regrets are expressed to the 
de Menezes family on many occasions. It seems to become a ritual for those talking about the 
shooting to acknowledge the family (cf. 21,32, 33). When the open verdict against the police is 
delivered, the Home Secretary, the head of the Met and the head of the IPCC again express their 
regrets. Also, the statement of the final settlement between the family and the Met includes an 
apology to the family. In Austria, there are not so many voluntary statements of regret by police 
officials, and none addressed to the victim personally. It can therefore be argued that the Austrian 
police apologized to the wrong audience (i.e., to the people of Austria with whom they wish to 
maintain a positive relationship, but not to Brennan, the victim of the offence). This is another 
sign that the Austrian police apologize in their own interest and not in order to reconcile with the 
victim (cf. chapter 4.3.2.3.1).
 8.3.3 Content of the public apologies
In their first statement, the Austrian police (cf.2) are buying time by stating generalities which 
are probably meant to sound reassuring to the public. Among other things, an examination of the 
case,  clear  consequences  and  an  apology are  promised.  (strategy Austria1:  Ingratiation  and 
corrective action,  according to Coombs, cf. Chapter  4.4.2.5). The first statement given by the 
British police also includes generalities which are probably uttered to reassure the public that the 
police are competent (cf.1) (strategyUK1: Ingratiation).
 The second statement of the Austrian police (cf.4) expresses regret (but only for the mix-
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up, not for the injuries and the pain the police have caused him) and states that an attempt to 
offer an apology has been made. It does not contain an apology directed at the victim but shifts 
the  blame for  the incident  onto him (strategy A2:  denial:shift  blame79).  In  their  next  public 
statement (cf.7) the police accuse Brennan of exaggerating and imply that he is lying (strategy 
A3: attack accuser). The attack accuser strategy is applied again, when the police claim to be in 
contact with a witness who can testify that Brennan is playing a show for the media and not as 
badly injured as he says (APA 2009d). In the fourth public statement (cf.8) the Polizeipräsident 
offers  his  explicit  regret  for  the  mix-up.  The  adjective  “ausdrücklich”  (explicit)  accentuates 
Pürstl's  regret.  Adjectives  like  “sincere,  deep  or  honest”  would  be  stressing  an  inner 
predisposition to uttering these words of regrets, something which Pürstl does not seem to be 
willing to do: His words of regret are not addressed to the victim himself, even though he is 
sitting in the same room.  This suggests that the “explicit regret” is directed towards journalists 
and the viewers of the TV-show but not in particular to the victim. The expression of regret is 
followed  by  the  strategy  of  justification  (cf.  chapter  4.4.2.5)  when  Pürstl  states  that  what 
happened at  Spittelau can happen in  the best  police forces (strategy A4:  justification). Then 
Pürstl  backs up the course of events as presented by the accused policemen, thus implicitly 
accusing Brennan of not telling the truth (attack accuser). 
The British police applies strategies closer to the accommodative end (cf. the defensive-
accommodative continuum by Coombs, chapter  4.4.2.5). For instance, in the second statement 
(cf. 2) Blair says that the Met accept full responsibility and offer their “deep regrets” (strategy 
UK2: Full apology). It becomes obvious, however, that this full apology is not meant seriously 
when in the same statement Blair argues that it really is the terrorists who bear responsibility for 
the killing (strategy UK3: denial: shift blame). To accept full responsibility and shift the blame in 
the same statement is contradictory. Another controversy can be found in this speech, this time 
regarding the strategy of corrective action. Blair states that “everything is done to make it right” 
(strategy UK4:  corrective  action).  This  promise  together  with  an unequivocal  acceptance  of 
responsibility would very likely convince the public that the Met mean what they say. As pointed 
out in chapter  8.2.2,  mortification80 as an image repair  strategy on behalf of an organization is 
credible  when accompanied by  corrective action.  But the Met further state  that  “we're quite 
79 Shift blame is not an explicit strategy in Coomb's continuum. I argue that depending on the wording of the 
statement shifting blame could fall in the categories of excuse (admits that there is a crisis but minimizes  
organizational responsibility for it) or denial ( claims there is no crisis or that the organization is uninvolved).  
Benoit, however, explicitly states shift blame as a subcategory of denial and I will stick to his subdivision.
80 Coombs uses the term Full apology to describe the strategy of apologizing.  Benoit names the same strategy 
mortification. When referring to Benoit's advice on image repair work I am using his term. 
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comfortable the [shoot-to-kill] policy is right” and that “[the rules] have to be that”. Thus also 
the strategy of corrective action is made implausible by contradicting statements. 
The Met is supported in its strategy of shifting blame by the mayor of London (cf.3). The 
strategy of ingratiation (i.e., trying to create positive impressions of the organization) is applied 
again by the Home Secretary when she states that the police “were trying to do their very best” 
and have her full support (cf. 4). The same message is sent by the Prime Minister (cf.8). The 
Foreign Secretary applies the strategy of corrective action by promising a thorough investigation 
(cf.7). 
An interesting aspect  is  that  in court  both police forces use defensive strategies. The 
lawyer of the Austrian police shifts blame onto Brennan when he claims that Brennan bears guilt 
because he let the situation escalate (cf.12). By doing so, he repeats the accusation that the police 
raised against Brennan earlier on (cf.4). The British police drop their accommodative strategies 
in the trial over health and safety regulations. Instead they choose the strategy of  denial (shift  
blame),  which is contradictory to the  full apology and  corrective action  strategies which they 
used in public.  Denial (shift blame), the most defensive strategy that the Met ever use, is not 
applied in public statements, only in the court hearing. This may be because the Met want to 
harvest  advantages  in  court,  without  facing  further  threats  to  their  image in  public.  The  de 
Menezes family are aware of the contradiction between strategies applied in court and out of 
court and state that attacking de Menezes in order to defend the police undermines the apologies 
which were given by senior officers (cf.22).  
On Coombs' continuum for the analysis of crisis situations (cf. Figure 2), both crises can 
be placed between transgression and accident. According to Coombs, such a crisis should be 
responded to with strategies from the accommodative end of the continuum of crisis response 
strategies.  Austrian  police,  however,  refuse  to  admit  that  what  they  did  to  Brennan  is  a 
transgression. They portray the incident as an accident for which they bear no responsibility and 
choose their crisis response strategies accordingly (and even further to the defensive end of the 
continuum than advised for an accident). Brennan and most media, on the other hand, portray the 
incident as a clear transgression, which would require accommodative response strategies. As 
there is no investigation that would prove one party right, the means to judge the incident is the 
final verdict which finds the policeman guilty. This verdict communicates that the policeman 
bears responsibility and that Brennan's injuries are not the result of a mere accident. Thus, latest 
after  the  verdict,  an  accommodative  response  strategy  is  advisable  for  the  Austrian  police. 
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However, the police do not comment and the policeman himself merely says that it is sad how 
the media pre-judged him.
To  sum  up,  Austrian  police  use  the  strategies  of  ingratiation,  corrective  action, 
justification, denial (shift blame) and attack accuser which can be placed on the defensive end of 
the continuum, with attack accuser being the most defensive strategy on the scale. The British 
police  choose  the  strategies  of full  apology,  corrective  action,  ingratiation  and denial  (shift  
blame)  to repair its image, thus applying strategies from the accommodative end (full apology 
being  the  most  accommodative  strategy).  The  British  choice  of  strategies  is  aligned  with 
Coombs' advice that a crisis for which the organization bears “personal” control should be met 
with  victim-centred  strategies  from  the  accommodative  end  of  the  scale.  This  means,  that 
according to Coombs' theory, the British crisis response is the more suitable one. 
 8.3.4 Action taken accompanying the public statements 
So far, I have taken the spoken statements into account and come to the conclusion that the Met 
use victim-centred strategies as advised by Coombs – but to apply such strategies takes more 
than  verbally  committing  to  them.  Therefore,  I  will  now compare  how, if  at  all,  the  verbal 
strategies are followed up by actions. 
As pointed out above, the British full apology is negated in the same statement in which it 
occurs. Also, the police are reported to have defended themselves in court by shifting  blame on 
to  the  victim  (cf.22),  which  of  course  contradicts  the  police's  initial  public  acceptance  of 
responsibility.  The  family point  out  this  incompatibility  and argue  that  public  apologies  are 
rendered meaningless by the police's defence. Thus, it can be concluded that the verbal strategy 
of full apology  is not mirrored in police action. 
The  promise  of  corrective  action is,  at  least  partly,  fulfilled  by  the  two  IPCC 
investigations,  which  are  launched to  learn  lessons  from the  incident  (Crawford 2008).  The 
leaked documents from the first investigation make clear that the police did not behave correctly 
(cf.11). In the course of these investigations, lies have been revealed and stories which have 
“come up” in the police's favour have been proven to be wrong (e.g. the story about the bulky 
jacket or that de Menezes jumped the ticket barriers). The fact that two (expensive) independent 
investigations were launched shows that an effort was put into revealing the truth. However, 
when  the  IPCC  decides  that  none  of  the  police  officers  involved  in  the  killing  will  face 
disciplinary action, the benefit of having the IPCC as an independent commission is questioned. 
The IPCC is accused of being ineffective and no better than the police internal investigation 
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department it replaced (cf.25). Thus, the strategy of corrective action is followed through in so 
far as investigations were launched and that the police action that led to the death is revealed in 
public. What is missing, are consequences for the policemen involved.
The  Austrian  police  mainly  use  defensive  strategies,  and  it  is  only  the  promise  of 
corrective action  given by Landespolizeikommandant Mahrer (cf.2) which requires follow-up 
action in order to be fulfilled. 
Mahrer promised that allegations against the police would be looked into and taken seriously and 
that  there  would  be  clear  consequences  once  the  investigations  are  completed.  Those 
investigations, however, are run by an office which is subordinate to the Austrian police (i.e., the 
BBE). An independent investigation is demanded by Brennan's lawyer (Klenk 2009b), but not 
carried out. The police-internal investigation concludes that Brennan's injuries are not due to 
deliberate bodily harm: It is claimed that the policemen had to use bodily force because Brennan 
refused to obey (Mayr 2010). 
While the investigation in the UK brings to light the facts about police procedure, this is 
not the case in Austria. This may partly be blamed on the police-internal investigation but also on 
the lack of CCTV recordings and the fact that no witnesses step forward and volunteer to speak 
out. Therefore, the only material available to come to a conclusion about what really happened 
on that February 11 are the two versions of the story and Brennan's injuries.  The police,  of 
course, discredit  Brennan's version altogether and state that nothing was done wrong and that 
only the mix-up is regrettable. Therefore it can be doubted that the corrective action promised by 
Mahrer (cf.2) has any effect on the police at all. Also, because the internal investigation finds no 
errors, there is apparently no need for the clear consequences that Mahrer had promised. Had 
there been an investigation into the case, the police might not have been able to hold on to their 
portrayal of the incident. The Austrian promise of corrective action appears to have been uttered 
merely as a component of the ingratiation strategy, but with no intention to be fulfilled. 
At first sight, the British way of dealing with the crisis appears to be the more suitable 
one. By applying victim-centred crisis-response strategies, the Met respond well to the crisis type 
at hand. However, the Met's actions do not always mirror the verbal strategies and sometimes 
even contradict the oral statements (e.g., Blair promising that “everything is done to make it 
right”  while  at  the  same time attempting  to  stop  an  independent  investigation  into  the  case 
cf.2,11). The actions that the Met take are not of the accommodative, victim-centred kind. E.g., 
the attempt to stop the investigation, the retention of the shoot-to-kill policy, the police's defence 
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in court. 
I am under the impression that the Met are very skilled with words, but not interested in 
following up these words with actions. Thus, the actions of the Met are not too different from the 
actions taken by the Austrian police: The Met (unsuccessfully) attempt to avoid an independent 
investigation – the Austrian police (successfully) do not allow an independent investigation. In 
court, the Met shift blame for the incident on to the victim – so do the Austrian police. There is 
no change in the shoot-to-kill policy which led to the death – neither is there a change of policy 
in Austria. None of the Met police officers involved face disciplinary action – neither do Austrian 
police officers.  The main differences between the two events concern the clearing up of the 
inconsistencies (which, in de Menezes' case was mostly achieved by the IPCC and the inquest, 
but not at all in Brennan's case) and the approach towards the victims (accommodative strategies 
in the UK, defensive strategies in Austria). To sum up, the Austrian police stick to defensive 
strategies in their actions and oral statements while the British police pursue defensive strategies 
in their actions and accommodative strategies in their oral statements. 
I  agree  with the  Guardian (2005,  cf.  5)  that  it  is  to  the  Met's  credit  that  they offer 
statements of regret and break with the “tradition of prevarication” (ibid.). The Austrian police 
appear not to be ready to do so yet. This is also criticised by Lorenz (ORF 2009c, Min. 8:50; 
ORF 2009d, Min.0:00), who states that in case of accusations, to be on the safe side, the Austrian 
police and Home Secretary first of all stand behind the accused police officers. This is exactly 
what was done in Brennan's case. And this is also what was done in de Menezes' case. However, 
the  British  police,  over  and  above  statements  of  support  for  its  staff,  also  issue  apologetic 
statements to the victims. 
 9  Conclusion
I argue that if judged by their actions both police forces respond similarly and follow defensive 
strategies. If  judged by their public statements however, the British police can be said to have 
responded in a more sophisticated way than the Austrian police, who stuck to their defensive 
strategies also in oral statements. It appears that both police forces find it hard to admit guilt and 
to take blame for their wrongdoing. This is mirrored in their actions. Their communicative style, 
however, differs and this may be due to the cultural norms which are prevalent in each society. 
“Orientation towards other” and “orientation towards addressee” have been pointed out 
by  House  (2006a,  cf.  chapter  6.1.1.4)  to  be  English  communicative  styles,  in  contrast  to 
“orientation  towards  self”  and  “orientation  towards  content”  which  she  finds  to  be  German 
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communicative styles. In the course of my research I came across an article dealing with “the 
things that really make Britain great” (Aitch 2008). “Apologising” is listed as item number three 
on this list and the author argues that “Brits are apologetic to the point of irritation” (ibid.). The 
website “Icons”  (http://www.icons.org.uk/nom/nominations/sorry, 13 April 2011) has nominated 
“sorry” as an icon that represents England. Saying sorry is described as an “expression of light 
regret” and “not necessarily the same thing as apologising” and it is pointed out the British “say 
sorry before complaining […] and also when asking somebody for information”. On the other 
hand, a  News.at  article (Hoa 2010) describes Austrians as particularly unwilling to apologize. 
These three texts are, of course, no academic sources, but they may help describe a tendency 
which  is  also  present  in  House's  research.  They  suggest  that  apologizing  has  a  different 
connotation in the UK than it has in Austria. In the UK, apologizing may be an expression of the 
addressee-oriented communicative style and as such used more easily by members of the British 
cultural group.  
It can be argued that the English communicative style is reflected in the Met's victim 
centred oral response strategies. Even though the British police initially deny their guilt for the 
killing  as  much  as  the  Austrian  police  deny  guilt  for  Brennan's  injuries,  the  British 
communicative style has influence in so far as concern for the victim is expressed nevertheless. 
In  Austria,  where orientation towards the addressee is  not  valued that  highly,  no concern is 
expressed for the victim. 
At this point the question arises, which of the two crisis responses is the better one? To 
answer this question I would again like to bring up Wierzbicka (1985a) who compared Polish 
speech acts to English speech acts and found that the difference in style depends on the different 
cultural traditions and values that these communities hold dear (1985a: 167). She finds that in 
Polish culture  cordiality is valued, while in Anglo-Saxon culture  autonomy of the individual is 
important. It is impossible to argue that one of these values or communicational styles is, per se, 
better – they are simply different. I argue that the same holds true for the differences in police 
crisis  responses.  The  Austrian  police  do  not  put  an  effort  into  glossing  over  their  public 
statements and they do not show concern for the victim when none is to be expected in their 
actions. The British police, on the other hand, issue sophisticated public statements and express 
concern for  the  victim which,  however,  is  not  followed up in  their  actions.  Which of  these 
approaches is deemed to be better depends on the values that are important to the beholder and 
cannot be decided once and for all. 
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In the introduction I established that the  purpose of this thesis is to find out whether a 
culture's distinctive interactional style can be tracked down in the public speech act of apology. 
This case study constitutes one step towards being able to answer this question, and it suggests 
that cultural values and preferences in interactional style indeed influence public apologies. 
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Press Releases by the Austrian police
Misshandlungsvorwurf gegen Polizisten  - versendet am 16.02.2009
Wien  (OTS)  -  Am  11.  Februar  2009  erfolgte  die  Festnahme  eines  Verdächtigen  wegen 
Suchtmittelhandels  in  der  U-Bahnstation  Spittelau.  Im  Zuge  dieser  Festnahme  kam  es  zur 
Anwendung von Körperkraft seitens der Beamten. Dabei wurde der Mann verletzt.  Bereits nach 
kurzer  Zeit  stellte  sich  jedoch  heraus,  dass  es  sich  um eine  Verwechslung  handelte,  da  die 
Personsbeschreibung nahezu ident mit  einem Verdächtigen war.  In weiterer Folge wurde der 
Verletzte im Krankenhaus ambulant behandelt. Der tatsächliche Verdächtige, der sich im selben 
Waggon aufgehalten  hatte  und in  der  Station  ausstieg,  versuchte  vorerst  zu  flüchten,  wurde 
jedoch schließlich angehalten und festgenommen. Nach Bekanntwerden der Verwechslung und 
der  damit  verbundenen  Verletzungen  wurde  das  Büro  für  Besondere  Ermittlungen  mit 
Erhebungen beauftragt. Dieses Büro hat am 12. Februar einen Bericht an die Staatsanwaltschaft 
Wien übermittelt, der Menschenrechtsbeirat wurde informiert. Derzeit sind noch Einvernahmen 
von Zeugen ausständig.  Allfällige dienst-  und disziplinarrechtliche Maßnahmen werden nach 
Vorlage aller Ermittlungsergebnisse überprüft.  Die Wiener Polizei bedauert die stattgefundene 
Verwechslung.  Unmittelbar  nach  der  Amtshandlung  erfolgte  eine  Kontaktaufnahme mit  dem 
Betroffenen,  um sich  zu  entschuldigen,  wobei  lediglich  die  Lebensgefährtin  erreicht  wurde. 
Grundsätzlich  sind  Verwechslungen  von  Personen  mit  ähnlicher  Statur,  Kleidung,  etc.  nicht 
auszuschließen.  Durch  Einhaltung  der  Mitwirkungspflichten  seitens  der  Betroffenen  an  der 
Klärung des Sachverhaltes kann ein derartiger Irrtum jedoch rasch geklärt werden. Für allfällige 
Rückfragen steht Iris Seper unter der Telefonnummer 31310 72114 zu Verfügung.
Bpd/16.02
Verwechslung bei Suchtmittel-Schwerpunkt. Nachtrag zu Pol. 5/16.02  =
Wien  (OTS)  -  Nach  den  Behauptungen  des  Mike  B.,  am 11.  Februar  2009  im Zuge  einer 
Verwechslung bei einem Suchtmittelschwerpunkt im Bereich der Linie U6 misshandelt worden 
zu sein,  nahm das Büro für Besondere Ermittlungen Erhebungen auf.  Nach dem vorläufigen 
Abschluss  stellt  die  Bundespolizeidirektion  Wien  zusammenfassend  fest:  Bei  intensiven 
Fahndungsmaßnahmen nach einem Suchtmittelhändler  kam es zur erwähnten Verwechslung. 
Dieser  Einzelfall  wurde  von  der  Bundespolizeidirektion  Wien  ausdrücklich  und  mehrmals 
bedauert.  Versuche  mit  dem  Betroffenen  in  Kontakt  zu  treten,  blieben  vorerst  erfolglos. 
Daraufhin wurde am 18. Februar 2009 mit seinem Rechtsvertreter Kontakt aufgenommen und 
angeboten, seinem Klienten das Bedauern in einem persönlichen Gespräch auszudrücken.
Zu den Behauptungen des Mike B., er sei im Zuge der Anhaltung vorsätzlich verletzt worden, 
wurden auch unbeteiligte Zeugen einvernommen. Die Behauptungen des Betroffenen konnten 
durch das Büro für Besondere Ermittlungen aus dienst-  und disziplinarrechtlicher Sicht nicht 
bestätigt  werden.  Vielmehr  wird  verdeutlicht,  dass  sich  die  einschreitenden  Polizisten 
ordnungsgemäß zu erkennen gegeben  haben.  Nach derzeitigem Ermittlungsstand widersetzte 
sich der Angehaltene der Amtshandlung, was im Zuge der Eigensicherung der  Beamten zur 
Anwendung von Körperkraft führte. Dies führte auch zu den Verletzungen des Betroffenen. Die 
Überprüfung der rechtlichen Zulässigkeit der Anwendung der Körperkraft obliegt jedoch auch 
der  Staatsanwaltschaft.  Nach  Vorliegen  derzeitiger  Ermittlungsergebnisse  werden  bis  zur 
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Entscheidung der Staatsanwaltschaft keine dienst- und disziplinarrechtlichen Maßnahmen gegen 
die einschreitenden Polizeibeamten gesetzt. 
German summary 
In  dieser  Arbeit  beschäftige  ich  mich  mit  Entschuldigungen  im  öffentlichen  Raum.  “Sich 
entschuldigen” wird allerdings als weiter Begriff gesehen und schließt alle Sprechakte ein, mit 
denen ein Image nach einer Krise wieder aufpoliert werden kann. Das Ziel meiner Arbeit ist es 
herauszufinden,  ob  es  kulturell  bedingte  Unterschiede  im  verbalen  Krisenmanagement  gibt. 
Hierzu  vergleiche  ich  den  Fall  einer  öffentlichen  Entschuldigung  aus  Österreich  mit  einem 
vergleichbaren Fall einer öffentlichen Entschuldigung aus Großbritannien. 
Das erste Kapitel ist eine Einleitung in die Arbeit und stellt unter anderem die interkulturelle 
Pragmatik, die sich mit der Verbindung zwischen Sprache und Kultur beschäftigt, vor. Danach 
wird  ein  Einblick  in  die  Sprechakttheorie  gegeben:  Kapitel  2  geht  auf  Austins  Theorie  und 
Searles Dreiteilung des Sprechakts in Lokution,  Perlokution und Illokution ein.  Weiters  wird 
hervorgehoben, dass illokutionäre Akte zwar universal, d.h. in allen Sprachen vorhanden sind, 
deren  Realisierung  aber  stark  von  den  kulturellen  Gegebenheiten  abhängig  ist.  Aus  diesem 
Grund können keine allgemein gültigen Regeln aufgestellt werden, die einen Sprechakt für alle 
Sprachen und Kulturen erklären und dessen korrekte Anwendung festlegen würden. Dies trifft 
natürlich auch auf Entschuldigungen zu: Was in einer Kultur als angemessene Entschuldigung 
zählt, kann in einem anderen kulturellen Umfeld als unpassend gedeutet werden. Die Studien des 
CCSARP-Projekts (Cross Cultural Speech Act Realization Patterns project) zielen darauf ab, die 
kulturellen Unterschiede in der Realisierung von Sprechakten aufzuzeigen. 
Studien  dieser  Art  legen  den  Fokus  meist  auf  interpersonale, private  Sprechakte. 
Dementsprechend gibt  es  für  Entschuldigungen zwischen zwei  Personen -  einem Opfer  und 
einem Täter - mehrere Definitionen. Diese werden im dritten Kapitel vorgestellt,  in dem  “sich 
entschuldigen”  auch aus  moralischer  Sicht  erläutert  wird und die  Bedingungen,  die  für  eine 
ehrliche  Entschuldigung  gegeben  sein  müssen,  geklärt  werden.  Außerdem  werden  die 
etymologischen  Wurzeln  von  “apologize”  aufgezeigt.  Vom griechischen  apologia kommend 
hatte  apologize keineswegs  schon  immer  die  heutige  Bedeutung.  Diese  hat  sich  über  die 
Jahrhunderte  hinweg von  apologia  als  Verteidigungsrede zu  apology  als  Ausdruck der  Reue 
entwickelt. 
Der  erste  Abschnitt  des  vierten  Kapitels  behandelt  Entschuldigungen  im öffentlichen 
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Raum und wie sie sich von privaten Entschuldigungen unterscheiden. Von zentraler Bedeutung 
ist  Ellwangers  Theorie,  die  sich  mit  dem  Diskurs  um  öffentliche  Entschuldigungen 
auseinandersetzt. Ellwanger zeigt, dass öffentliche Entschuldigungen andere Ziele verfolgen als 
private  Entschuldigungen.  Bei  öffentlichen Entschuldigungen zwingt  das  Opfer  den Täter  zu 
einer  Entschuldigung,  um  ihn  öffentlich  zu  blamieren.  Ziel  des  Diskurses  öffentlicher 
Entschuldigungen ist daher keineswegs eine Versöhnung, sondern eine Art Rache des Opfers, die 
öffentlich aufzeigt,  dass der  Täter sich nicht so verhalten darf  wie er  sich verhalten hat.  Im 
letzten  Abschnitt  des  vierten  Kapitels  wird  auf  öffentliche  Entschuldigungen  als  Mittel  der 
Image-Wiederherstellung  im  PR-Bereich  eingegangen.  Benoits  und  Coombs  Ratschläge  zu 
erfolgreichem Krisenmanagagement und die Rolle der öffentlichen Entschuldigung im Bereich 
der Image-Wiederherstellung werden hier erläutert. 
Kapitel  5  ist  eine  Einleitung  zu  meiner  Fallstudie.  Durch  die  Analyse  öffentlicher 
Entschuldigungen in Österreich und Großbritannien möchte ich herausfinden welche Werte in 
der jeweiligen Kultur von Bedeutung sind und den Diskurs beeinflussen. 
Kapitel 6 zeigt die in diesem Themengebiet schon vorhandenen Studien. Von besonderer 
Bedeutung  sind  Houses  Studien,  da  diese  den  angelsächsischen  und  deutschen  Kulturkreis 
betreffen und erste Schlüsse über den kommunikativen Stil in der jeweiligen Kultur bieten. 
In Kapitel 7 beschreibe ich wie ich zu dem Schluss gekommen bin, die Fallstudie als 
Methode meiner Untersuchung auszuwählen und welche Kriterien für die Auswahl der Daten 
festgelegt wurden. 
In Kapitel 8 wird das Krisenmanagement der österreichischen und der britischen Polizei 
unter vergleichbaren Umständen dargestellt und analysiert. 
Kapitel  9  zeigt  abschließend  auf,  dass  das  verbale  Krisenmanagement  der  Polizeien 
voneinander abweicht, während in ihren Aktionen (die die Polizeien als Reaktion auf die Krise 
setzen) ähnliche Strategien verwendet werden. Ich komme zu dem Schluss, dass - zumindest in 
den hier analysierten Fällen -  kulturelle Werte sehr wohl einen Einfluss auf Entschuldigungen 
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